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The Harbin Jewish Community and the Regional Conflicts of Northeast China, 1903-1963  
Ming Hui Pan, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2020 
This study examines the historical development of the Harbin Jewish community in 
Northeast China from its beginning in the early 1900s to its end in the 1960s. Scholars seldom 
pay enough attention to the Harbin Jewish community, the largest and most influential Jewish 
community in Asia. This study aims to fill this significant geopolitical gap of the history of Jews 
in the East.  
I develop two major narrative strategies in locating the Harbin Jewish Community in its 
historical map: (1) chronologically intertwining the development of the Harbin Jewish 
community within the local history of Harbin, by examining the relations between the Harbin 
Jewish community and its changing governors, namely, the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese 
policies towards the Jews; (2) investigating in parallel the contacts between the Harbin Jewish 
community with its contemporary Jewish communities in Shanghai, Europe and the United 
States, especially during the globally influential World War I and World War II period. 
This study challenges the argument that the Chinese and the Jews did not cross paths in 
these important historical events mentioned above. By tracing the history of the Harbin Jewish 
community, this study demonstrates that Jewish experience in China must be perceived as a 
whole and the survival of the Jewish refugees in Shanghai during the Holocaust in WWII should 
be put into its historical context rather than a single historical accident. The Harbin Jewish 
community thereby has an enduring legacy in the reconstruction of postmodern historiography 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The modern era full of conflicts ended with the two World Wars in the middle of the 20
th
 
century. In the case of the Harbin Jewish community in Northeast China (an area traditionally 
known as Manchuria), conflicts and wars run through all its existence from 1903 to 1963: first, 
the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05; and then, the First World War (WWI); the Sino-Soviet 
Conflict of 1929; Japanese aggression of Manchuria in 1931; finally, the Second World War 
(WWII). The history of the Harbin Jewish community was affected by all these conflicts of the 
last century. In this case study of the Harbin Jewish community, we wish to learn from the past, 
prompt cross-cultural understanding, and build a better and peaceful future for all nations 
together.   
1.1.The Significance of the Harbin Jewish Community in Jewish and Chinese History 
1.1.1. The History Gap of Jews in China  
 
When talking about Jews of China, people either think of the Kaifeng Jews in ancient 
time (since the Northern Song Dynasty, 960-1127) or the temporary European Jewish refugee 
camps in Shanghai during WWII. The Harbin Jewish community in Northeast China, a Jewish 
center in Asia which rose after WWI, had been overlooked. There is no monograph on the 
history of Harbin Jews in Western academic circles. It was generally believed that “except for 
some cherished memories, China left no imprint on Jewish life and the Jews left no mark on 
Chinese history.”1   
                                                             
1 Irene Eber, “Passage through China,” The Jerusalem Post, International Edition, Week ending 5 July 1986, p16, 
cited in Felix Patrikeeff, Russian Politics in Exile: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924-1931 (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 2002), 165, note 39.  
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However, the survival of more than 20,000 Jews in Shanghai during the Holocaust is not 
an accident. It is related to the half century of the development of the Harbin Jewish community 
in China. During the two World Wars period, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees passed 
through Northeast China on Russia’s eastern border. The Jewish communities in China were all 
related to each other, and had a close tie with the Jewish communities in the United States. It is 
well known that the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) supported the 
Shanghai Jews in WWII, but before that, JDC had already extended its influence to Harbin in 
WWI (see Chapter 2).  
Existing historical works have not revealed these connections between Jews in Shanghai 
and in Harbin, and their contacts with the world Jewry. This study argues that Jewish experience 
in China must be seen as a whole, and the survival of Jews in Shanghai should be put into its 
historical context.  
1.1.2.  The Harbin Jewish Community in the Geopolitics of Modern Time 
 
The development of Jewish communities in China constitutes an indispensable part of 
Jewish history in modern times. At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, Russian Jewish immigrants 
established the Harbin Jewish community. At its peak, the Harbin Jewish community hosted 
20,000 to 30,000 Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe in the 1920s. The study of the Harbin 
Jewish community in China will absolutely enrich and diversify our understanding of Russian 
Jewish communities in the Diaspora.  
On the one hand, this study endeavours to embed the Jewish experience of China into 
modern Jewish history. Lloyd P. Gartner concludes that there were three influential movements 
in twentieth-century Jewish history – Zionism, Holocaust and Migration: 
3 
 
Comprehending twentieth-century Jewish history requires the realization that 
three vast movements in one way or another engulfed almost the entire Jewish people. 
One is Zionism, the Jewish national movement, which led to the founding and rapid 
growth of the new State of Israel. Second is its antithesis, the systematic mass murder of 
nearly six million Jews, now called the Holocaust, during the Second World War, and the 
destruction of their communities…. the third great movement was literally movement and 
hardly claimed any ideology. It is the voluntary international migration of millions of 
Jews, mostly hungry and needy, to many new countries, above all the United States.
2
 
Similar to the development of the Jewish communities in the United States, the Harbin 
Jewish community was the largest and most influential Russian Jewish center in China, and it 
shared many characteristics with other parallel Jewish communities in the West. The events of 
Emigration, Zionism, and Holocaust all shaped, reshaped and finally transformed the Harbin 
Jewish community.  
On the other hand, my study is to construct the history of the Harbin Jewish community 
within its Chinese context. In the existing historical writings and the memoirs of Harbin Jews, 
the Chinese natives were invisible. Scholars pay attention to the Harbin Jewish community under 
the Russian domination in the 1910s and the Japanese occupation in the 1930s. However, 
Manchuria’s history was in the first place an integral part of Chinese history, despite Russian 
invasion and Japanese aggression. Initially, I examine the uphill political struggles of Harbin 
Jews under Chinese rule in the 1920s. 
From a postmodern historical perspective (cross-cultural, cross-national, and 
reconstruction),
3
 this study intertwines the development of the Harbin Jewish community within 
the chronological local history of Harbin in its Chinese backdrop. By embodying these general 
processes of Harbin Jews in specific local dynamics, it also allows Harbin Jews to speak to 
central historiographic concerns. In other words, divergent from the existing literature that 
                                                             
2 Lloyd P. Gartner, American and British Jews in the Age of the Great Migration (Lodon; Portland, OR: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2009), ix.  
3
 See Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History (Columbia University Press, 1988). 
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alienates Harbin Jews to its Chinese background, my historical narrative focuses the Harbin 
Jewish community in its dual contexts, both Jewish and Chinese.    
1.1.3.  On Modern Jewish and Chinese History 
 
If we agree with the analytical political view on history that “history is the mental form in 
which a civilization accounts for its past,”4 neither modern Jewish nor Chinese history was a 
happy one. Both modern Jewish and Chinese politics were born and developed in the turmoil and 
chaos of conflicts and wars of the late modern period. Different from the West whose history 
continued through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when the Chinese and the Eastern 
European Jews encountered modernity, they were totally cut off from traditional historical 
understanding and perspectives. To them, “tradition” was equated with “backwardness” and 
resulted in being beaten and massacred as oppressed nations. Struggling for national survival, 
both modern Jewish and Chinese histories were built on crisis and struggle.
5
  
In Eastern European Jewish history, the Jews became a “question” when the Russian 
Empire extended its influence to Poland-Lithuania and inherited the largest Jewish settlements 
during the three partitions of Poland in the late 18
th
 century. Jews were not allowed to move to 
inner Russia but were confined in the Russian western and southern borders, later known as the 
Pale of Settlement. After decades of reform, integration and assimilation, the majority of Jews in 
the Pale were still segregated from the dominant Russian society. Anti-Jewish persecution and 
violence were common, but the 1881 pogroms were a watershed. After the assassination of 
                                                             
4 Frank Ankersmit, “Manifesto for an analytical political history,” in Manifestos for History, eds. Keith Jenkins, Sue 
Morgan, and Alun Munslow (London: Routledge, 2007), 179. 
5  See Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 
(Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
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Alexander II in 1881, not only new residential, economic and educational restrictions to the Jews 
were imposed by the Russian authorities, but anti-Jewish pogroms, conducted by peasants, police 
and ordinary civilians, also reached its peak and were out of the Russian government’s control. 
As a response to the economic deprivation and pogrom violence, the great Jewish migration 
ensued.
6
 To escape pogroms, a group of Jewish immigrants sought safety in Northeast China. In 
this context of Jewish history, the Jews encountered the Chinese.  
However, during the time, the Chinese were in trouble too. By 1900, the powers – 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan – had guafen China. The Chinese word guafen 瓜分 
literarily means “cutting up a melon.” A German scholar traces the initial use of guafen in 
modern Chinese literature as a translation of the concept of the “Partition of Poland.”7 But later, 
China was carved up too. Being guafen was a key word to understand modern Chinese history. 
American Christian scholar, Gilbert Reid, wrote in 1921 that: “The contact of European 
civilization with the peoples of Asia and Africa, and the American continents, makes sad reading 
for the man of justice. As to the one country of China, with a long record of civilization, 
statecraft, philosophy, art and religion, the question arises, ‘Has China been blessed or cursed by 
Western civilization?’”8  
If we really want to understand the Chinese policy towards the Jews and the Jewish 
experience in China, we have to tell the tragic history of China's suffering and resistance from 
the perspective of those who went through it. In the sad havoc of the years, even though Qing 
                                                             
6 See John Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the "Jewish Question" in Russia, 1772-1825 (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1986); Irwin Michael Aronson, Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-
Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).  
7 Rudolf G. Wagner, “Dividing up the [Chinese] Melon, guafen 瓜分: The Fate of a Transcultural Metaphor in the 
Formation of National Myth,” in The Journal of Transcultural Studies, No.1, 2017, https://heiup.uni-
heidelberg.de/journals/index.php/transcultural/article/view/23700. 
8 Gilbert Reid, China, Captive or Free?: A Study of China's Entanglements (New York, N.Y.: Dodd, Mead and 
Company, 1921), 1. 
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China strove to self-strengthen, the failed domestic reforms of the late 19
th
 century only resulted 
in the radical Revolution of 1911. Furthermore, the loss of international recognition after WWI 
stirred up the New Cultural Movement. The national weakness and humiliation finally turned to 
cultural self-denial. In other words, the Chinese civilization shattered. Deviating from its 
traditional self-identified “Middle Kingdom” perspective, China began to see itself as a weak and 
small nation in the world.  
Struggling to save the nation determined modern Chinese politics and foreign policies, so 
China’s coherent ethnic policy was to ally with other oppressed, small and weak nations to 
counter imperialism. Therefore, both the Chinese nationalists and the warlord governments 
supported Zionism and they never allowed any persecution of Jews in the Chinese territories. 
When China and the United States finally allied in WWII, the Chinese and the American Jews 
sought to aid each other so the Chinese opened their door to the European Jewish refugees. From 
a postmodern perspective, this study for the first time illustrates the history of Jewish survival in 
China in its ignored Chinese context.   
1.2.The Japanese History Problem and the Jews  
 
Even though we should read the history of the Jews in China in its Chinese background, 
we cannot avoid referring to Japanese history and its historical problem. Regardless of the 
existing Jewish communities in Harbin and Shanghai, or the Chinese project of Jewish 
settlements in Hainan and Kunming (see Chapter 4), the Japanese Army either occupied or 
attacked these places one after another. In its propaganda, Japan made some similar Jewish 
settlement plans, but Japan in fact barred Jewish refugees in its controlled areas.  
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1.2.1. Japan’s Holy War 
 
Learning from the lesson of the Chinese vis-à-vis Western colonization, the Japanese 
quest for reform started in the Meiji era (1868-1912). Victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 
and the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 enabled Japan to escape the colonial fate suffered by other 
Asian nations. Having transformed itself into a world imperial power, Japan joined the rank of 
the “carving up” countries and expanded its power into China. Seizing the opportunity of WWI 
when Western influence weakened in Asia, Japan gained more territories in China and the 
Pacific, and prepared itself for becoming a supreme power in East Asia in the 1920s.  
The Japanese invasion of Northeast China in 1931, known as the Manchurian Crisis, 
marked a turning point in both domestic Japanese politics and its relations with the rest of the 
world. Withdrawn from the League of Nations in 1933, isolated Japan turned to extreme 
militaristic nationalism and aggression. Seeking to purge the Japanese state of all foreign 
influence, both from China and the West, “by the end of the 1930s, extreme nationalists had 
taken over the state by employing radical religious fundamentalist ideas to crush or sublimate the 
advocates of all competing ideologies.”9 Walter A. Skya, in his book Japan’s Holy War, argued 
that “the ideological equivalent of Nazism and Fascism in Japan was radical Shintō 
ultranationalism.”10  
To justify Japan’s wars, the radical Shintō ultra-nationalists embedded in people’s minds 
that “the Greater East Asian War [the Pacific War] was not merely a ‘defensive war (jiei nosen)’ 
to free the peoples in East Asia from Western imperialism by expelling the Europeans and the 
Americans, only to let each individual country in Asia go its own way…. the political aim of the 
                                                             
9 Walter A. Skya, Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of  a   al    n    l rana  onal s  (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 12. 
10 Ibid., 299. 
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Greater East Asian War was the consolidation of East Asia using the imperial way as the 
foundation of unity. This was to be a major stepping stone to the establishment of the Japan-
centered world order…. it was a ‘holy war.’” 11  Advocating religious purification and anti-
foreignism, the ideologists of State Shintō made the Japanese people believe that only “Holy” 
Japan could save the world. The Japanese emperor was deified and the soldiers who died for the 
emperor in the war were all enshrined. The radical Shintō ultranationalism not only justified 
Japan’s acts of terrorism, but finally also mobilized the Japanese to wage wars with both China 
and the United States in WWII. 
But more ironically and confusing for outsiders, after 1945 the Shintō Shrine continued to 
function as a national cultural heritage and to work closely with the government’s official 
historical narratives. The remains of the Class-A war criminals of WWII were enshrined in the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The Japanese prime ministers repeated visiting Yasukuni Shrine, mourning and 
honoring their “war heroes.” The Japanese textbooks seldom mention Japan’s war atrocities and 
the suffering they caused to other nations. Rather, Shintō nationalism remains a spiritual link 
from the Meiji Restoration, to the Greater East Asian War, the Allied occupation in postwar era, 
and Japan’s reconstruction until today. In other words, modern Japanese history maintains its 
“holiness” after WWII until today.12 
It is different from postwar Germans, who faced their history with guilt and repentance. 
Japan has not yet come to terms with the violence it perpetrated during WWII. On the contrary, 
by honoring its war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan keeps glorifying its national past. 
The way the Japanese treat their history, lacking awareness of its war atrocities and denying war 
                                                             
11 Ibid., 313. 
12 For details, see Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan's Unending Postwar (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2016).  
9 
 
responsibility, leads to diplomatic relationship crises with its neighbors, China and Korea. 
Nowadays, the Japanese historical problem has become a focus of intense political controversy 
internationally. 
1.2.2.  The Tokyo Trial 
 
After the Cold War, Asian Americans, especially the “comfort women” (sexual slaves for 
the Japanese Army), began to pursue redress for Japanese crimes in the U.S. judicial system in 
the 1990s. Subsequently, American historians and legal scholars have begun to think seriously 
about the Japanese war crimes and its historical problems. American scholars have explored 
several reasons for Japanese historical problems, of which the main cause was the politics of 
justice during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, known as the Tokyo Trial, in 
1946.  
In contrast to the Nuremberg Trial, which overturned the Nazi regime and severely 
sentenced the German war criminals, in the Tokyo Trial, only a small number of Japanese war 
criminals were prosecuted. The Japanese emperor and the wartime bureaucracy were all kept 
intact. Franziska Seraphim stated that “Emperor Hirohito, who had been the supreme commander 
of all Japanese military forces during the war, weathered the transition largely unscathed; he 
neither abdicated nor faced any criminal prosecution but instead was declared the symbolic 
cornerstone of Japan’s new peace constitution …. Further, although occupation authorities 
ordered the closing of some wartime ministries, large parts of the social and economic 
10 
 
bureaucracy remained intact and regained their position of power in the postwar political 
structure.”13  
In addition, “the realization that the war crimes trials had been selective was exacerbated” 
by the discovery that the U.S. authorities had “quietly given safe passage to the Japanese 
perpetrators of hideous medical experiments on prisoners of war and local people in Manchuria, 
in return for scientific information.”14 For scientific, military, and political purposes, America 
covered up Japanese biological warfare and obstructed justice at the Tokyo Trial.
15
 Moreover, 
the Tokyo Trial also failed to identify, prosecute, and punish the military system of comfort 
women, the forced labors, cannibalism and many other indisputable Japanese war crimes. 
Consequently, the victims of Japanese war crimes were largely marginalized and never received 
recompense for their suffering.
16
  
Given so many flaws of the Tokyo Trial, the scholars in Japanese War Criminals: The 
Politics of Justice after the Second World War explain that “from 1947 onward, most U.S. 
leaders were convinced that they should cultivate Japan as a Cold War ally rather than 
continuing to punish it as a wartime enemy.”17 Lisa Yoneyama in Cold War Ruins: Transpacific 
Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes, argues that “the pursuit of Japanese war 
                                                             
13  Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 319. 
14  Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt, and Dean Aszkielowicz, eds., Japanese War Criminals: The 
Politics of Justice After the Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 271.  
15 See Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-Up. 
(London: Routledge, 1994). The book has two parts: Part One recounted the establishment of Japanese biological 
death factories across China in Harbin, Changchun, and Nanjing; Part Two was about America’s cover up. Harris 
illustrated that America covered up the Japanese biological warfare (BW) because they did not see BW as severe 
war crime against humanity, but rather as a valuable scientific achievement. After the discovery of the “secret of 
secrets,” the American scientists and military preserved these data for themselves after the war. Also see Jeanne 
Guillemin, Hidden Atrocities: Japanese Germ Warfare and American Obstruction of Justice at the Tokyo Trial 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018). 
16 See Lisa Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).   
17 Wilson, Cribb, Trefalt, and Aszkielowicz, eds., Japanese War Criminals, 9.  
11 
 
criminals and other Allied moves to reckon with Japan after the war became hopelessly entwined 
with the politics of the cold war and with the legacy of colonialism in the region, which 
ultimately led to the failure of Allied justice.”18  
Killing more than 200,000 Japanese civilians in three days by atomic bombs, but leaving 
the war criminals free for political and practical purposes, Japanese American scholars question 
the American style of justice. Comparing the different approaches to history of the West and 
Japan, in the book On   e pers s en e of   e Japanese “H s ory Proble :” H storicism and the 
International Politics of History, the message of Hitomi Koyama is clear: since the colonial 
period until today, if all powers follow the rule of the jungle to fight for survival, why does only 
Japan have to pay a price for “history?”19 
1.2.3.  Effect on Jewish history 
 
The Japanese denial of war crimes and the American cover-up directly resulted in a 
Jewish illusion that Japan saved Jews in the Holocaust because Japan had not killed all the 
Jewish refugees in the Shanghai Ghetto that the Japanese discriminatively established in WWII. 
However, not killing does not mean saving or rescuing.  
Japan’s history problem caused many other associated problems, one of which was the 
use of Jews to justify Japan’s wars both during and after WWII. During the war, Japanese 
propaganda advocated German Nazism and used Jews as a means to justify its Greater East 
                                                             
18 Dean Aszkielowicz. Book Review on “Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese 
War Crimes” by Lisa Yoneyama, in The Journal of Japanese Studies 44, no. 1 (2018): 225-29: 225.  
19 See Hitomi Koyama, On the Persistence of the Japanese 'History Problem': Historicism and the International 
Politics of History (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018). 
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Asian War in domestic Japan.
20
 However, overseas, Japan attempted to appease international 
opposition by promising equal treatment to the Jews in Manchuria. More ironically, after the 
war, Japan kept using Jews to escape war responsibility. Japanese anti-Semites, such as 
Koreshige Inuzuka (1890-1965), the maker of the bluff fugu plan, turned themselves into Jew-
savers and escaped from being tried as war criminals.
21
 As a result, some postwar Jewish 
historians and scholars either were confused by the Japanese history problem or built their own 
work on it. 
This study clarifies that Jews in all sense were also victims of Japanese militarism in 
WWII. Because Russian Jews were an oppressed nation, Japan treated Russian Jews no different 
than other oppressed nations, the same as Chinese and Koreans. Jews also suffered from Japan’s 
atrocities in Northeast China in the 1930s (See Chapter 3). During the Holocaust, Japan further 
barred European Jewish refugees in its occupied areas. After Japan finally took over the 
Shanghai International Settlement in the wake of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan interned the 
Jewish refugees who escaped Nazi Germany by the assistance of Chinese authorities and 
American Jewish reliefs. From a comparative, transnational and comprehensive perspective of 
postmodern historiography, this study fairly argues that Jews were in fact one of the victims of 
Japan’s war atrocities.  
1.3.Chapters 
 
Based on the existing Chinese scholars’ archeological research on the Harbin Jewish 
community, this study reveals an international angle by applying the findings of Jewish historical 
                                                             
20 See Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), esp. last Chapter 
“The Imaginary Devil: Japanese Anti-Semitism.” 
21 For the political use of Jews in postwar Japan, see David G. Goodman, and Masanori Miyazawa, Jews in the 
Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2000), esp. Chapter 
VI, “Identification and Denial: The Uses of the Jews in the Postwar Period.”   
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records in the archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) from World War I to the present period. Therefore, instead of 
merely focusing on the Harbin Jewish community per se, this study will help address the lacunae 
in our understanding on the relations between the Harbin Jewish community with its changing 
governors during the regional conflicts among powers, as well as its relations with the Shanghai 
Jewish community. Thus, this study is divided into chapters chronologically.  
Chapter Two explores the origins of the Harbin Jewish community under Russian 
domination from 1903 to 1917. The fin de siècle Russian colonizers selected Harbin, a small fish 
village in Northeast China, as an administrative center for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). 
Consequently, Harbin boomed into a modern city at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. The CER 
was designed by Russia as the terminal of the Trans-Siberian Railroad whose construction 
resulted from Russia’s ambition to connect Europe, Russia, Siberia, and China. Russian Jewish 
immigrants spread to China from Russia as a result of the subsequent Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-05), a war fought for the control of Manchuria. Jews enjoyed almost all civil rights in 
Harbin in a time when anti-Semitic pogroms were rampant in Western Russia. This useful 
Jewish capital and commercial skills enhanced Russian economic power in Northeast China. 
Therefore, the Harbin Jewish community burgeoned on the border of Russia and China.   
WWI and the Russian Revolution of 1917 caused a new wave of Russian Jewish 
emigration from Eastern Europe to Harbin. Chapter Three shows that the Harbin Jewish 
community was not only transformed by the large number of WWI refugees, but it also 
experienced a new political atmosphere when the Chinese took charge of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. Under the brief rule of the Chinese authorities in the first half of the 1920s, Harbin 
grew into the major economic, political and religious Jewish center in Asia, comparable to its 
14 
 
contemporary Jewish communities in North America and Europe. However, the regional, 
national and revolutionary clashes among the Chinese, the White Russians and the Soviets in late 
1920s made the Harbin Jews’ situation precarious. The destabilization of the status of all these 
nations turned into disasters when the Japanese Guandong Army finally occupied Northeast 
China by force in the 1930s.  
In Chapter Four, I examine the development of anti-Semitism in the Japanese puppet 
state of Manchukuo and include it in the history of the worldwide rise of anti-Semitism between 
the two World Wars. The savage Japanese Gendarmerie almost did what the darkest regime did 
to the Jews in history – extorting Jewish money and expelling them by slander, kidnapping and 
murder. The Harbin Jewish community consequently declined and fell into the full control of the 
extreme Japanese militarists. 
In Chapter Five, within the context of Japan’s wars of aggression in Asia and 
international diplomacy during the Pacific War, I argue that China was not only a forgotten ally 
of the United States in WWII, but also an ignored rescuer of the Jews in the Holocaust. Indeed, 
by virtue of the Chinese government’s admission of Jews and American Jews’ support, a total of 
about 17,000 German and Austrian Jewish refugees successfully reached and settled in Shanghai. 
However, the Japanese halted the massive Jewish immigration to China by military force in late 
1939. As a weak and calculating power, Japan refrained from any actions that would provoke the 
West. By promising equal treatment to the Jews, Japan attempted to appease international 
opposition of its wars of aggression in Asia. However, Japan in fact banned Jewish refugees 
from the Japanese controlled areas, both in Harbin and Shanghai. A careful examination 
indicates that militarist Japan’s prejudice and persecution of the Jews shockingly coincided with 
Nazi Germany during WWII.  
15 
 
The Jewish communities in China left after WWII. However, in the new era after the 
foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, Jews that emigrated from China to the Holy Land 
maintained their special identity. The history of the former Harbin Jewish community now 
becomes a friendship tie between Jews and Chinese. The Epilogue illustrates the double 
nostalgia between Harbin and Jews, and its role in the economic, diplomatic and cultural 
relations between Israel and China. As we will see, the scale of the Harbin Jewish community is 
not large enough to be marked on the map, but its history will shed light on “the culture affected 
















                                                             
22 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial 
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Chapter II: The Origins of the Harbin Jewish Community under Russian Domination 
 
Since 1881, oppressive Tsarist policies towards Jews and waves of pogroms dominated 
Eastern Europe and facilitated the greatest Jewish Migration (1881-1914) in modern Jewish 
history. While millions of Jews arrived in the new world of the United States, Canada, West 
Europe and Palestine, a small group moved towards the East and ended up in Harbin, a 
burgeoning railway town on the Russian and Chinese border. 
At the end of 1890s, when Tsarist Russia extended its influence to Northeast China by the 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), Jews came along with the Russians and 
established their communities in China. In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the Harbin Jewish 
community arose. It created a unique Jewish immigrant culture in China and in turn, enriched the 
experiences of East European Jews in the Diaspora until today.      
2.1. Foundation of the Harbin Jewish Community 
 
The region of Northeast China, traditionally known as Manchuria, was the birthplace of 
the Manchu, who established the last dynasty of China – the Qing Dynasty. When imperialism 
escalated in the last decades of the 19
th
 century, Qing China was forced to cede North Manchuria 
to Russia and South Manchuria to Japan. During this time, another oppressed nation, the Jews, 
ventured to Manchuria and started a new life in Northeast China.   
2.1.1.  “Matey” Imperialists – Russia’s Expansion to China  
 
Qing China, since the 19
th
 century, became a major victim of imperialism. To make up its 
trade imbalance, Britain opened China’s door by force with the First Opium War (1840-42). The 
result of the Opium War was the signing of the unequal Treaty of Nanjing, which set up Canton, 
17 
 
Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai as treaty ports. Following Britain, under the legal guise 
of treaties, France, and Germany, as well as China’s neighbors Russia and Japan also expanded 
to China. Each power established its sphere of influence in their concessions by building houses 
and factories, exploiting natural resources and governing the natives.   
In the late modern period, imperialism became the world order, acting throughout Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia. In an article, "The Powers and the Partition of China," published in 
the North American Review in 1900, Gilbert Reid stated that “The scramble of European Powers 
has shifted from Constantinople to Peking, and into this scramble Japan and the United States 
have entered. The destiny of China seems to depend upon action taken in London, Berlin, St. 
Petersburg, Paris, and Tokyo.”23 The article continues to analyze the different interests of these 
powers in China.  
During the partition of China, the interests of the powers always conflicted with each 
other. After the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Japan became the biggest winner through 
China ceding Taiwan in the South and the Liaodong Peninsula in the North. Japan’s move 
directly affected the other powers’ interests, especially Russia, because Russia saw North China 
as its sphere of influence. Russia had already encroached China’s border territory along the 
Amur River since the mid-19
th
 century, but it did not get the chance to move into inner China.
24
 
In April 1895, Russia, France and Germany, in an action known as the “Triple Intervention,” 
forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. Thus, Russia made China her ally 
                                                             
23 Gilbert Reid, "The Powers and the Partition of China." The North American Review 170, no. 522 (1900): 634-41: 
634.  
24 Kwong Chi Man, War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria: Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique during the 
Northern Expedition (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 28. 
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against Japan and occupied Manchuria by building the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER, 
Zhongdong tielu 中东铁路).25  
The CER concession cutting through Manchuria was the shortest route to connect the 
Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, Russia’s only ice-free port on the Pacific Coast. The 
Trans-Siberian Railway, built between 1891 and 1896, accelerated Russian immigration and 
influence from Europe to Siberia and the Far East. The Trans-Siberian Railway was planned by 
Russia’s Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte (1849-1915), and was approved by the Tsar 
Alexander III (1845-1894). To emphasize the priority of this railway project, Alexander III 
appointed his heir the Tsarevich Nicholas Chairman of the Siberian Railway Committee and 
entrusted him with “the carrying out to the end of this Russian project of peace and 
enlightenment in the East.”26  
The Chinese were not interested in the Russian project of “enlightenment in the East,” 
but they were “overwhelmed by the Russian tenderings of friendship” against any future 
Japanese aggression.
27
 Therefore, the Qing general and diplomat, Li Hongzhang (李鸿章 1823-
1901), and Russia’s Finance Minister, Witte, signed the railway contract in Berlin in September 
1896. At the beginning, “because Li Hongzhang would not agree to a railroad owned or 
constructed by the Russian government, Witte agreed to put the railroad under the control of a 
nominally independent joint stock company called the Chinese Eastern Railway.”28 Through the 
Chinese Eastern Railway Company, Russia could be ceded a strip of land and obtain certain 
                                                             
25 For details of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Sino-Japanese-Russian diplomatic relations, see Immanuel C. 
 . Hs , The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp.332-48.   
26 J.N.Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1964), 110. 
27 Hs , The Rise of Modern China, 346.  
28 S.C.M.Paine, “The Chinese Eastern Railway from the First Sino-Japanese War until the Russo-Japanese War,” in 
Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China – An International History, eds. Bruce A. Elleman and Stephen 
Kotkin (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 17. 
19 
 
rights of jurisdiction, military control, taxation, and administration of the railway zone. However, 
in practice, it was hard to adhere to all these railway contractual stipulations. Interpreting the 
railway contract divergently, the Russians and the Chinese constantly fought with each other 
over control of the CER and the railway zone.
29
 As a result, the CER became a symbol of 
Russia’s expansion to Northeast China.  
 
 
Map 1: The Qing's Ruling Area Map  
(Map from https://www.chinahighlights.com/map/ancient-china-map/qing-dynasty-map.htm, accessed March 17, 
2019). 
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Map 2: Trans-Siberian, Trans-Mongolian, Trans-Manchurian… 
 (Map from http://www.seat61.com/Trans-Siberian.htm#.V3BoIfkrJdg, accessed Feb. 3, 2017) 
 
2.1.2.  Manchuria Before the Russians Came 
 
The three Northeast Provinces of China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), traditionally 
known as Manchuria, was the birthplace of the Manchus. The Manchus’ ancestors can be 
historically traced back to Sushen, Yilou, Wuji, Mohe, Bohai, and N zhen. According to 
Immanuel Hs , 
Historically, the Manchus were a hardy stock of the nomadic Jurched [女真
N zhen] tribe, living in what is today’s Manchuria where they subsisted by hunting and 
fishing. During the 12
th
 century they founded the Chin (Gold) dynasty (1115-1234), 
which had threatened the existence of the Southern Sung dynasty (1127-1279). Though 
conquered by the Mongols in the 13
th
 century, they regained something of their former 
independence under the Ming (1368-1643) emperors, who divided them into three 
commanderies: Chien-chou, Hai-his, and Yeh-jen. They sent horses, furs, and ginseng as 
tribute to the Ming court, and received Chinese agricultural products as gifts in return.
30
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In the early 17
th
 century, Nurhaci (1559-1626), the leader of the Jianzhou (Chien-chou) 
Left Branch, reorganized all the N zhen tribe into a military system, the Eight Banners, 
“whereby his warriors were organized into four companies (niru) of 300 men each, represented 
by banners of four different colors: yellow, white, blue, and red. By 1615 the number of 
companies had grown to 200, and four more banners were created, with the same four colors but 
bordered in red, except for the red banner itself, which had a white fringe. Later, the size of the 
banner (gusa or gusai) grew to 7,500 men, divided into five regiments (jalan), each of which 
comprised five companies (niru).”31  Every Manchu family belonged to a banner. When the 
Manchus extended to the South, they also added Eight Mongol and Eight Han Banners. The 
Eight Banner system strengthened the Manchus more than ever before so that they could finally 
overthrow the Ming Dynasty and establish the Qing Dynasty in Beijing in 1644.
32
  
In central China, the Manchus combined the banner-style military administration with the 
Han civil administration which was based on Confucianism. But to keep their Manchu identity, 
they barred Han Chinese immigration from the Northeast. In the mid-19
th
 century, when the 
Russians reached Eastern Siberia and further moved to Manchuria, the Qing Dynasty lifted the 
immigration ban and the influx of Han Chinese speeded up to the Northeast.
33
 According to R. 
K. I. Quested, “by 1895 Manchuria already contained a population of which the minimum 
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estimate is nearly six million, and the maximum in excess of 10 million, most of whom must 
have been Chinese.”34  
The Heilongjiang Province adjoining Siberia was the northernmost province of China. 
The population of Heilongjiang Province was 26,000 in 1734, and increased to 444,000 in 
1812.
35
 Numerous hereditary Manchu banner-style towns were scattered across this area. When 
the Han Chinese settled, they established the Han banner system and integrated into the Manchu 
society.
36
 Gradually, “the different old customs of Manchu and Han became similar after a long 
period of acculturation.”37 My grandfather’s family belonged to the 4th camp of the bordered 
yellow banner (xianghuang situn 镶黄四屯) in Shuangcheng, a typical Manchu town. My father 
remembered that his grandmother spoke a few Manchu words, and his grandfather left him a set 
of the Confucian Four Books
38
. But in my generation, nothing was left, either of the Manchus or 
the Confucians.  
In early 1897, the Russians arrived in Manchuria. To avoid civil disputes with the natives, 
the Russians did not build their railway administration center in the existing Manchu towns. 
Instead, the Russian railway engineers chose a sparsely populated fishing village known as 
Harbin, from where they began to construct the CER. Geographically, Harbin was located in the 
                                                             
34 R. K. I. Quested, "Matey" Imperialists: the Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917 (Hong Kong: Centre of 
Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1982), 9.  
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1998), 43. 
36 For the development of the Han banners in South Manchuria, see Yoshiki Enatsu, Banner Legacy: The Rise of the 
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37 Kwong, War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria, 37. 
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center of North Manchuria, near Acheng, N zhen’s traditional capital. Moreover, Harbin was 
good for water transportation because it was by the Songhua River. 
The population of Harbin increased dramatically while the CER was being constructed. 
Xue Lianju summarized the reasons for Harbin’s rising: on the one hand, the Russian CER 
construction bureau moved to Harbin from Vladivostok in June 1898. The Russian officials, 
engineers, railway managers, staff, workers, servers, railway guards and soldiers all poured into 
Harbin. The Russians kept illegally expropriating lands along the railway. In 1901, the CER 
bureau divided the Russian railway zone into three districts: Old Harbin (Xiangfang 香坊), New 
Town (Nangang 南岗), and Pristan (Daoli 道里). From 1898 to 1903, in Xiangfang, the CER 
built 30 Russian streets with banks, businesses, churches, clubs, and schools.
39
  
On the other hand, the construction of the CER brought about an influx of Chinese 
laborers, who in fact built the railway and the city. With Harbin at the center, the railways were 
being built in three directions at the same time: east to Suifenhe, west to Manchuli, and south to 
Dalian. The gigantic project was completed with the sweat and toil of the Chinese people. In 
1900, about 65,000 Chinese laborers, emigrating from Shandong, Hebei, Henan and other 
provinces, worked on the CER. When the CER was completed, the total number of Chinese 
railway workers reached 170,000 or so.
40
 The destitute Chinese laborers worked hard day and 
night building the railway, but almost earned nothing compared to the Russians. Similar to the 
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situation of city and railway building in North America, the abuse and discrimination of the 
cheap Chinese laborers were common around the world in the last century.
41
   
In Harbin, the Chinese laborers gathered nearby the Russian railway zone and settled in a 
traditional Chinese trade center called Fujiadian (Daowai), adjoining Pristan (Daoli). When the 
CER was open to traffic, Harbin further attracted foreign immigrants, such as Jews, Poles, 
Tartars, Japanese, and Koreans. Xue estimates that in 1903, when the railway was completed, 
there were 44,756 people residing in the railway zone and about 70,000 in greater Harbin, 
including both the railway zone and Fujiadian.
42
 Gradually, as a railway hub, Harbin grew into a 
modern city, surpassing other Manchu towns.  
 
Map 3: Manchuria 
(Map from https://www.britannica.com/place/Manchuria, accessed October 23, 2018)  
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2.1.3. Jewish Presence in Harbin  
 
The Trans-Siberian railway brought a large immigration from European Russia to Russia 
Far East. According to James Forsyth, “between 1896 and 1912 almost 1.8 million Russians left 
the provinces west of the Urals to go to Asiatic Russia, along with more than the same number of 
Ukrainians and half a million Belorussians.”43 In contrast to the millions of Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belorussians, who left East Europe and moved to Asiatic Russia, the number of Jewish 
settlers was rather small. There were only 34,477 Jews in 1897 and the number increased to 
50,000 in 1911 in all of Siberia.
44
 The slight increase of Jewish population in the east was mainly 
due to the Tsarist Russia’s policy towards the Jews.   
It is well-known that when Russia extended its influence to Poland-Lithuania in late 18
th
 
century, about 600,000 Polish Jews became Russian subjects during the partition of Poland. 
Catherine II did not allow Jews to move to inner Russia but confined them in the western and 
southern borders, later known as the Pale of Settlement. During this time, Siberia was sparsely 
populated, and was mainly for exiles, labor camps and prisons. The opening and closing of 
Siberia to the Jews depended on Russian needs. In 1855, when Alexander II ascended to the 
throne, he permitted Jewish merchants and artisans to live outside the Pale of Settlement. Under 
Alexander II’s liberal policy, according to Irena Vladimirsky, “certain changes were introduced 
into the legal status of the Jewish population of Siberia: male and female children who were born 
in Siberia and who stayed with their parents, were free to receive education in state public 
schools and were allowed to choose their own occupation. Other decrees issued in 1868 and 
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1875 permitted retired Jewish soldiers and artisans to settle in every part of Siberia.”45 As a 
result, Jewish settlements swelled in many Siberian cities, such as Omsk, Tomsk, Tobolsk, and 
Kainsk.  
However, after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, not only new residential, 
economic and educational restrictions for the Jews were imposed, but anti-Jewish pogroms also 
became rampant throughout the Pale of Settlement and peaked in Kishinev in 1903.
46
 Therefore, 
“in the 1890s the entry of Jews into Siberia and the rights of the Jews living there were further 
restricted. The revised edition of the passport rules published in 1890 proclaimed a total ban on 
Jewish immigration to Siberia, save for those who were sentenced to exile or hard labor there. 
This ban became the fundamental rule regarding Jewish entry into Siberia and served as a basis 
for further prohibitions.”47 As one complained, if Jews wanted to escape suffering from poverty 
and pogrom in the Pale of Settlement and to breathe the free air of Siberia, they would find only 
one way open to them, namely, to commit some crime and be exiled to Siberia.
48
 Moreover, 
“regulations of a similar nature were adopted in 1899 by the governor-general of Transbaikalia. 
According to these, ‘all Jews are forbidden to reside in the boundary-zone adjoining the Chinese 
frontier. Only those Jews who lived there prior to the ukase of June 12, 1860, are permitted to 
remain in the place of their registration. The banished Jews and their descendants have no right 
to move freely from place to place in Siberia, but may apply to the governor-general for 
permission to do so.’”49  
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According to these rules, Jews were actually prohibited to live in Siberia and the border 
regions between Russia and China. However, Finance Minister Witte, the designer of the Trans-
Siberian Railway, encouraged “those of the trade and industrial class, searching for enrichment 
at their own risk” to settle along the railway lines.50 For security and economic promotion of the 
new Russian colony, soldiers and merchants were supposed to be the ideal settlers.  
According to Takao Chizuko, “in March 1898, the Committee of Ministers gave the CER 
the right to issue passports. With this, it became legal for Jews to reside in the railway zone as an 
‘exemption’ in cases where it was acknowledged that such Jews could contribute to the benefits 
of railway construction.”51 Nevertheless, forbidden Siberia but open Manchuria seemed not to be 
very practical for large Jewish immigration. Therefore, in its early stage, few Jews moved to 
Harbin from East Europe, except the first guild merchants, such as Leonty Skidelsky (c.1845-
1916), who obtained a contract from the Russian government to construct the railway from 
Vladivostok to Khabarovsk. 
Local Jews previously living in the boundary zone of Siberia and Manchuria first 
ventured and settled in Harbin. In his survey of the Harbin Huangshan Jewish Cemetery, scholar 
Zhang Tiejiang asserts that G. B. Drizin (1846-1949) was the first Jew who came to Harbin. 
From 1894, Drizin purchased grain and livestock along the Ash River branch, around the Fuyu 
District, and shipped and peddled the grain and livestock to Russia in his own ship Truzhenik 
(Toiler). Later Drizin settled in Harbin and founded the Drizin and Patushinsky Flour Mill in 
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 However, historian Li Shuxiao, believes that Samuil Ilevich Pertzel was the first Jew that 
settled in Harbin and opened a clothing store in 1899. Li’s research was based on an article 
published in the journal Jewish Life in No.3-4 of 1939, which asserted that Pertzel was the first 
Harbin Jew.
53
 All in all, the existing historical evidence indicates that Jewish merchants began to 
do business in Harbin at the turn of the 1900s.  
As the railway was being constructed, some Siberian Jewish merchants did retail business 
along the railway to support the Russian railroad workers and railroad guards. Finally, the 
Siberian Jews established the Harbin Jewish community in 1903. According to Abraham 
Kaufman:  
 In 1899 there was the first “minyan”, (a ten-men group of male Jews recognized 
by the Jewish law as an official congregation).  They used to gather at random in the 
apartment of various Jews living in Harbin (Konovalov, I.L. Bach, M. M. Berkovich).  
Some Jews lived in other small villages of Hailar, Tsitsikar [Qiqihar], Yaomyn [Yaomen 
Zhan], Mao er shan and others….The first written document to be found in the archive of 
the Harbin Jewish community is dated 1902 and relates to the 32 Jews assembled in the 
apartment of Gendler to discuss the employment of a full time shohet (ritual slaughterer) 
to be paid 900 Russian roubles annually.  The protocol of this gathering is dated 24 
December, 1902 and is entitled “The verdict on the issue of employment of a shohet”, 
signed by B. Berkovich, Pertzel, Meirovich, Abramov, Bach brothers, Drizin....the first 
starosta (Russian for chairman or president) of the Harbin Jewish Community was 
specifically B. L. Berkovich. In the following year 1903 an official election of the first 
“Spiritual Management of the prayer home took place with Raphael Matveyevich 
Meirovich elected as “gabbe (= overseer),  evsei Isayevich Dobisov as the treasurer; K. 
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On February 16, 1903, the Harbin Jewish Spiritual Community (Harbinskoe Evreiskoe 
Duhovnoe Obshestvo, HEDO) officially registered with the Russian CER authorities. Rabbi 
Shmuel Levin was invited from Siberia as the spiritual leader. The Khevra Kadisha (Burial 
brotherhood) was then established. The Harbin Jewish Spiritual Community functioned as the 
Kehillah, which was a local Jewish communal structure in charge of both secular and religious 
issues.  
By 1903, about 300 to 500 Siberian Jews settled in Harbin and opened about ten stores. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to thousands of Russian railway workers and railway guards, the 
number of Jews in Harbin was too small to be noticed. At that time, the muddy village of Harbin 
was not yet fully developed in a modern sense, no better than the shtetl (small Jewish villages) in 
East Europe. Kaufman called Harbin “the little hamlet” and stated that “the living conditions 
were very difficult and demanded a great amount of energy, courage and adaptability to the 
unusual situations. There was no notion of the bright future that awaited this little fishing 
village.”55  
However, after the CER was completed, the powers waged wars to control the railway, 
the natural resources, and the people living in the region. Manchuria soon became the “‘cockpit 
of Asia,’ where ‘drama never dies.’”56                                                                                                      
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Map 4: The Pale of Settlement 
(Map from https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/image/pale-settlement, accessed March 4, 2019) 
2.2. The Expansion of the Harbin Jewish Community 
 
The Harbin Jewish community experienced its first expansion during the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1904-05, a war fought to colonize Northeast China. After the war, many demobilized 
Russian Jewish soldiers chose to remain in Harbin due to the accelerated anti-Semitic 
persecutions and pogroms in Russia proper. But in the Chinese colonies, the Russian authorities 
implemented a liberal policy for the Jews living.  
2.2.1. The Russo-Japanese War 
 
By 1900, the powers had guafen (carved up) China. Acting against imperialist powers 
“cutting up” China, the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreigner movement, spread all over China. To 
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suppress the Boxer Rebellion, the provoked colonizers set up an international military coalition, 
known as the Eight-Nation Alliance (Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, the United States, 
Austria-Hungary and Japan), which occupied Beijing in the summer of 1900. The Eight-Nation 
troops killed tens of thousands of Chinese and burned the Qing Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan 
圆明园). Post-colonial scholars observe that during this time, “claims to represent civilization in 
the face of barbarism and talk of the ‘ ellow Peril’ reached new heights, even while a few 
Western critics of imperialism wondered who were the civilized and who the barbarian.”57 
During the Boxer Rebellion, the oppressed Chinese laborers destroyed almost two-thirds 
of the railways that had been completed in Manchuria by 1900.
58
 In the name of suppression of 
the Boxers, Russia sent more than 100,000 troops to Northeast China and occupied the region. 
However, after the Boxer Uprising subsided, the Russian army did not withdraw from China but 
attempted to move into Korea. Russia’s obvious invasion directly threatened Japan’s interests 
and security in these areas, which resulted in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The so-called 
Russo-Japanese war in fact took place in Northeast China.
59
  
The Russo-Japanese War brought the first large wave of Russian Jewish immigration to 
China. To fight against Japan, Russia dispatched hundreds of thousands of soldiers to Northeast 
China day and night via the newly constructed CER, among whom there were more than 30,000 
Jewish soldiers recruited from European Russia.
60
 According to Simon Dubnow, these Jewish 
soldiers and physicians were "free to be sacrificed on the battlefield," because “they held no 
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government posts.”61 Moreover, the wives and children of the Jewish soldiers were at risk to be 
expelled from their domicile, because rights of residence were granted to the head of the family, 
and husbands or fathers had been sent to the war.
62
  
The war endured for more than one and a half year and ended with Russian defeat. 
Through the American President Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation, a peace treaty was signed by 
the Russian Minister Witte, and the Japanese Minister Baron Komura, in the American city of 
Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. Different from Russia and Japan, the United States was not 
interested in China’s territory. America’s Open Door Policy aimed to maintain the balance of 
power and equal economic opportunity in China. Under this guideline, “Roosevelt preferred that 
the war end on terms that left both Russia and Japan a role to play in Northeast China. Though 
excited by the Japanese military victories, Roosevelt worried about the consequences to 
American interests if Japan managed to drive Russia out entirely.”63 As a result, not only did the 
Chinese feel humiliated, but neither Japan nor Russia were satisfied:  
The Treaty ultimately gave Japan control of Korea and much of South Manchuria, 
including Port Arthur and the railway that connected it with the rest of the region, along 
with the southern half of Sakhalin Island; Russian power was curtailed in the region, but 
it was not required to pay Japan’s war costs. Because neither nation was in a strong 
financial position to continue the war easily, both were forced to compromise in the terms 
of the peace. Still, the Japanese public felt they had won the war, and they considered the 
lack of an indemnity to be an affront. There was a brief outbreak of protests and rioting in 
Tokyo when the terms of the agreement were made public. Similarly, the Russian people 
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In Russia proper, bloody pogroms and anti-Semitic persecutions reached new heights. 
Jews were blamed for the unexpected victory of Japan, as American Jewish banker Jacob Schiff 
facilitated Japanese loans in the war. Hence, the Jews became the internal enemies while the 
Japanese were external. Pogroms took place throughout the Pale of Settlement and beyond the 
Pale in various places of Russia, such as Odessa, Mogilev, Gomel, Bialystok, Dusyati, Melitopol, 
Simferopol, Zhitomir, Troyanov, Minsk, Brest-Litovsk, Siedletz, Lodz and Kerch.
65
 Tens of 
thousands of Jews were injured and murdered in the pogroms from 1904 to 1905. Millions of 
Jews had to leave Russia for America or somewhere else. Thus, Dubnow documented the Russo-
Japanese War as a significant event in Russian Jewish history.  
After the war, many Jewish soldiers chose to stay in Northeast China because of the 
pogroms in Russia. Two years of military life in Harbin made it a familiar place to the Jewish 
soldiers. Many of them went to pray in Harbin’s Jewish House of Prayer. Rabbi Levin actively 
organized relief work for Jewish soldiers in the Russian units. With the Pesakh (Passover) 
coming, the Harbin Jewish religious committee distributed Matzos 
66
 and money to the Jewish 
soldiers.
67




When the war ended, “the Jewish population of Manchuria had significantly grown. 
Many of the demobilized Jewish servicemen decided to remain in Harbin and other points along 
the railway line and brought their families and relatives to join them.”69 According to the law, 
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Jews who served in the army and the descendants of the former “Nikolai soldiers” (who had 
served in the army during the reign of Nicholas I), received permission to reside outside of the 
Pale. 
 In addition, during the war, “the army was in dire need of providers, contractors, and 
commissioners. Harbin began to speedily absorb any and all men of enterprise, often reckless 
adventurers, amongst those Jewish merchants and businessmen from Siberia and the European 
parts of Russia.”70 A. Kaufman wrote that: “rumors have reached the Jewish Pale about the 
wondrous Harbin and Manchuria and the ‘golden rain’ perpetually falling there. Why not leave? 
What was there to lose here? Pogroms? Humility? Hundreds of Jewish communities were looted 
and razed to the ground? And out of the stuffy, oppressive ghettoes in Poland, Lithuania, 
Ukraine, throngs of Jews began their long Exodus – Eastward: to Harbin, to the small hamlets 
along the newly built railway line. In 1906/1907 the Jewish population of Harbin crossed the 
3000 mark.” 71  Consequently, the Harbin Jewish community experienced its first expansion 
during the Russo-Japanese War. In that time, the Harbin Jewish community set about building 
the synagogue and the cemetery.  
2.2.2.  Russian Policy on the Jews in Harbin 
 
When the Russians and the Japanese fought to colonize Manchuria, the disadvantaged 
Chinese struggled by all means to keep the integrity of their land. Examining the agricultural 
development of Northeast China from 1900 to 1931, Patrick Fuliang Shan argues that “The 
region was still in the hands of the Chinese. The local Chinese tried to utilize every possible 
opportunity to restrict Russian activities beyond the railway zone; even within the railway zone, 





the local Chinese authorities wasted no time in recovering their lost interests. Indeed, Russian 
influence had its bounded limits.” 72  In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, the Qing 
government immediately set up a Chinese local administration office, yamen 衙门 , in the 
Fujiadian zone in October 1905.
73
 The Harbin circuit (guandao), also known as Binjiang 
guandao yamen or Daotaifu, was the last traditional local administration office, yamen, the Qing 
government established before the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911.    
Russia also wanted to enhance its position in this new colony. In 1908, the CER 
organized a “self-administrative council” in the railway zone. The Russians called it the Harbin 
“municipality.” But the Chinese never recognized its authority. According to the CER treaty, the 
local administration in the railway zone was to be operated by the Chinese Eastern Railway 
Company, not the Russian government. The Russian “municipality” in Harbin, which the 
Chinese called “Russian autonomy,” was loosely organized without a central bureaucratic system 
as in Russia proper.  
Fin de siècle Russia lacked the power to impose a full control of the newly colonized area 
on its eastern border. In their book, Clausen and Thogersen supported Quested’s point that: “the 
Russian plans in Manchuria had in a sense failed already before the Russo-Japanese War. 
Economically the CER had been a very costly adventure for the Russian treasury, and the 
expected benefits in terms of trade had failed to materialize. Military force had been relied on to 
a far greater extent than originally envisaged by Count Witte, who had hoped to nurture 
collaborationist forces within Manchuria and gain control by largely peaceful means. Russian 
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migration to Manchuria was unorganized, and the attempts to attract Russian peasant settlers had 
totally failed….The dream of a “ ellow Russia” had collapsed…. ”74 Thus, in terms of Russia’s 
economic, military and immigrant disadvantages in the colonization of Manchuria, as well as the 
pressure from the Chinese and the Japanese governments, it was impossible for Russia to 
establish a strict administration in the distant Harbin station.  
The disadvantageous position of Russia in China gave the Russians no choice but to 
accord a reluctant “liberty” to the minorities, namely, Jews, Poles, Tatars and other immigrants 
from East Europe. Especially, Jewish capital and commercial skills were often used to enhance 
Russian economic power in border regions. Russia’s new Minister of Finance, Vladimir 
Kokovsov, admitted that “the continuing arrival of new Jews was bringing needed capital…. 
Any curtailment of Jewish rights in the CER zone would have had a very unfavorable effect on 
the Russian position in Manchuria.”75 
 Historians believe that in frontier zones like Siberia, the Far East and Manchuria, “Jewish 
policies were influenced more by the policies of local authorities than by those of the central 
authorities.”76 When the Jewish population kept increasing in Asiatic Russia in the wake of the 
Russo-Japanese War, the attitudes of the local Russian authorities in the Far East and Manchuria 
were totally different.  
When Jewish settlements spread along the railway lines, in a number of Siberian and the 
Far Eastern cities, such as Sretensk, Blagoveshchensk, Nikolayevsk-na-Amure, Ussuriisk, and 
Vladivostok, the Priamurskii Governor-General, Nikolai Gondatti, “again and again demanded 
of the Russian supreme authorities to equate the status” of the CER region to that of the cities in 
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Russia proper where “Jews were forbidden to settle.”77 Takao found that “Gondatti imposed 
stricter measures than the central authorities, often disregarding potential benefits for the local 
economy. When the Russian government relaxed the residential restrictions and permitted 
immigration of refugees into the Russian interior in the summer of 1915, when the government 
had difficulties in coping with a large number of Jewish refugees within the Pale, Gondatti 
imposed a new limitation that made it mandatory for Jewish refugees to apply for special permits 
to migrate to the Far East.”78 A. Kaufman asserted that “Jews were deported and persecuted as an 
unwanted, lawless element” in the Russian Far East.79 
However, on the other side of the Amur River (which the Chinese called Heilongjiang, 
the boundary line between Russian Far East and Northeast China), Jews founded a safe harbour. 
According to David Wolff, the general manager of the CER in Manchuria, Dmitry L. Khorvat 
(1858-1937), seemed “a steady supporter of a liberal minority policy and a proponent of urban 
colonization. On June 1, 1906, he approved the land grant in Pristan on which the Jewish 
community would build its synagogue, school, and hospital.”80 Wolff estimates that nearly 25 
percent of the representatives elected to the Russian municipal assembly in 1908 were Jewish.
81
 
 The Jewish community seemed to maintain an excellent relationship with the Russian 
authorities in Harbin. The Harbin Zionist leader, A. Kaufman, had a favorable impression of 
Khorvat. In his memoir, Kaufman recalled his meeting with Khorvat:  
I have met General Khorvat several times in my capacity of the representative of 
the Harbin Jewish community, and once privately. He impressed me as an extremely 
pleasant personality. When the local society and the administrative circles of the KVJD 
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[Russian abbreviation for CER] celebrated in 1914 the fifteenth anniversary of General 
Khorvat’s heading the KVJD management, he was greeted by the two-man delegation of 
the Jewish community - A. Dobisov and myself. We conveyed the congratulations of the 
entire Jewish community living along the KVJD line and presented him with the Scroll of 
Esther in a silver container, produced by the Bezalel Art Academy in Jerusalem. The 
general was visibly moved by this homage, and told us that this was the most meaningful 
and valuable gift. Sometime later, at a casual encounter, his wife Camilla Benoit (the 




General Khorvat further reported to St. Peterburg about the Jewish achievements and 
contributions to the economy and welfare of the region.
83
 The amicable relations between Jews 
and Russian authorities in Harbin could hardly be imagined in either European Russia or the 
Russian Far East.    
The situation was similar to that in East Europe, where the Russians themselves were also 
minorities, Jews were usually tolerated. Russia’s policy toward the Jews in China corresponded 
to the Russian government’s guiding principle relating to the status of the Jews, which “stemmed 
from the desire to encourage economic activity that would be beneficial to the Russian economy 
or from the intention to use the Jewish population to disseminate Russian culture.” 84  Even 
though the number of Harbin Jews was not as large as that in Kiev, Riga or other Jewish cities in 
Russia’s colonies on its western border, its percentage of the total population was comparable to 
that in these cities. In 1913, besides the Russians (34,313 persons), 5,032 Jews constituted the 
second largest foreign immigration in Harbin, followed by “Poles (2,556), Japanese (696), 
Germans (564), Tatars (234), Latvians (218), Georgians (183), Estonians (172), Lithuanians 
(142) and Armenians (124).” 85  The Jewish population constituted 7.3 percent of the total 
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population (including 23,537 Chinese) in the Russian railway concession of Harbin in 1913. In 
the very same year, in Riga in East Europe for example, Russians accounted for 22.4 percent and 
Jews accounted for 4.5 percent of the total population.
86
 Therefore, as a percentage of the total 
population, as well as in the Russian liberal policy in these regions, Harbin was an analogy to the 
cities in East Europe.  
However, on the other hand, as Harbin was in Chinese territory, four-fifths of its Jews 
“resided either within or adjacent to the Chinese ghetto [Fujiadian].”87 Thus a Russian Jewish 
community in China made the Harbin experience a very unique one in the history of the Jewish 
Diaspora. Teddy Kaufman comments that “we were a minority within a minority, like a Jewish 
fortress on a Russian island surrounded by a Chinese sea.”88 Especially, the contact between 
Jews and Chinese became more and more obvious when Russia power faded in China after 1917.  
2.3. The Manchurian Haven  
 
Without overt discrimination, Jews found haven in Manchuria. Jews were not only 
allowed to participate in all kinds of business and city building projects, but they also could 
freely practice their religion, and express themselves culturally with respect to Jewish education, 
Zionism and Yiddishism. The flourishing of the Harbin Jewish community coincided with 
Harbin turning into a large city, and in turn gave the city an obvious Jewish flavor.  
2.3.1. Burgeoning Jewish Business in Northeast China  
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For the Eastern European residents in Northeast China, the old saying came true that 
“God is high above and the Tsar is far away.” In a time of malaise at home and weakness abroad, 
the Russians in China had no choice but to practice tolerance of the other minorities. As a result, 
the Jewish communities were burgeoning in Manchuria.   
Many Jewish merchants made their fortune during the Russo-Japanese War by building 
food stores and flour mills for the Russian army. According to Zvia Shickman-Bowman, Harbin 
Jews, such as Bonner, Mindalevich, Drizin, Patushinsky, L. Skidelsky, A. Kagan, and the Soskin 
brothers, operated at least five flour mills in Harbin and their domination enabled them to 
supervise “the operation of Russian-owned mills.”89 
Moreover, as Northeast China was abundant in soybeans, Jews played a predominant role 
in developing Harbin’s typical industry of soybeans. Jewish merchants, like Roman Moiseevich 
Kabalkin and Semion Soskin, were the pioneers in exporting Manchurian soybeans to North 
America and Europe. Roman M. Kabalkin (1850-1933) “who had already made his name and 
fortune in European Russia as a grain trader with no fear of novel methods, served for fourteen 
years as a consultant to the Riazan-Uralsk railway, the chief source of engineers for the CER. 
This association led to an invitation from the chief of the CER Commercial Department, K.P. 
Lazarev, to help develop freight traffic between Siberia and Manchuria.” 90 Settling down in 
Harbin in 1906, Kabalkin “started exporting Manchurian-grown grain and soybeans to Europe 
via the CER. In 1909 Kabalkin established his own soybean exporting firm in London by 
attracting British investors and named it ‘The English-Chinese Eastern Company.’ By 1914 
Kabalkin had opened a large oil factory in “Old Harbin” [Xiangfang District] – the first to be 
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equipped with the latest European machinery. The factory filtered soybean oil, and refined it for 
salads under the brand name Acetco and pressed soybean cakes for cattle. His high-quality 
refined soybean oil was exported to the United States.”91 Chinese scholar Zhang Tiejiang reputes 
Kabalkin as the founder of the Manchurian export trade.
92
     
In addition, after the Russo-Japanese War, most of the demobilized Jewish soldiers that 
settled down in Harbin found employment or opened a business there. A Jewish cavalryman 
named Joseph Kaspe opened a jewelry store in the most prosperous commercial street in Harbin 
and got rich. Later he founded the Moderne Hotel, which became the most luxurious and modern 
hotel in the Far East.
93
 A Chinese journalist observes that “in Harbin, the Jews gradually re-
established the life they had left behind. This process coincided with the rapid growth of Harbin 
on its way from a cluster of villages to a big city, branding the city with a distinguished ‘Jewish 
style.’ The city's first batch of modern hotels, banks, shops, cafes, newspapers, and publishing 
houses were initiated by members of the Jewish community, and helped boost the city's business. 
Almost all of the enterprises in Harbin at that time, whether bakeries or coal mines or mills, were 
closely linked to the Jews.”94  
After several years’ effort, Jews in Harbin owned large stores, trading firms and factories. 
According to A. Kaufman:  
The Jewish traders, bankers and industrialists in Manchuria rubbed shoulders with 
the most prominent representatives of the financial establishment and were listed 
amongst the first rank financial entrepreneurs of the region. The Stock Exchange 
Committee was now headed by a group of Jews: M. Fried, E. Dobisov, D. Samsonovich, 
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G. Drizin, R. Kabalkin and others. Out of the 40 voting members of the Harbin 
Municipality twelve were Jewish. The main initiators and the leading representatives of 
the lumber, oil, river shipping, winery, pharmaceuticals, bakeries, textiles, and metallurgy 
industries are the Jews. So are the chief exporters of grain products, furs and leather. This 
equality of rights and status enjoyed by the Jews of Harbin and those living along the 
KVJD railway tracks, irritated the anti-Semitic governors of the adjacent proper-Russian 




As Kaufman mentions, Jewish entrepreneurs led the newly established Harbin Stock 
Exchange Committee. In addition, the Harbin Jewish entrepreneurs were allowed to engage in all 
kinds of industries without restrictions. Hence, besides the light industries which Jews 
traditionally engaged in, such as textile and food manufacture, Jews in Harbin were able to 
participate in some heavy industries, like railway building, city building projects, mining, and 
logging industries, which were rarely available or never possible for Jews in either European 
Russia or the Russian Far East. Harbin Jewish descendant, Lily Klebanoff Blake, recalled that 
his grandfather Michael (Mihail), from Mogilev in Belarus, moved to Harbin in 1908 and 
successfully engaged in the coal/timber business. Lily’s father later became a manager of the 
world famous Moderne Hotel.
96
 It was believed that China offered unusual opportunity for the 
Jews. 
Besides the city of Harbin, Jewish businesses also extended to Manzhouli, Hailar, 
Qiqihar and other towns and villages along the CER lines in China. There Manchurian Jews 
established synagogues and Jewish schools as well. But the scale of these Jewish communities 
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were rather small, usually 10-25 families. They all recognized Harbin as the Jewish center in 
Northeast China.
97
     
2.3.2. An Eastern Zion 
 
Jewish institutions in Harbin sprang up after the Russo-Japanese War, including a 
synagogue (1907), a Jewish primary school (1907), a theater (1906), a Jewish Women's Charity 
(1907), a library (1908), and a Jewish club “IMALDAG” (the  iddish abbreviation of “The 
Jewish Musical-Literary-Theatrical Society,” 1908).98 Harbin Jews successfully set up an East 
European Jewish style community in China.  
Harbin Jews resided next to the Russians, spoke Russian, read the Russian newspapers, 
and shared common resources with Russians peacefully. Some Russian emigrants maintained 
their bigoted anti-Semitic views, but they did not form a mainstream in Harbin before 1917. For 
instance, when the bizarre incident, “the Beilis Affair,” in which a Jew named Mendel Beilis was 
accused of the ritual murder of a Christian boy, took place in Kiev in 1911 and brought about a 
new wave of anti-Semitic persecutions around the Russian Empire, the Jews of Harbin were not 
affected at all. Jews enjoyed almost all civil rights with Russians peacefully in Harbin in a time 
when anti-Semitic pogroms were rampant in European Russia.  
Free from restriction and discrimination, Russian Jews in Harbin could openly practice 
their traditional religious and communal way of life. In 1906, Rabbi Levin went back to Siberia, 
and served as a Rabbi in Omsk and Chita, but he frequently visited Harbin. After he left, Rabbi 
Hashkel held his post of Harbin until 1911. In 1913, the Harbin Kehillah decided to elect a 
spiritual leader. When more Jews from Southern Russia, particularly Odessa, came to reside in 
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Harbin, they called themselves “Russian Jews” to differentiate themselves from the “Siberian 
Jews.”99 The “Russian Jews” wrote to Warsaw asking for an ideal candidate. Rabbi Kiselev of 
Borisov had the highest evaluation both for his scholarship and personality. But the “Siberian 
Jews” preferred to have Rabbi Levin as their spiritual leader, who was as responsible and 
competent as Rabbi Kisilev. During the election, Rabbi Levin moved back to Harbin and held 
the rabbi’s post. At the end of intensive debates, Rabbi Levin was persuaded to withdraw his 
candidacy for the benefit of the community. Rabbi Levin declared that he “was the first rabbi of 
Harbin and one of the founders of its Jewish community, and that this fact makes him 
responsible for its unity and peace.”100 Therefore, Rabbi Kiselev was elected as the chief rabbi of 
Harbin, and Rabbi Levin became his deputy.  
Well trained in the complexities of Jewish law, Rabbi Kiselev was committed to 
reshaping the Harbin Jewish community in accordance with the Orthodox Jewish life in East 
Europe. In his collection of halakhic (Jewish law) response Sefer Mishbere Yam [Waves of the 
Sea], Rabbi Kiselev mentioned his health problems but said because of the distance from centers 
of rabbinical learning in Poland and Russia he was the only one qualified to respond to the 
Jewish halakhic divorce and many halakhic problems arising from this situation.
101
 For example, 
in Responsum 28, dated 18 Adar I 5679 (February 18, 1919), Rabbi Kiselev addressed an 
unnamed rabbi in the Far East about whether a get (Jewish divorce) could be witnessed by non-
Sabbath observant Jews in a place where there were no Sabbath observant Jews to be found. At 
the end of his responsum, R. Kiseleff noted that: “In Siberia there is a big problem when it comes 
to gittin, as many places have no rabbi and the local shochet arranges the get. Needless to say, 
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these shochetim were often not learned at all in this matter, and this could create major halakhic 
complications. R. Kiseleff therefore suggested that no one should be authorized to slaughter in 
Siberia until he learns the laws of gittin and is given an authorization to arrange gittin.”102 By 
Rabbi Kiselev’s effort, the religious life of the Harbin Jewish community gradually corresponded 
to that in the Jewish center of East Europe. Rabbi Kiselev served the Harbin Jewish community 
for thirty-six years from 1913 until 1949 when he passed away.  
Jewish education was another main concern of the Harbin Jewish community. In April 
1907, a Jewish primary school was opened to give basic knowledge of Judaism and the Hebrew 
language to 18 boys and 8 girls. In 1909, the student number increased to 100 pupils, but the 
school “had no premises of its own and sheltered in a Chinese mud hut.”103 It was not until April 




But more importantly, Jewish students in Harbin had the advantages for accessing higher 
education, because of the absence of the Russian discriminative law limiting Jewish admission to 
secondary and higher education. In Russia proper, the majority of Jewish youth could not be 
admitted to higher education, even though the quota of Jewish students allowed in state 
secondary schools was increased by law “to 5 percent in the capitals, to 15 percent in the Pale of 
Settlement, and to 10 percent elsewhere” in 1909.105 According to Wolff, “school enrollment 
statistics for Harbin show a very different situation. The men’s and women’s commercial high 
schools, founded and funded by the CER, were the closest Harbin had to ‘state’ schools. In 1913, 
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14.7 percent of the combined student body was Jewish. The percentage in private schools was 
much higher (25 percent), and the overall rate for secondary education was 20.1 percent. Since 
the 402 students enrolled represent most of the Jewish children of high school age, we can safely 
assume that education was available to all who qualified.”106  
Without legal restriction and discrimination towards the Jews, not only the Jewish youth 
enjoyed the equal opportunity of education, but Zionists and Yiddishists also found heaven in 
privileged Harbin. The beginning of Zionism in Harbin can be traced as early as in the Russo-
Japanese War, when the famous Russian Jewish soldier and a Zionist national hero, Joseph 
Trumpeldor (1880-1920), “came to Harbin on his way back to Russia from his captivity in 
Japan” in 1905. 107  In Harbin, Trumpeldor “lectured to the Jewish youth about the Jewish 
settlement in the Land of Israel, and told them of ‘The Pioneer’ and ‘The Guard’ movement.”108 
Later, a small group of men of the Herzlian trend, J. V. Geshelin, S. G. Yabrov, S. L. 
Rabinovich, formed a Zionist circle in Harbin. Vladimir Kharitonovich Soskin, a brother of the 
Harbin “grain king” Soskin, led the Palestine Society until 1912 when the Kaufmans came to 
Harbin.
109
   
Abraham Josevich Kaufman (1885 – 1971) and his wife, Bertha Schwartz, graduated 
from medical school at the University of Bern, Switzerland. In 1905, Kaufman attended the 
Seventh World Zionist Congress in Basel. In 1909, after graduation from medical school, 
Abraham and his wife Bertha returned to Perm in Russia. In 1912, the couple left for Harbin 
where Bertha’s sister had settled. In Harbin, a burgeoning city in the Far East, the Kaufmans 
were able to start their careers as doctors without discrimination and to advocate freely for 
                                                             
106 Ibid. 
107 T. Kaufman, The Jews of Harbin live on in My Heart, 28. 
108 Ibid.  





 In Harbin, without Russian censorship, Kaufman was surprised that he could 
announce his call for a Palestine Society assembly through the Russian newspaper, in a time 
when all Zionist activities were banned in European Russia.
111
 
However, there are two sides to every story. Not everyone in East Europe enjoyed their 
exodus to Harbin. Most of the wanderers had no confidence in what was waiting ahead. Siberia 
was already far away, while Manchuria was even farther. It took about 24 days and nights or 
more by train to get to Harbin from Eastern Europe. Abraham Fishzon,
112
 the founder of the first 
Jewish theater in Romania, was once very afraid of being arrested and exiled to Siberia by the 
Russian police, but he eventually moved to Harbin. In his diary, Fishzon recalls that:  
As it happened, my sister-in-law came to Kiev, and insisted that my wife and I 
should join her on her trip to Harbin. Harbin is somewhere in China, even further away 
than Siberia. How many times during the Russo-Japanese war I was offered to come to 
Harbin with my troupe. I was even paid in advance, but I sent the money back and refused 
the offer out of fear to pass through this terrible Siberia I heard of so much. I resisted as 
much as I could, but the insistent requests of my sister- in-law convinced my wife, and I 
gave up. And here we were, in the train carriage on our way to Vologda, and from 
Vologda to Omsk…. The train crawled on and on, slowly cutting through the endless dark 





Fishzon’s journey suggested that Harbin had been well-known in East Europe at that time. 
Residing in Kiev, Fishzon mentioned that he had several chances to move to Harbin. He delayed 
it because Harbin was too far, and in China. 
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However, once having arrived in Harbin, the Jews would have discovered that they 
attained a freedom far beyond their expectation. When Fishzon, the founder of the Yiddish 
theatre, finally reached Harbin in 1917, the first thing he did was to stage the Yiddish dramas 
which were prohibited in Russia. Having experienced a lifelong of persecution and poverty in 
East Europe, Fishzon finally preserved his troupe intact in Harbin.  
Even so, Fishzon had been dreaming to immigrate to the United States before he died in 
Harbin in January 1922, eighty-four years of age.
114
 Harbin did not develop a typical Yiddish 
culture as that in New York or Montreal. According to a census, 62 percent of the Jews in Harbin 
spoke Russian in the home, and only 32 percent Yiddish.
115
 This was probably why Zionism 
surpassed other political trends and finally dominated Harbin Jewry. On the one hand, most 
Harbin Zionists, including the merchants, doctors, students, etc., were well acculturated to and 
integrated into the Russian society. On the other hand, however, Harbin Zionists did not have to 
cope with the dual loyalty problem being both Russian and Jewish nationalists. The influence of 




Since the end of the 19
th
 century, waves of persecutions and pogroms forced millions of 
Jews to uproot from the soil of East Europe. While the majority of Russian Jews emigrated to the 
United States, Western Europe, and Palestine, some of them moved eastwards to Northeast 
China. The construction of the CER and the Russo-Japanese War brought about Jewish 
immigration to Harbin. Without legal restriction and persecution, the Harbin Jewish community 
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flourished in this frontier boomtown. For the Jews who preferred to immigrate to Manchuria 
instead of moving to the West, “a location outside the official boundaries and prejudices of the 
Russian state, but within a Russian-speaking cultural, social, and economic world” was ideal.116 
However, when Russian influence receded from China after 1917, Harbin Jews began to 
experience a new journey, encountering the Chinese and the Japanese. This encounter added a 
surprising new page in modern Jewish history, as will be shown in the following chapters.  
 
 
Figure 1：Harbin’s Old Synagogue.  
（Image from https://www.timesofisrael.com/home-to-one-jew-harbin-synagogue-to-be-renovated/, accessed April 
10, 2019) 
 





Figure 2：Skidelsky Home in Harbin 
（Image from Igud Yotzai Sin, No. 399, p49.) 
 
 
Figure 3：Kovtun Family Moves form Poltava to Harbin, 1905 
（Image from Igud Yotzai Sin, No.399, p48.） 
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Chapter III: Transformation of the Harbin Jewish Community after WWI 
 
In their book World War I and the Jews: Conflict and Transformation in Europe, the 
Middle East, and America, Marsha L. Rozenblit and Jonathan Karp admit that “in a global 
conflagration involving Jews from several continents and from many different countries, there 
really is no typical ‘Jewish’ experience.” 117  Their book examines the different Jewish 
experiences in Europe, the Middle East, and America. However, like many Jewish historical 
writings, this book too ignores the Jews of China. They even did not notice this lacuna. In fact, 
when postwar Versailles-Washington systems rebalanced Russian, Japanese and Chinese power 
in the Far East, the Jews in China were experiencing similar political trends and struggles as in 
Europe, the Middle East and America.  
Resembling Jews, the Chinese also experienced dramatic national reconstruction after 
WWI. Chinese nationalism, similar to Zionism, surged up in the 1920s, a time when the post-
WWI Versailles-Washington system failed to re-establish an equal world order. The Chinese 
actively participated in the Great War by sending about 140,000 laborers to the British and 
French battlefronts and expected international recognition and a new world order in the spirit of 
national self-determination.
118
 Nevertheless, after the war, by ceding Shandong Province 
(Confucius’ hometown) from Germany to Japan, the Allies (America, Britain and France) 
absurdly humiliated the Germans and enhanced Japanese power in Asia – both factors fermented 
and constituted a cause for a second world war. As a member of the Allies in WWI, the Chinese 
felt betrayed. The result was the May Forth Movement in 1919, demonstrating against “Western 
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imperialism, Japanese aggression, and China’s weakness in the face of both.”119 The university 
students and the new literati urged a radical revolution in China. During that time, Chen Duxiu’s 
journal La Jeunesse introduced democracy, science and Marxism to China. Besides the new 
cultural movement, China’s national industries and political modernization were also in process. 
To some degree, WWI facilitated the making of a modern Chinese national state.
120
   
During WWI and Russia’s Civil War, the Harbin Jewish community was not only 
transformed by the large number of refugees, but it also experienced a new political atmosphere 
when the Chinese took charge of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). From the collapse of the 
Russia Empire in 1917 to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1932, administration of the 
CER and Harbin went through three periods: the Chinese took over the CER after 1917; the 
Chinese and the Soviet Union jointly-managed from 1924 on; and the Sino-Soviet Conflict in 
1929. Within the complex Russian-Chinese relations in Northeast China as a setting for 
remaking of the Harbin Jewish community, this chapter will reveal for the first time the uphill 
political struggles that the Harbin Jewish community experienced in the 1920s. 
3.1.  The Influx of Russian Jewish Émigrés and the Emerge of Anti-Semitism in Asia 
 
Replacing East Europe, the United States became a new Jewish center after WWI. During 
the Great War, American Jewish relief organizations established branches in Harbin to transfer 
Jewish refugees from East Europe to the U.S. via the CER. During Russia’s Civil War, White 
Russians spread anti-Semitism to Harbin and other stations along the CER, but the Chinese 
authorities prohibited any anti-Jewish persecutions in the areas it controlled.  
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3.1.1. JDC and HIAS Supported the Jews in China since WWI 
 
WWI and the Russian Revolution of 1917 caused a new wave of Russian Jewish 
emigration from East Europe all over the world. From 1915 to 1925, American Jewry increased 
1.5 times: “Contemporaries estimated that 1,000,000 Jews dwelled in the United States in 1900, 
3,000,000 in 1915, and 4,500,000 in 1925, when drastic immigration laws took effect.”121 In 
Canada, about 42,029 Jews arrived between 1911 and 1921.
122
 Also, tens of thousands of 
Russian Jews moved west to England and France. Similarly, a large number of Jews crossed 
Russia’s eastern border and arrived in Northeast China.  
Eastern European Jewish refugees, escaping the Great War, the Russian Revolution, and 
the ensuing famine, flooded into Harbin. Similar to New York, Montreal, and other cities in 
western countries, the Chinese city of Harbin became one of the world’s largest host cities for 
Eastern European Jewish refugees after the First World War. About 20,000 to 30,000 Jews lived 
in Harbin, and they were supported both by the local Jewish community and major American 
Jewish relief organizations.  
To aid Eastern European Jewish refugees worldwide, many significant Jewish institutions 
sprang up during and after WWI. The Great War facilitated the development of American Jewish 
institutional life: “In response to the war, American Jews constructed not only the Joint 
Distribution Committee (known as JDC, “the first Jewish organization in the United States to 
dispense large-scale funding for international relief”123) in the fall of 1914 but also the American 
Jewish Congress in late 1918, a month after the armistice, to coordinate postwar lobbying efforts 
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on behalf of Eastern European Jews, including for Jewish national rights in the successor 
states.”124  In addition, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), an international news agency 
serving Jewish community newspapers and media around the world, was founded in 1917. Led 
by American Jewry, postwar Jewish institutions linked global Jewish communities more closely 
together ever, including the Jews in China.  
Many American Jewish relief organizations operated in Harbin, and later in Shanghai. 
The most efficient and the longest sustained relief agency in Harbin was the Hebrew Sheltering 
and Immigrant Aid Society of America (HIAS), a Jewish non-profit organization founded to 
support Jewish refugees and argue for Jewish immigration rights globally. HIAS and the JDC co-
operated in the Far East. Mark Wischnitzer’s research shows that “Louis Marshall, speaking in 
behalf of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, promised to assist HIAS’s effort 
for the thousands of refugees moving ‘from the Urals to the Pacific.’ The AJDC made good this 
pledge by contributing five thousand dollars a month to HIAS for its Far East program.”125  
In 1918, HIAS set up a branch in Harbin, known as the Far Eastern Jewish Central 
Information Bureau “Daljewcib.” By the effort of its able chairman on foreign relations, Samuel 
Mason, the activities of HIAS in the Far East were productive. From 1918 to 1934, a period of 
17 years, the Bureau Daljewcib processed 68,566 applications for emigration, documents, 
citizenship of countries of birth, the bringing over of relatives, individual assistance to relatives, 
searches, etc., with assistance of $134,468 dollars.
126
 On the one hand, the HIAS Bureau 
“receives a considerable number of tracers from oversea Jewish organizations to locate relatives 
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on the Far East, in Siberia, the USSR, and Ukraine. The World Jewish Association for the 
Protection of Girls, Women, and Children, the Rabbinical Bureau ‘Agunot’ for women deserted 
by their husbands (Warsaw) etc. apply with similar requests.”127 On the other hand, the Bureau 
“Daljewcib” helped the refugees make a living or find employment in Northeastern and Central 
China. Qualified specialists, especially physicians, were doing rather well in China.
128
 The 
“Daljewcib” also established information bureaus in Irkutsk and Vladivostok, but they did not 
last for long.
129
 Only the Harbin office continued to function until 1939, when it transferred to 
Shanghai to aid the influx of WWII refugees from Central Europe.
130
  
Most of the Jewish refugees, who were trapped in Harbin, planned to go abroad and join 
their relatives in the United States. The main route for Russian Jewish refugees to embark for the 
United States was via the western ports of Japan. In order to shelter the Russian Jewish refugees 
and facilitate their immigration, the American JDC established its office in Yokohama. By the 
influence of Jacob Schiff, the Japanese Government agreed to permit Jewish war refugees enter 
Japan via Harbin in transit to the United States. By August 12, 1918, a total of 1706 Jewish war 
refugees sailed from Yokohama to the United States and other countries.
131
 The tiny Jewish 
community in Yokohama functioned as a transition point, but it did not have further 
development. By contrast, the city of Harbin, as the CER administration center connecting 
Russia, China and Japan, grew into a major Jewish center in Asia after WWI.  
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In November 1920, the Kehillah of Harbin appealed to the New York JDC for 15 sewing 
machines and 3 paper box machines, which would enable the Harbin Jewish refugees to open 2 
factories and “thus furnish work to all who are in need of it.”132 The JDC did not fulfill that 
request.
133
 The priorities of the JDC were to appropriate funds as far as possible to plans for 
reconstruction work that would be “of lasting and permanent benefit to the people of various 
countries.”134 Thus, when the Talmud Torah of Harbin, as well as the Shanghai Jewish school, 
appealed to the JDC, their requests were met. In 1920, Rabbi Levin established the Harbin 
Talmud Torah and served as its principal. One member of the school board, Haim Abraham 
Soloveitchik, formerly chairman of a committee in Vladivostok funded by the JDC and charged 
with the work of repatriating Siberian war prisoners, established a contact with the JDC in New 
York.
135
 So the Cultural Committee of the JDC agreed to grant an appropriation of $1000 to the 
Talmud Torah in Harbin in 1924 and another $2,000 in 1927.
136
 To the Shanghai Jewish School, 
the Cultural Committee appropriated $2,000 and the Refugee Committee made a similar 
appropriation at the same time of $2,000 in 1926.
137
 Moreover, the JDC remitted $500 to the 
Harbin Kehillah for relief of the Great Flood in 1932.
138
  
As New York City became a new world Jewish center after WWI, the American Jews 
positively supported the Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe to China as well as to other parts 
of the world. This tie between Jews in China and in America kept strong until WWII when it 
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became crucial for the survival of the Jewish refugees who escaped from Nazi Europe to 
Shanghai.  
In addition, the rise of the Harbin Jewish community in China as a result of the influx of 
Eastern European Jewish immigrants after WWI coincided with the expansion of Jewish 
communities in New York, Montreal, London, Paris and other cities in the West. The following 
sections will pay attention to the similarities and differences of these Jewish communities in 
Harbin and in the west, as well as the preconditions and the course of development that made 
these parallels.     
3.1.2. Siberian Intervention and the Emerge of Anti-Semitism in Asia 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 dramatically changed the political status of the CER and 
Northeast China. The period from 1917 to 1922 saw a Russian émigré influx in Asia. In 
opposition to the Soviet regime, White Russian troops and refugees gathered in Siberia and the 
Far East. Far from the capital, Siberia became a major region that was controlled by the White 
Russians fighting against the Bolsheviks in the civil war.  
During the famous “Siberian Intervention” (1918-1922), the Allied powers dispatched 
armed forces to support the White Russians against the Soviet Union. Japan seized this 
opportunity and occupied Siberia. When the other allies withdrew, Japan kept increasing its 
heavily armed troops in Siberia and North Manchuria. The Japanese military invasion not only 
strengthened the White Russians’ influence, but the Japanese offensive also intensified the White 
Terror in Siberia by slaughtering innocent civilians.
139
 After the Red Army defeated Admiral 
Kolchak, leader of the White government based at Omsk, the Soviet Union strategically 
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established a Far Eastern Republic in Chita in 1920, a buffer state between the Soviet Union and 
the territories occupied by Japan.
140
  
During the Siberian Intervention, anti-Semitic propaganda emerged for the first time in 
Asia, where traditionally nothing was known about anti-Semitism. The White Russian movement 
adopted anti-Semitism as their ideology, blaming the Jews for the Russian Revolution. From 
1918 to 1920, anti-Jewish violence escalated to an unprecedented level. Historians believe the 
mass murder of Jews in Russia’s Civil War was a prelude to the Holocaust.141 The existing 
literature mainly focuses on the pogroms in Ukraine, where the Jewish population was 
concentrated, but the Jews in Siberia suffered more distressingly in the White Terror of Russia’s 
Civil War. Along the Trans-Siberian Railway, Cossack troops killed Jews cruelly and raped 
Jewish women for amusement.
142
 In Urga, the infamous Bloody Baron Ungern-Sternberg, 
“mandated that all Jews, Communists and commissars be killed along with their families and 
their property confiscated.”143  In the Transbaikal region, another ruthless Cossack governor, 
Ataman Semenov, handed out to each soldier a copy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
144
 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion described a threatening Jewish plan for global economic and 
political domination. The fabricated text was first produced “by the Russian secret police 
working in France during the Dreyfus Affair, probably in 1897 or 1898, on the basis of earlier 
fictional sources.”145 After the Russian Revolution of 1917, it circulated in the White Russian 
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military but was soon passed around to Europeans and became an influential anti-Semitic 
propaganda on the Jewish plot to take over the world.  
The Japanese Army supported Semenov’s troops to fight against the Red Army to the 
very end, so The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was also distributed among the Japanese 
soldiers.
146
 According to David G. Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, “The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion was being distributed as required reading to White Russian and Ukrainian troops 
in Siberia. Japanese soldiers also received copies and took it back with them to Japan, where it 
helped them explain how the revolution had occurred and why they were powerless to reverse 
it.”147 Especially, having served in the headquarters of the Fifth Army in Siberia as a Russian-
language specialist posted to Semenov’s staff,  asue Norihiro (1888-1950) completed the first 
Japanese translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in 1924, under the tile Behind the 
World Revolution (Sekai kakumei no rimen).
148
 Accordingly, Japan made its anti-Semitic policy 
in Harbin and Shanghai in the 1930s.  
3.1.3. The Chinese Took Over the CER and Stemmed Anti-Semitism in Manchuria 
 
In Northeast China, Japan’s ambition caused the high vigilance of foreign allies, 
especially the United States. After the Russian Empire collapsed, Japan and America competed 
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to control Manchuria. Therefore, “to counter a possible Japanese annexation of North Manchuria 
the United States took the lead in establishing the Inter-Allied Committee entrusted with the 
supervision of the Siberian railway system and the CER.”149 Foreign Allies led by the U.S. 
requested that Chinese troops take over the CER. Seizing this opportunity and winning over 
other Chinese forces, warlord Zhang Zuolin in Shenyang, South Manchuria, extended his power 
to Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces in North Manchuria. 
Old Marshal Zhang Zuolin (张作霖 1875-1928), “the tiger of the Northeast,” governed 
Manchuria after the Qing Empire collapsed. Zhang supported Yuan Shikai (袁世凯 1859-1916), 
who replaced the revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen (孙中山 1866-1925) and became the first 
president of the Republic of China in Beijing in 1913.
150
 The western countries recognized the 
Beijing Government as the central government of China de jure. But after Yuan died in 1916, 
control of the country de facto was divided among regional cliques.  
 Located in Shenyang (Fengtian) in South Manchuria, Marshal Zhang strived to build a 
civil government by appointing intellectuals, such as Wang Yongjiang, to reform 
administration.
151
 During Zhang’s rule, the unavoidable banditry problem in the frontier zone 
was also manageable.
152
 Moreover, Zhang was able to use his power to balance the Chinese 
interests with that of Japan in South Manchuria and Russia in the North. Thus, Zhang 
strengthened a relatively effective Chinese rule in the region.     
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During the Russian Civil War, the Chinese not only controlled Manchuria militarily, but 
they also retrieved their rights in the CER. The Soviet Union forces struggled with the White 
Russian army in Siberia and could not reach Northeast China. Moreover, the internationally 
isolated Soviet Union attempted to draw China over to its side. Thus, on July 25, 1919, the 
Soviet Union published the famous “Karakhan Manifesto,” announcing a return of the CER to 
China without compensation.
153
 It took almost 7 years for the newly established Soviet power to 
reach Northeast China again.
154
 Therefore, the Chinese authorities under Zhang’s leadership 
claimed sovereignty of the CER and the region of Northeast China.  
Russia’s Civil War ended when the Soviet Union merged with the Far East Republic in 
late 1922. In the wake of the Japanese army retreat from the Far East, the helpless White 
Russians fled all over the world. According to John J. Stephan, “some 560,000 Russians had 
flocked to Germany by 1920, and most of these later gravitated to France, which in the 1930s 
emerged as a mecca for displaced Russians. An eastward wave of about 250,000 people rolled 
across Siberia to the Far East.”155  The exiled White Russians in China mainly gathered in 
Harbin, from where they further transferred to Shanghai or overseas. According to a Chinese 
source, in Harbin, there were 60,200 Russians in 1918, but the Russian population increased to 
131,073 in 1920 and 155,402 in 1922.
156
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In the borderlands, the remnant White Russian forces kept spreading anti-Semitic 
propaganda and murdering Jews, but they did not become rampant because the Chinese 
authorities disarmed the White Russian troops and forbade any anti-Semitic persecutions. In 
October 1922, White bandits killed a Manchuli Jewish merchant named Nisan Mendelevich 
Fridman in the area of Abagaitu Islet on Russian-Chinese border. On October 17, the panic-
stricken Manchuli Jewish community called for an emergency meeting and immediately 
informed the Harbin Jewish community of the Fridman incident. The Harbin Jewish community 
asked the Chinese Army for protection. The Chinese Army of the Special District of the Eastern 
Provinces subsequently increased sentries and patrol guards, and instituted some precautionary 
measures to protect Jewish émigrés.
157
 According to Qu Wei and Li Shuxiao, the Chinese 




Even though anti-Semitism escalated and spread to Asia after WWI, the Chinese did not 
develop an anti-Jewish view. In early modern China, most of the available information on Jews 
was translated from British, German, Japanese and some other anti-Semitic literature, but the 
Chinese interpreted them differently to serve their own purpose for national struggle. Irene Eber 
observes that in the Chinese literature on Jews, “practically all of the articles stressed the fact of 
the Jews’ dispersion and emphasized that the Zionist movement was an organized effort to help 
their return to the homeland.”159 By speaking of Zionism, Chinese writers aimed to encourage 
the Chinese people to fight for their national independence. Recounting Jewish history and the 
Zionist movement, German-educated scholar  u Songhua wrote that “If our Chinese fellow-
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countrymen could have the same enthusiasm and determination that Jews displayed in their 
resurgent movement,” Chinese national independence would be achieved. 160  Sympathy and 
alliance with other oppressed nations was one of the main Chinese moral orientations and 
diplomatic policies during the two World Wars.  
Therefore, in the 1920s, White Russian anti-Jewish violence was stemmed in Northeast 
China because of the Chinese rule. An article titled “The Great Jewish Settlement in the Far 
East,” in the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, reported in May 1926 that: 
Harbin may in truth be considered a fortunate Jewish community that has entirely 
escaped the unpleasant operations that the other Jewish settlements in Russia have gone 
through during the years of the war. The town makes the impression of having, by mere 
chance, avoided all the terrible incidents of the Civil War, Pogroms, hunger and military 
communism and has remained quite untouched by them. It needs a more intimate study 
of the out-of-the-way corners and more distant alleys to find the tens of thousands of 
hungry, broken and spiritually wrecked and homeless people that the Civil wars and 
pogroms have brought here. It is only then that one is reminded of the great tragedy that 
has taken place thousands of miles away.
161
 
The article shows that the Harbin Jewish community fortunately escaped the violence 
caused by the Russian Civil War and became a shelter for Jews in the Far East.  
3.2.  Golden Age of the Harbin Jewish Community under Chinese Rule  
 
After the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Chinese inherited the CER from the 
Russian colonizers and Sinicized it. The existing western scholarly work speaks of a Chinese 
civil government of Manchuria of the 1920s. This study illustrates that during this time the 
Harbin Jewish community also entered its heyday and emerged as a new Jewish center in the Far 
East.  
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3.2.1. Chinese – Administrated Harbin  
 
In 1920-21, the Beijing Government established the Special District of the Eastern 
Provinces (东省特别区, Dongsheng Tebie Qu) to replace Russian colonial rule in Northeast 
China. The administration was both national and regional: “Although the Special District was 
established by a national mandate from Beijing, the details of its organization were left to 
regional, provincial, and municipal elites.”162 The Special District administers responded both to 
the Beijing Government and Zhang Zuolin’s Shenyang Government.  
In 1920, the previous CER governor Khorvat was replaced by Boris Ostroumoff, who 
was a bureaucrat of the former Russian Empire in Siberia.
163
 Ostroumoff worked for the benefit 
of the Russian émigrés, as did the Chinese. The newly nominated Chinese officials of the CER 
were usually bilingual and bicultural. They had graduated from Russian schools in Harbin, or 
married Russian wives; therefore, they protected the rights of the Russian émigrés. The head of 
the Special District, Zhu Qinglan, “founded the International Society for the Protection of 
Refugees, which lobbied the Chinese commercial class for funds and carried on extensive charity 
work.”164  
The Chinese aimed to turn the CER into a commercial entity only, so the administration 
of the police, the courts, municipal governments, and territoriality could be transferred to the 
Chinese gradually. On 23 October 1920, the Beijing Government announced the abolition of “the 
extraterritorial rights of all Russian subjects living in China.”165 On 30 October, the Chinese 
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confirmed the authority of the Special District High Court over all the courts in Manchuria.
166
 
Nevertheless, Russian judges, lawyers, and laws were retained to ensure the functioning of the 
Russian community. Also, the CER police and guards integrated both Chinese and Russians. In 
1923, the Chinese attempted to take over the CER’s land Department but failed, so “the Special 
District continued to have two land administrations until 1935, when the new Japanese-
controlled state of Manchukuo forced the USSR to sell the CER to Japan.”167  
Under the co-management of the Chinese and the Russians, the CER gained more profits 
than ever: By 1923, the CER was carrying 2,762,000 tons of goods, 296.8 tons of bean oil 
production, and doubled passenger traffic.
168
 It was well recognized that Chinese rule had 
brought about a new order in Harbin: the economic improvement of the CER, more effective 
juridical systems, and a better urban sanitation. Chinese religious and cultural symbols – the 
Buddhist Paradise Temple and the Confucian Temple – were also constructed in Harbin during 
this period. 
To some extent, Harbin Chinese authorities inherited and improved upon the previous 
Russian government. Undoubtedly, the Special District was a political bright spot in the early 
years of the Republic of China. Its model was soon applied to Shanghai, Tianjin, and other 
concessions in which foreigners’ influence was weakened. By examining Harbin’s history in the 
1920s, James Carter comments that “the first generation of Chinese nationalists had sought a 
modern Harbin as part of a new China, produced from cooperation between Western and 
Chinese forces.”169 Also Blaine Chiasson observes that, the period of the 1920s, “reviled as the 
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absolute low point of China’s century-long crisis, would herald a period of relative growth and 
prosperity for Manchuria.”170  
3.2.2. Prosperity of the Harbin Jewish Community   
 
In the 1920s, Harbin became the leading city in Manchuria under Chinese administration. 
China gained the chance to develop its own national industries as the Europeans loosened their 
control in Asia because of the war. Historian Hs  wrote that “the World War I period had 
witnessed an unprecedented expansion of Chinese industry and commerce – especially in the 
fields of textiles, flour mills, silk, matches, cement, cigarettes, and modern banks and joint-stock 
corporations – as a result of favorable internal and external conditions.”171 Through the Chinese 
program to improve the country by developing industry (shiyejiuguo), 400 private Chinese firms 
were established in Harbin during WWI, and the number grew into 1,200 by 1931.
172
 Clausen 
and Thogersen observed that “Chinese entrepreneurs thus successfully moved into the vacuum 
created by the demise of Russian influence.”173  
Thanks to the rise of the Chinese economy, the Jewish industries and trades also thrived. 
There were more than 116 Jewish shops in Harbin before WWI.
174
 But by 1926, there were 489 
Jewish businesses in Harbin, multiplying more than four times as compared to before WWI.
175
 
Jewish commerce accounted for 31.6% and Jewish industry accounted for 46.5% of all the 
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foreign investment in Northern Manchuria.
176
 Harbin scholar Zhang Tiejiang places Harbin at 
the centre of Jewish economy in East Asia. Zhang’s researches on Harbin Jews have stimulated 
both Jewish studies in China in particular and the worldwide studies on the Jews of China.
177
 
According to the “1922-1923 Harbin Immigration Vocation Survey” (see below) in the 
Harbin – Fujiadian, Trade - Industrial and Railway Directory, which was conducted by a 
Russian named K. Ocheretin, Harbin Jews numbering 5,848 out of 56,375 Eastern European 
immigrants were the second largest Russian immigrant group. Poles, Latvians, Estonians, and 
Czechs had hundreds of people, but their numbers were far less than the Jews. The “1922-1923 
Harbin Immigration Vocation Survey” (The Survey) classified 15 career categories, such as 
engineer, doctor, teacher, student, railway worker, priest, police, businessman, clerk, craftsman, 
and laborer. More than three thousand Russians took almost all the jobs of railway workers, 
accounting for 7 percent of the Russian population. The policemen were Russians too. By 
contrast, most Jews engaged in business to supply the railway. 1,106 Jewish landlords, 
merchants and industrial workers took 33.7 percent of the total 3,820 population in business. 
Also, 162 Jewish doctors and nurses, 131 teachers and lawyers and 464 artisans took large part 
of those vocations among the Eastern European immigrants. Generally speaking, the Survey of 
vocation of the Eastern European immigrants showed that Jews made up a high percentage of the 
employees and businessmen in Harbin. Most of them had relatively stable and high-salary jobs. 
Harbin Jews were among the higher and middle social classes.  
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Table 1: 1922-1923 Harbin Immigration Vocation Survey 
Nation 
Career  
Russia Jew Poland Latvia Estonia Czech Other Total 
Engineer, 
Technician  
675 19 40 8 6 5 9 762 
Doctor, Nurse 474 162 16 9 6 2 5 674 
Teacher, Lawyer  1704 131 39 12 4 7 25 1922 
Student 955 145 25 3 2 1 8 1139 
Railway Worker 3482 16 27 6 _ 1 2 3534 
Priest 100 5 2 1 _ _ 2 110 
Police 98 _ _ 2 _ _ _ 100 




1986 1106 71 13 6 10 88 3280 
Accountant, 
Statistician, Clerk  
926 95 25 10 3 7 21 1087 
Artisan  3519 464 92 25 15 49 53 4217 
Laborer 2034 38 24 2 _ 5 11 2114 
Household 13493 1912 233 50 21 32 95 15836 
Service work  7276 535 103 18 16 19 48 8015 
Children 10961 1211 211 35 12 24 101 12555 
Total 48674 5848 922 196 93 164 478 56375 
 
[Table from: К. Oчеретин (K.Ocheretin), харбин – фуциядянь: торгово - лромышленный и железнодорожный 
спровочник, (Harbin – Fujiadian. Trade - Industrial and Railway Directory), (Harbin: 1925), 53, quoted in Liu, 
Harbin Youtai Qiaomin Shi, 73-4.] 
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The Survey indicates that Russian Jews dominated Harbin’s commerce and industries. 
Evidently, “a socialist and ethnographer, Moisei Krol, noticed when he arrived in 1918 in Harbin 
that ‘almost all big commercial enterprises in Harbin were in Jewish hands.’”178 
After 1917, Jews kept leading Harbin’s typical industries of grain and soybeans. 
Kabalkin’s soybean oil mill earned huge profits during WWI, as the food demand of European 
markets increased. However, the crash of the rouble after the Russian Revolution of 1917 swept 
away the fortunes of so many Russian factories; Kabalkin’s company was no exception. Loyal to 
the old regime, Kabalkin never believed that the Russian Empire would collapse. As a result, 
almost all of his businesses in Manchuria went bankrupt. It was not until 1921 when Kabalkin re-
established his company with the help of his son, Yaakov Romanovich Kabalkin.
179
  
Using new technology that he studied in Western Europe, Yaakov R. Kabalkin 
introduced 22 new hydraulic oil presses, which increased his company’s oil yield from 10 to 12 
percent. The renewed oil mill could produce 225,000 Russian pounds (3,700 tons) of soybean oil 
and 1,500,000 Russian pounds (25,000 tons) of soybean cakes in one year. The young Kabalkin 
exported the refined soybean productions to South China, Siberia, Japan, the United States, and 
Europe.
180
 A prominent entrepreneur, Yaakov Kabalkin, was elected President of the Harbin 
Stock Exchange Committee in 1924. He headed the Stock Exchange Committee for ten years, 
until 1934 when the Japanese forced him to resign. In July 1939, the Japanese took over 
Kabalkin’s oil mill, and all its soybean productions was exported solely to Japan.181 
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Harbin’s well known grain and sugar producers, Semion Soskin, also known as “the grain 
king” and Lev Zickman, referred to as the “sugar king,” were also Eastern European Jews. 
Soskin was from a wealthy grain merchant family in the town of Kerch in Crimea. He and his 
two brothers established the S. Soskin and Co. Ltd in Harbin with funds of one million American 
dollars after WWI. They set up branches in Vancouver, London, Dalian and Vladivostok.
182
 By 
1923, the Soskin flour mill and oil mill, located in Fujiadian (the Chinese town), “exported 
nearly 250,000 kgs of wheat, soybeans, and oil, more than a quarter of the CER’s total annual 
export.”183 The popular Harbin Russian ditty sang that “Bez zhenshchiny muzhchina, kak ofitser 
bez china, kak mestnyi Soskin bez bobov [A man without a woman is like an officer without rank, 
like our own Soskin without soybeans].”184 This Russian ditty demonstrates how prominent the 
Jewish economic achievement and influence were in Harbin.  
In addition, China’s first and largest sugar beet processing plant, the Ashihe Sugar-
refining Factory, was founded by a group of Polish Jews: Chaidewafu 柴德瓦夫 (Russian or 
Polish name is not available), Aaron Iosifovich Kagan, and Lev Zickman.
185
 “They taught local 
farmers how to cultivate sugar beets,” and produced both “soft Chinese sugar and hard cube 
sugar and sugarcones.” 186 Later, they imported raw sugar from Cuba and Java. It was estimated 
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that the Ashihe Sugar Factory produced about 15,000 tons of raw sugar and 6,000 tons of 
granulated sugar per year.
187
  
One prominent example of the cooperation of Chinese and Russian Jews in industry was 
the Skidelsky family. As early as the CER being constructed, the Skidelskys easily obtained 
timber and coal concessions from Qing government officials. After the Qing dynasty collapsed, 
the Skidelskys re-established a good relationship with the republican government. In 1920, the 
Heilongjiang Province Bureau of Railway Negotiation (Tielu Jiaosheju) granted the Skidelskys a 
permit to recruit 9,500 coal workers for the Dalai Nur Mines. In 1924, the head of the Industrial 
Department of Jilin Province, Ma Deen, and the Skidelskys signed a 30-year contract for the 
joint management for Mulin Mines between the Chinese officials and the Russian Jewish 
merchants. The total investment was six million Chinese currencies of Harbin (Ha dayang): Jilin 
Province invested in the mining pits three million; the Skidelskys invested another three million. 
The corporate headquarter was set up in Harbin. The Skidelskys and the Chinese jointly 
managed the investment, administration, and employees, based on a half and half principle. By 
1931, there were two pits (No.2 pit was headed by the Chinese engineer Sun Yuqi), seven adits, 
a 9,925 square meter machinery factory, and a 138 square meter power plant, which produced 
1.63 million tons of coal and gained profits of 6.7 million Chinese currencies of Jilin (Jilin 
dayang). It became the number one coal mine in Northern Manchuria. In 1927, the Skidelskys 
and the Chinese officials jointly established a primary school for the miners’ children in Lishu 
village.
188
 Teddy Kaufman recalls that the Skidelskys built “a town” close by the Mulin Coal 
Mines, “where thousands of their workers lived; there they also built a school, a hospital, a 
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Russian Orthodox Church and other public buildings… They were among the most generous 
donors to the Harbin Jewish community.”189 
Besides soybean, grain and sugar exportation, timber and coal industries, Russian Jews 
also led the tobacco industry, petroleum corporations, the fur and textile trades, and the banking 
and insurance business in Harbin. In January 1922, to boost the established Jewish businesses, 
Harbin Jewish magnates, such as Solomon Skidelsky, Yaakov (Jacob) Kabalkin, Isaac Soskin, 
Aaron Iosifovich Kagan, and Jacob Frizer founded the Far Eastern Jewish Bank of Commerce. 
With the investment of Japanese currency 400,000 yen (the Russian rouble crashed after the 
1917 Revolution), the Jewish Bank of Commerce competed against the Japanese banks, whose 
capital came from South Manchuria. Subsequently, the Jewish Bank of Commerce went 
bankrupt in 1933 when the Japanese Guandong Army occupied North Manchuria.
190
   
In June 1923, another Jewish bank, the Jewish People’s Bank, was opened. It was 
registered with Chinese currency in Harbin 5,812 yuan. In 1924, the capital fund increased to 
100,000 yuan. Led by small traders and middle class employees, like A. M. Pataka, Dr. A 
Kaufman, and G. B. Drizin, the Jewish People’s Bank provided a low interest rate and small 
credit, only 10 yen par value share, for retail traders and artisans to start their own businesses. At 
least 10 percent of the profits of the bank were donated to Jewish public education and charity. 
The Jewish People’s Bank was operated until October 1959 when the Harbin Jewish community 
came to its end. The Chinese government subsequently transformed the Jewish People’s Bank 
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into the Harbin People’s Bank for Foreign Residents. It was one of the banks that lasted the 
longest time in Harbin.
191
 
Overall, WWI and the Russian Revolution weakened the western colonizers’ control in 
China so that the Chinese gained the opportunity to recover their national economy. When the 
Chinese administrated the CER and Harbin, the CER earned more profits and the city of greater 
Harbin, both the Russian enclave and Fujiaodian, flourished. Consequently, the Harbin Jewish 
community not only expanded by the arrival of the new Russian Jewish immigrants, but also 
became prosperous and came into its golden time.   
Remarkably, the Russian Jews in Harbin dominated the industries and boosted the 
economy of the city in an early stage when other Russian Jewish immigrants in New York, 
Montreal, London or Paris could only sell their labours in the garment industry. One reason that 
made the distinction between Russian Jews in Harbin and in the West was that the unfamiliar 
social, political and cultural milieu in America, England and the other western countries 
challenged the uprooted Eastern European new comers. Lloyd Gartner observes that “Once in 
England, however, East European Jews moved speedily in the direction of Anglicization and 
assimilation into English culture.”192 Even so, the East End of London, the Lower East Side of 
New  ork, the Pletzl of Paris, and “other immigrant areas of settlement were poor and crowded 
quarters, where Yiddish signs, kosher butchers, and Jewish restaurants gave visible expression to 
the foreignness of their residents.”193 Moreover, the well-established German Jews in New York, 
the native Jews in England and France, all shared some of the prejudices of their host societies 
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toward the immigrants. Even though native Jews established charities to assist the new 
immigrants, they kept a separate identity from the Russian Jews, and feared that the differentness 
of the later might arouse anti-Semitism.  
By contrast, the precondition of remaking of the Russian Jewish community in Harbin 
was different. The well-established Russian Jewish community in Harbin almost immediately 
absorbed the new immigrants, who constituted the same Russian Jewish identity. The new 
immigrants settled down in the railway zone, the most developed area of the city. Since 
November 1915, when the WWI refugees arrived in Harbin, a free soup kitchen “was opened on 
Samannaya Street, serving hot food for the refugees and the local needy three times daily.”194 A 
Jewish infirmary and a home for the aged were both set up in 1920. Moreover, because of the 
previous Russian influence in Harbin, the Eastern European Jewish immigrants did not have 
cultural or language barriers to integrate into local society. The Russian enclave served as a 
buffer between the Jewish and the Chinese societies. It was much easier for the new immigrants 
to integrate into the native Jewry and society. Therefore, among all the Russian Jewish 
communities in Diaspora, Harbin was a very unique one in that it was dominated by the Russian 
Jews from the very beginning to the end. In Northeast China, the homogeneous Harbin Jewry 
established for itself the sort of coherent Russian Jewish institutions that were being challenged 
or destroyed in Russia itself.  
But more importantly, the rise of the Harbin Jewish community could not be separated 
from the Chinese setting as a whole. After WWI, similar to the Jews, the Chinese also 
experienced national self-reconstruction, as analyzed previously. As a rising economic entity, 
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China offered Jews the equal opportunity without prejudice or restrictions. Jewish doctors, 
professionals, technicians and merchants were welcomed in China. Evidence can also be drawn 
from the developments of the Tianjin and Shanghai Jewish communities in inner China.  
The Tianjin (Tientsin) Jewish community was founded by Russian Jews in 1904. The 
Great War and the Russian Revolution of 1917 brought a wave of Jewish refugees to settle in 
Tianjin via Harbin. It consequently grew into the second largest Russian Jewish community in 
China, consisting of about 500-600 Jewish families. The Tianjin Hebrew Association was 
founded in 1920, led by Leo Gershevich, a fur merchant.
195
 The Tianjin Jews had the closest ties 
with the Harbin Jewish community because of the fur trade industry. According to scholar Xu 
Xin, “There were more than 100 fur firms owned by Jews in the city. Furs were obtained in 
Northeast China but sorted and processed in Tianjin. Fur products were chiefly shipped to 
American and European markets.”196  
Similarly, Jews from Harbin, who moved south, also expanded and strengthened the 
Shanghai Jewish Community. Before the Russian Jews came, the Baghdadi Jews had already 
established a Sephardic Jewish community there. As Shanghai was a British colony, the 
Baghdadi Jewish merchants came with the Englishmen in the 1840s, just after China was forced 
to open to foreign trade.
197
 The Baghdadi Jewish tycoons in Shanghai were very wealthy, but 
their number was no more than 700, all of whom integrated into the Shanghai’s International 
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 Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russian Jewish refugees 




Hence, the Jewish communities in China all expanded after the WWI period, a time when 
Eastern European Jews were uprooted and immigrated all over the world. Therefore, the Russian 
Jewish communities not only sprang up in the western countries, such as the United States and 
Canada, but they also obtained a foothold and multiplied in China during the Great Immigration 
period. The parallel development of the Jewish communities in China, which have long been 
ignored, indeed deserves more attention in modern Jewish history.   
 
Figure 4: Jewish Fur Traders in Rural China  
(Image from YIVO, RG 2030, Dan and Yisha Ben-Canaan Collection) 
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Figure 5: Guests attend a banquet in Harbin, China, to celebrate the wedding anniversary of Isaac and 
Manya Soskin, circa 1925. 
 (Image from https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1140234, accessed 9 Oct. 2017) 
 
3.2.3. Remaking of the Harbin Kehillah  
 
After WWI, the American Jewish Congress was founded in Philadelphia's historic 
Independence Hall in 1918 and was led by the famous Rabbi, R. Stephen S. Wise. Similarly, the 
Canadian Jewish Congress was established in Montreal in 1919. In this way, diverse Jewish 
groups were able to vote for their representatives and be unified for the struggle for Jewish 
national rights all over the world. In the remote Far East, Harbin Jewry quickly recognized the 
new democratic trend and surprisingly made the same efforts.  
 After the demise of the organized Jewish communities in Siberia in 1917, Harbin became 
the only major Jewish center in the east. In January, 1919, the Provisional Committee of the 
Harbin Jewish Association organized an Electoral Bureau of the Council for a democratic 
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election. The Electoral Bureau of the Jewish Council was something new to the Harbin Jews, so 
the electoral Bureau first initiated a census of Harbin Jews.  
However, the census was conducted by the Jewish school students, who were not 
professional. In addition, the orthodox Jews rejected the census, “arguing that ‘counting’ the 
Jews will inevitably bring calamity upon the community.”200 Consequently, the outcome of a 
total of 7,554 Jewish adults in Harbin was an inaccurate one. Kaufman estimated that the Jewish 
population ought to be 15,000 to 16,000 living in the city of Harbin in 1919.
201
 Nevertheless, the 
census of 7,554 Jews, 4,500 who were above the age 20, and 3,000 under the age 20, was 
publicized in Harbin’s Yuandong Bao [Far Eastern Newspaper] on January 17, 1919.202 
An article titled “The Great Jewish Settlement in the Far East,” in The Canadian Jewish 
Chronicle, reported in May 1926 that “the last census of the Jewish population took place in 
1917, and this also in a far from thorough manner. This census showed that there were just 7,554 
Jews in the town. But the greater number of immigrants arrived since that time, that is, during the 
past seven years, and it can therefore be assumed that there are at least four times as many Jews 
in Harbin at the present time – that is, about 30,000 souls.”203  
Another reliable reference is the Census of the Old Jewish Graveyard in Harbin (shown 
below). It indicates that from the year 1903 to 1958, there were in total 3,173 graves, 1,923 
males and 1,250 females. The peak of the deceased population was 177 in 1919, which 
approximately doubled the total of 80 in 1917 and tripled the total of 59 in 1915. The census of 
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the graveyard confirmed that the peak of the Harbin Jewish population happened after the WWI 
period.  
Table 2: The Census of the Old Jewish Graveyard in Harbin 
 
{Table from: Zhang Tiejiang and Zhao Liantai, “Harbin  outairen Mudi Kaochao  anjiu [Investigation of the 
Jewish Graveyard in Harbin],” Heilongjiang Social Sciences, No. 1, 2002, General No. 70: 55. (The original source 
of the table is from Harbin Archive No.1-26-33)}. 
Year  Population  Total 
(Male/Female) 
Year  Population  Total 
(Male/Female) 
Year  Population  Total 
(Male/Female) 
1903         8/1             9 1922 71/35 106 1941         36/13 49 
1904       29/4 33 1923 61/29 90 1942 23/20 43 
1905 44/2 46 1924 48/37 85 1943 36/17 53 
1906 42/25 67 1925 49/30 79 1944 29/20 49 
1907 18/15 33 1926 43/32 75 1945  39/32 71 
1908 29/13 42 1927 45/39 84 1946 34/27 61 
1909 33/17 50 1928 49/22 71 1947 22/18 40 
1910 19/10 29 1929 43/46 89 1948 29/23 52 
1911 28/13 41 1930 53/35 88 1949 23/8 31 
1912 35/16 51 1931 35/33 68 1950          17/16 33 
1913 35/21 56 1932 39/43 82 1951 8/11 19 
1914  29/26 55 1933 32/36 68 1952 9/9 18 
1915 34/25 59 1934 47/23 70 1953 9/11 20 
1916 45/36 81 1935 44/22 66 1954 6/9 15 
1917 52/28 80 1936 27/17 44 1955 12/3 15 
1918 52/43 95 1937 34/20 54 1956 4/4 8 
1919 108/69 177 1938        31/27 58 1957 8/3 11 
1920 70/35 105 1939 31/18 49 1958 1/- 1 
1921 55/39 94 1940 31/24 55 Total 345/244 589 
Total 765/438 1,203 Total 813/568 1,381 Grand Total 3,173 
80 
 
Based on the 1919 census, the Harbin Jewish Council held a democratic election and 
elected 40 members: General Zionist Party had 16 members; the Bund had 8; the Poale Zion had 
7; the Zeirei Zion had 4; the Mizrachi had 2; the Volks Partei had 2; and the Agudat Israel had 
1.
204
 The General Zionist Party with 16 members was in the top place. Bund (Jewish Socialist 
Party) with 8 members was in the second place. Following them, socialist Zionism and religious 
Zionism (Mizrachi) also gained some influence. A small group supported the Agudat Israel, an 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish political party. Despite their small number, the Harbin Jewry manifested a 
vigorous Jewish political engagement. Hence the newly established Harbin Jewish Council 
transformed the Kehillah and functioned as the Jewish Association. The sequential presidents of 
the Harbin Jewish community from 1903 to 1950 were: E. Dobisof, G. B. Drizin, Shlomo 
(Salomon) Ravikovich, Isaac Soskin, Abraham Kaufman, Rabbi Aharon Kiselev, and Michael 
Zaigraef.
205
 Dobisof and Drizin were Siberian Jews who founded the Harbin Jewish community. 
Soskin and Kaufman were ardent Zionists. Rabbi Kiselev also supported Zionism.  
On April 19, 1920, the Statute of the Harbin Jewish Council was successfully registered 
with the newly established Chinese District Court of the Border Region.
206
 The Chinese Special 
District of the Eastern Provinces had become the chief civil administrator of Harbin, “assuming 
most of the powers that the Russian administration had held previously.” 207  The Chinese 
gradually secured the administration of police and court, but the Russians still dominated the 
previous Russia-established municipality in the railway zone as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. In the municipal elections taking place during 1922-23, the Chinese authorities made 
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efforts to add their influence in the municipality. The elected members made up the Municipal 
Assembly, which consisted of 60 members: 12 Russians, 12 Chinese, 3 Japanese, 3 foreigners (1 
British, 1 American, and 1 Belgian), and delegates from other blocs.
208
 The Chinese did not take 
over the Russian municipality by force, but they gradually expanded their influence there.  
Seven Russian Jews were elected to the Municipal Assembly, constituting 11 percent. 
Three Jews– I. H. Soskin, I. S. Fride, and Y.Y. Yabrov – were elected by the General City bloc, 
which traditionally controlled the municipality. Four Jews – Dr. Y. E. Elyason, Dr. A.Y. 
Kaufman, Y. R. Kabalkin and Y. R. Baranov – were elected by the newly formed democratic 
section in the Russian bloc.
209
 The democrats “attempted to form a coalition with Chinese 
electors,” thus they “drew the criticism of Russian traditionalists who said they were traitors.”210 
Finally, the four Jews and one non-Jewish delegate operated the democratic bloc in the 
Municipal Assembly. We know details about three of the seven Jews in the Municipal Assembly: 
I.H. Soskin was the chairman of the Far Eastern Jewish Commercial Bank of Harbin and the 
president of the Harbin Jewish Council; Y.R. Kabalkin was the president of the Harbin 
Exchange; Dr. Kaufman was the leader of the Harbin Zionist Organization. The elected Jewish 
municipal members immigrated to Harbin and established themselves well in Harbin before the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. The Harbin Jews successfully kept their civil rights and influence as 
in the previous Russian dominated period before 1917. With Harbin a home base, the Chinese 
and the Russians, including the Russian Jews, lived relatively peacefully and harmoniously.  
In 1921, the Harbin Jewish community built a new synagogue on the Diagonalnaia Street 
(Jiangwei Street), not far from the Main Synagogue. The New Synagogue became the largest 
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synagogue in Northeast China with a capacity of 800. For the large number of Jewish refugees 
coming after 1917, the Harbin Jewish community built one more Heder (Jewish primary school) 
in the Majiagou area in 1921.
211
 The first Jewish middle school in the Far East – the Harbin 
Jewish Middle School – was built in 1918 near the main synagogue in the Pristan District 
(Daoli). In August 1922, there were 140 primary students and 100 middle school students. Sixty 
percent of the Jewish students were from poor families, so the Jewish schools largely depended 
on charity and donations.
212
  
In 1920, Rabbi Levin founded the Talmud Torah School, financially aided by the 
Skidelsky brothers. In its first years the school followed the Orthodox teachings on Halakha and 
classic texts. But their students could not be admitted by Russian public schools; wealthy Jews 
chose to send their children to Russian commercial or technological schools.
213
 Therefore, from 
the second grade, besides Hebrew and Torah studies, the school added 12 hours out of 34 hours 
every week on secular subjects, including mathematics, Russian and geography.
214
 Moreover, 
Zionist teachers, Yehezkiel Leib Nadel and his wife Rivka, not only taught knowledge of 
Palestine, but also advocated equal education for female children so that Jewish girls could 
attend the Talmud Torah too. The Talmud Torah was the great hope for Harbin Jewish parents 
who wanted their children to learn Judaism and inherit the Jewish tradition. Hayim Tadmor, 
whose family immigrated to Palestine in 1935, recounted that “I was 12 years old when my 
mother and I joined my sister and her family in Palestine, and so I went directly into the sixth 
grade in elementary school. Thanks to the Harbin Talmud Torah, my transfer to school in 
Palestine was normal and natural, and I do not remember having any special problems with 
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Hebrew. I seem to have known enough to communicate with teachers and classmates and to 
study the Bible, Hebrew songs, and literature.”215 Tadmor later became the vice present of the 
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.  
The Balfour Declaration of 1917, which declared British support for the establishment of 
a Jewish national home in Palestine, boosted Zionists’ activities worldwide. On 26 November 
1918, Harbin Zionists celebrated the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in the Moderne 
Hotel. In December, Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in 
London, sent letters to Harbin concerning Palestine fund collection.
216
 In addition, the WZO sent 
its first representative, Israel Cohen, to East Asia in 1920.
 
Toward the end of 1920, Cohen 
arrived in Harbin and he was impressed by the community’s vigorousness and generosity. Cohen 
said that there was no need for him to “gain converts,” and his task was “confined to spreading 
information and obtaining donations from a relatively small group who had succeeded in 
becoming or remaining wealthy despite the economic typhoon that had swept away the fortunes 
of so many.”217 Jews in China made considerable donations to the Jewish National Fund. Yossi 
Katz’s research shows that of “the total sum collected in 32 countries in the period from the 
establishment of the Jewish National Fund in 1901 until 1922, the Zionists of China lie in 16th 
place, having collected £26,000 sterling.”218 
From 1919 to 1921, Harbin hosted two Far Eastern Zionist Congresses, aiming to prompt 
cultural, social and commercial contacts between the Far Eastern Jews and Palestine. In April 
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1921, the WZO in London nominated Kaufman as the representative of the WZO in the Far East 
and Siberia. Kaufman picked up the official nomination letter through the British Consul in 
Harbin, who was in charge of distribution of Palestine Immigration Certificates. In April 1921, 
the first aliyah of 47 Far Eastern Jews immigrated to Palestine. Twenty-one of them came from 
Harbin. In May and July, another two aliyahs, about 70 Jews, left China for Palestine.
219
     
Furthermore, the Palestinian informational bulletin Sibir - Palestina was transferred from 
Shanghai to Harbin in December 1920. Kaufman was its chief editor. It was renamed as 
Evreiskaya Jizn (Jewish Life) in January 1925. The journal’s special issues for youth, Maccabi, 
were initiated in 1939 (Maccabi as the Harbin Jewish youth sport organization was established in 
June 1921). When Zionists’ activities and publications were halted in Soviet Russia, Jewish Life 
became the only source for Far Eastern Jews to learn Palestinian information and to establish 
contact with other Jewish communities. Twenty percent of the copies of the journal were sent to 
Palestine and other countries, and eighty percent of the copies were circulated among Jews in 
Harbin and other Chinese cities. Jewish Life was published for more than 20 years until the 
Japanese authorities closed it in June 1943.
220
    
It was notable that Kaufman’s wife, Bertha Schwartz-Kaufman, was one of the few 
women who participated in the first World Zionist Congresses. She led the Women's 
International Zionist Organization (WIZO) in Harbin. She was also the leader of the Harbin 
Women’s Charity Association. The Harbin Jewish community founded the Women’s Charity in 
1906: “They provided clothes, some money, wood, and coal when necessary, and also helped 
poor Jewish families to pay rents, repay bank loans, or pay tuition for their children. The 
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expenses were covered by membership fees and donations. On average the Women’s Charity 
Association helped about 200 families.”221 In addition, the Jewish Women’s Charity Association 
opened a training school in 1921, “where nearly 40 young women were studying tailoring and 
sewing for free.” 222 Unfortunately, Madam Kaufman died eight months after giving birth to her 
second son Theodore (Teddy) in 1925, at the age of 37.
223
 After her death, the Jewish community 
named the training school by her name as the “Schwartz-Kaufman Labor School” in memory of 
this extraordinary Jewish woman.
224
 
Before 1917, the Orthodox and Zionists dominated the Harbin Jewish community, with 
Harbin’s Chief Rabbi Kiselev advocating Zionism. In his Russian monograph called 
 a  s  onal      evre s vo : sborn   s a e    le   s    (Nationalism and Judaism: a collection of 
articles and lectures), Rabbi Kiselev combined Judaism and nationalism, and emphasized that it 
was the Jewish religion that kept the Jewish nationality alive in the Diaspora. To Rabbi Kiselev, 
Judaism and the Jewish nation were entwined like “‘the flame is to the ember’ and are 
inseparable.” 225  With the support of Rabbi Kiselev, the spiritual leader of the community, 
Zionism flourished in Harbin.  
However, many Russian revolutionaries fled to Harbin when the White Russians 
occupied Siberia. The new immigration after WWI increased the number and the influence of the 
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Bundists (Jewish socialists) dramatically. In 1917, two Bundists out of 31 members were in the 
Harbin Jewish committee.
226
 In 1919, Bundists consisted 8 out of 40 in the Jewish council, and 
their number increased to 13 out of 40 in 1921.
227
 The Canadian Jewish Chronicle, reported in 
May 1926 that “At the time of the Civil War, when the Russian Far East was flooded with blood, 
when Baron Ungern-Sternberg, Kalmikas and Merkuloff and their divisions in the years 1918-
1922 carried out their aggressions in the Amur and Baikal regions, thousands of refugee 
revolutionists found shelter in Harbin.” 228  The report continued that “The Jewish Workers’ 
parties, the Bund and others, worked intensively here and enjoyed great popularity for a time 
among the Jewish masses. In the communal elections of 1921, they received more than 49 per 
cent of the entire vote.”229  
Before 1920, the Harbin Bund was led by Lazar Epstein, whose son, Israel Epstein, later 
joined the Chinese Communist Party. In 1920, the Epsteins moved to Tianjin for business. The 
chairman of HIAS branch in the Far East, Meir Birman, became one of the Harbin Bund leaders. 
Birman recorded all the HIAS information, letters and activities in China, and sent them to the 
New York office. He was the chief editor of two socialist publications in Harbin: a Russian 
magazine Наше Слово (Our Word 1919) and a Yiddish newspaper Der Weiter Misroch (The Far 
East 1921), which was an analogy to New  ork’s newspaper Der Forverts (Forwards).230 But 
different from Der Forverts, which was popular among the American Jewish labor unions, the 
Yiddish newspaper in Harbin was ill-fated and lasted only for one year.   
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However, similar to its contemporary Jewry in America, the Bundists “had to guard its 
separate identity and resist the Zionist bid for hegemony” of the Jewish community.231 First, the 
issue of the language of Hebrew or Yiddish to be taught in the Harbin Jewish school curriculum 
raised serious debates among Zionists, Bundists and the orthodox in Harbin, like in New York, 
Montreal and elsewhere. According to Kaufman, the Bundists “initiated endless wrangling on the 
question of school agenda, demanding that the Yiddish be adopted as the official Jewish 
language. It was only after a long and a bitter struggle that the Council finally adopted Ivrit 
[Hebrew] to be recognized and taught in the Jewish school as the official Jewish tongue.”232  
Unsatisfied with the firm strength of the Zionists and the Orthodox in Harbin, the 
Bundists further put forward to the Harbin Jewish Council a proposal for registering non-
religious marriages. The Zionists pointed out that it was not the right time to discuss non-
religious marriages due to the problems stemming from its practice in West Europe. Finally, 22 
out of 40 in the council voted to reject Jewish non-religious marriages.
233
 
Another bone of contention between the Zionists and the Bundists was the management 
of the Harbin Jewish club “IMALDAG” (Russian initials of The Jewish musical-literary-
dramatic society). The Bundists organized a socialist library in 1918, which was merged with the 
IMALDAG library in 1922.
234
 When the Soviet Union recaptured Harbin, the Bund members 
advocated Soviet rule and spread Soviet propaganda. IMALDAG subsequently became “the 
bone of contention between the Poalei Zion Party and the Soviet dominated Bund.”235 In May 
1929, the Bundists, led by Ziroel Lifschits, attempted to illegally transfer the library books to 
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Birobidzhan (a Soviet plan for Jewish settlement, see below), but they were stopped by Kaufman 
and the Betar members
236
.  
Moreover, the Bundists’ free speech for Bolshevik propaganda in the Jewish club 
attracted the attention of the Chinese police. The Chinese authorities finally closed the Jewish 
club in 1925, a time when all these conflicts among the White Russians, the Red Russians, the 
Jews and the Chinese deepened and became more complicated with the Soviet Union reclaiming 
its rights on the CER.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Group Picture of the Leaders of the Jewish Community in Harbin in 1917, including Rabbi 
Kiselev, Kaufman, Drizin, Dobisov, and Mordokhovich.  
{Image from Michael Rinsky, Китайские Еьреи [Chinese Jews], (Tel-Aviv: Shlomo Levy Ltd. 2010), p18.} 
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Figure 7: Teachers and students of second grade, elementary school “Talmud Torah” 
 (Image from Igud Yotzei Sin, No. 394, p67.) 
 
Figure 8:  Harbin New Synagogue 
(Image from 
http://www.jewsofchina.org/JOC/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=103&FID=1655, 




3.3. The Troubled Water since 1924 
 
The rise of the Soviet Union as an anti-imperialist power won over the Chinese 
revolutionaries, but the Soviet Union soon betrayed its promise and deprived the Chinese 
authority of the CER. The coming turmoil caused by the Soviet intervention further divided and 
transformed the political identities among the Russians, the Chinese, and the Jews in Harbin.        
3.3.1. The Soviets Came! 
 
When the Chinese were getting their first experience administering their former 
colonizers in Northeast China, the Soviets came! When Soviet Russia was entangled in war 
communism, and with fighting White Russians in Siberia and Russia’s Far Eastern areas, the 
Soviets issued the Karakhan Manifesto to China in 1919. To get rid of its international isolation, 
“the Karakhan Manifesto offered to fulfill all of the requests that China had just had rejected by 
the Paris Peace Conference, including the abolition of all of Russia’s extraterritorial rights in 
China, the return of territorial concessions, abolition of all unequal treaties …. to return the 
Chinese Eastern Railway to China free of charge.”237 To win China’s backing, Lenin declared 
that he rejected imperialism, and that only the Soviet Union could be China’s true friend. In fact, 
the Karakhan Manifesto was the Soviets’ diplomatic strategy during the war communism period. 
 However, after the Soviet Union recaptured Siberia and the Far East, it realized the 
strategic importance of the railways in Manchuria to connect it with the Far East. The Soviets did 
not want to kill this golden goose in making its economic communism. Therefore, the Soviets 
began diplomatic relations with China by denying the first version of the Karakhan Manifesto to 
                                                             
237 Bruce A. Elleman, “Sino-Soviet Tensions and Soviet Administrative Control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
1917-25,” in Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China, eds. Elleman and Kotkin, 60. 
91 
 
return the CER freely. From 1920, the Soviet Union began to negotiate with the Beijing 
Government to regain the CER, but did not get satisfactory results.  
The Soviet Union then turned to Sun Yat-sen’s opposition government in Guangzhou. 
According to Bruce Elleman, by promising Sun military and financial aid, Sun agreed that the 
CER would be jointly managed by Russia and China, and he signed the declaration with Adolph 
Joffe, the Soviet representative, on January 26, 1923.
238
 As early as 1921, Sun agreed to ally with 
the newly established Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was fostered by the Soviet Union. 
Sun’s Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and the CCP formed the First United Front, which was 
led by the CNP. The Soviets’ spreading influence in China forced the Beijing Government to 
reopen the negotiations. On May 31, 1924, the Soviet Union’s representative, L. Karakhen, and 
C.T. Wang (王正廷 1882-1961), the representative of the Beijing Government, signed a second 
Karakhen Manifesto to jointly manage the CER.
239
  
   To cope with the difficult situation in Northeast China, in September 1924, the Soviet 
Union signed a secret agreement with Warlord Zhang Zuolin to contain Japan’s power; but on 
the other hand, in January 1925, the Soviet Union signed another secret agreement with Japan, 
recognising Japan’s “Twenty-one Demands”240 and all Japan’s rights in China so that Japan 
could accept the Soviet Union’s reinstatement in North Manchuria. Hence, the Soviet Union 
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recovered her control of the CER and North Manchuria. Bruce A. Elleman interpreted the Soviet 
Union’s practical “diplomacy” as “deception.” 241 Sow-Theng Leong assumed that the Soviet 
Union’s revolutionary internationalism became secondary to her national self-interest in Sino-
Soviet relations.
242
 After losing control of Manchuria and Mongolia to the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese finally recognized that the Soviet Union’s friendship was too expensive.243   
3.3.2.  Harbin Jews among the Reds, the Whites and the Yellow 
 
When the Soviets came back to Harbin, they established new CER administrative rules 
and regulations, which further split Russians between the Reds and the Whites. According to 
Chiasson, “before 1924, the CER’s Russian and Chinese workers had been organized into one 
union that was anti-Bolshevik in orientation. Ivanov, CER general manager (newly appointed by 
the Soviet Union), ordered this non-partisan Russian-Chinese union closed and insisted that all 
workers be members of the official CER union, which was under Soviet direction.”244 Thus the 
White Russians working on the CER were forced to take Soviet citizenship. A table on the 
citizenship of Harbin Russian immigration (see below) shows that the Russian immigrants 
reached as high as 155,402 in 1922, but the number dropped to 58,559 after the Soviet Union 
recaptured the CER in 1924. Also, the table indicates that from 1927 to 1931, less than half of 
the former Russian imperial subjects, around 25,000 to 27,000 people, decided to take Soviet 
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citizenship; more than half of the Russian population, about 30,000 to 40,000 chose to be 
stateless.  
Table 3: Harbin Russian Immigration Citizenship from the 1920s to the beginning of the 1930s 
year 
citizen 
1920 1922 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 
Russia 131,013 155,402 58,559 92,852 54,644      
USSR      25,637 27,492 26,704 27,633 27,617 
Stateless      30,322 29,652 30,415 36,837 41,188 
 
(Table from: Shi, Liu, and Gao, Harbin EQiao Shi, 80.) 
 
Competing with the new CER general manager Ivanov of the Soviet Union, Zhang 
Huanxiang (张焕相 1882-1962) became the new head of the Special District of the Eastern 
Provinces. General Zhang was once the head of the CER police and guards, in which both 
Chinese and White Russians were mixed. A food and housing allowance for employees in the 
CER Guards and Police attracted unemployed Russian émigrés, especially members of the 
former White Russian armies.
245
 Zhang worked closely with the White Russians, and called them 
“our Russians.” Influenced by the White Russians, Zhang had a strong anti-Soviet inclination. 
 Suspecting that all Jews were Bolsheviks and every Jewish meeting was a Bolshevik 
propaganda affair, Zhang and other Special District officials kept close watch on the Harbin 
Jewish community. They first prohibited the use of the Yiddish language at public meetings, 
entertainments or any other affairs, and then they closed the Harbin Jewish club IMALDAG.
246
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The Harbin Jewish community was split further between the Zionists and the Bundists who 
welcomed Soviet rule.  
The situation of the Harbin Jewish community became worse, as the conflicts between 
the Chinese and the Soviets widened in their joint management of the CER. In January 1926, 
Marshal Zhang Zuolin threatened to take the CER by force. General Zhang Huanxiang at Zhang 
Zuolin’s behest arrested Ivanov and three Soviet directors of the CER who “refused to continue 
transporting Chinese railway guards and troops on credit.”247 In March 1926, Zhang Huanxiang 
closed the Harbin Municipal Council by force in fear of the Soviets seizing it to gain power.
248
 
After that, the Special District requested that all the Jewish institutions which made up the 
community submit applications for ratification of their individual statutes in September.
249
  
In March 1927, the Special District administration requested that the Harbin Jewish 
Council reformulate its regulations. According to JTA, “the authorities declared that it is 
impossible in China, where even the citizens of Soviet Russia have no extra-territorial rights, to 
allow the existence of a Jewish institution with the right to unite all Jewish institutions and 
impose a tax upon its members.”250 Within the Harbin Jewish community, the Bundists resented 
the Chinese authorities and they wrote to the Harbin Municipality to inquire, but General Chu 
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In such a situation, the Harbin Jewish Council almost ceased to function. But fortunately 
enough, the Chinese authorities only had strong feelings against the Reds not the Jews; neither 
were they anti-Semites like the Whites. On May 31, 1927, the Chief of Police of the Special 
District of the Eastern Provinces finally approved the revised Statutes of the Jewish Communal 
Board of Harbin, the Harbin Kehillah.
252
 JTA reported in June that “The Chinese authorities 
consented to permit the functioning of the Kehillah only on condition that it deal with religious 
and charitable activities, the registration of births, marriages and deaths of the Jewish population, 
and the imposition of taxes upon Jews for the maintenance of religious institutions.”253 A new 
Jewish Council was established by the Orthodox and the Zionist parties in early 1928.
254
 The 
Bund was excluded from the Jewish council.   
In May of 1928, the representative of the Jewish Zionist Fund and the World Zionist 
Organization, Gaul Klichevsky, visited Harbin. The local Soviet newspaper новости жиэни 
[News of Life] attacked Klichevsky’s visit to Harbin and sharply critiqued Zionism and British 
policies concerning Jews moving to Palestine.
255
 The Soviet Union saw all Jews as Russians and 
rejected Jewish national independence. No evidence showed that the Soviet authorities 
recognized the legitimacy of the Harbin Jewish community. However, the Chinese authorities 
backed Zionism and welcomed Klichevsky’s visit. On June 13, the Chief General Zhang 
Huanxiang, the Supreme Executive Officer of the Special District of Northeast Provinces, 
granted an interview to G. Krichevsky and A. Kaufman. They talked for 45 minutes in a very 
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friendly manner. Zhang expressed his sympathy for Zionism and confirmed “China’s declaration 
of its stand on restoring Palestine to the Jews.”256 He further stated that “it was a great and just 
cause for the Jews to return to their historical homeland and regain independence and 
sovereignty, and that all nations should show sympathy and assist them to accomplish this great 
goal.”257  
The next day, Krichevsky met General Chu Zhen, Mayor of Harbin, and General Jin 
Ronggui, the Chief of Police of the Special District. Both of them endorsed Zionism. In addition, 
General Jin attended Krichevsky’s lecture at the Jewish business assembly in the evening. Jin 
gave a speech “pointing out that the Jewish people constructing an independent nation was in 
accordance with the most basic justice and international rights, declared the deep sympathy that 
the Chinese people had for the Jews,” and the Chinese people’s “best wishes for the Jews finally 
fulfilling the great cause of restoring their historical homeland.” 258  As an oppressed nation 
themselves, the Chinese seemed very much in sympathy with the Zionists who were also fighting 
for national independence. Thus, backing Zionism against Bundism became the earliest Chinese 
policy towards the Jews in modern time. Consequently, the tension between the Harbin Chinese 
authorities and the Jews was resolved to some degree.  
Regardless of the Chinese authorities’ political view of the Harbin Jewish community, 
the Chinese prohibited any attack on individual Jews. One example was the Vilensky File of 
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1927, in which the Chinese Court sentenced a White Russian to life imprisonment for killing 
Jews, despite of the Russians’ acquittal pleas for the murder.259 According to JTA, 
Levi Isaac Vilensky, a Jewish refugee from Russia, was murdered by a Russian, 
formerly a member of the monarchist army, at the railway station Chailar [Hailar, about 
750km north from the Harbin station]. M. Bichowsky Vilensky’s brother-in-law who was 
associated with him in his railway contracting work was seriously wounded by the 
officer. The murderer, Ruskin, was arrested by the Chinese authorities. 
The attack took place under circumstances which have caused great indignation in 
the Jewish community of Chailar which number 100 families. Chailar is a center where 
many former monarchist officers of the armies of Attaman Semionow, Kalmikow and 
Anenkow have found refuge and where they continue their pogrom agitation. 
Ruskin, who was employed as an electrician was on a telephone pole repairing 
wires near the Chailar railway station. He overheard a conversation in Yiddish between 
Vilensky and Bichowsky, who were waiting below for a train. Ruskin came down from 
the pole and asked the two: “Are you Jews?’ When Bichowsky replied: “ es, and if so, 
what of it?” Ruskin took out his knife and attacked them. Vilensky died within two hours. 
Bichowsky’s condition is serious. 
When Ruskin was arrested, several of the station officials attempted to establish 
that he was drunk, but the murderer was insulted by this and stated. “No, I was sober and 
I killed these Jews consciously. My only regret is that they were two instead of ten.” 




This was a typical anti-Semitic violence. Ruskin even did not know who he slew. In 
court, Ruskin confessed “that he never saw Vilensky or Bichowsky before and that he killed 
them just because they were Jews.” 261 Vilensky was in fact a scion of the family of the famous 
Berditcheff Rabbi, Levi Itzchok. This murder shocked the Far Eastern Jewish communities: “the 
Chailar Jewish community sent the body of the victim to Harbin where his funeral was held on 
July 14. General mourning was proclaimed by the community and all Jewish stores and 
workshops were closed for the day. Leaders of the Jewish community in Harbin have decided to 
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submit a memorandum to the Chinese Governor General concerning the increased anti-Semitic 
propaganda of the Russian monarchists.
262
 But the Russians wanted to secure an acquittal for 
Ruskin: “great interest was displayed on the part of the Jewish community of Harbin in the trial 
and by the Russian colony consisting chiefly of former officers of the White Army who 
exercised their influence in an attempt to secure an acquittal for Ruskin, formerly a member of 
the monarchist army.”263 Nevertheless, the Chinese could not tolerate the ruthless crimes of 
murdering innocent Jews. The murderer, Ruskin, was arrested by the Chinese authorities 
immediately. Before long, “life imprisonment to be spent in penal servitude was the sentence 
imposed by the Chinese court on Ruskin” in October of the same year.264 It revealed that the 
Chinese authorities treated Jews equally and justly without any prejudice.  
3.4. The Sino-Soviet War of 1929 and a Jewish Republic in the Far East 
 
When the Soviet Union extended its influence to Northeast China in the middle of the 
1920s, the situation in central China changed dramatically. After Sun Yat-sen died in March 
1925, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 1887-1975), the new leader of the Nationalist Party, 
launched the North Expedition to unify China. During the North Expedition, Jiang purged the 
communists from the United Front and broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In the 
following decade, the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong (毛泽东 1893-1976), had 
no choice but to carry out the Long March to the mountainous northwestern regions of  an’an 
and unite with Chinese peasants.
265
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In December 1928, Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang (张学良 1901-2001), the new leader 
of Manchuria, joined the Nationalist Party after the Japanese Guandong army assassinated his 
father Zhang Zuolin. Hence, the Chinese Nationalist Party ended the Warlord era and reunified 
China. In despite of the internal conflicts and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in later time, 
the Chinese Nationalist Government, led by Jiang Jieshi, was recognized by the West as the new 
central government of China. Jiang’s reign was based in Nanjing and it functioned until late 1937 
when the Japanese Guandong Army occupied Nanjing and enacted the Rape of Nanjing. 
The newly established Nanjing government devoted itself to state building and expelling 
foreign powers in China, especially with respect to the frontier threats posed by Russia and 
Japan. Japan’s influence in South Manchuria was too strong to take revenge, so the  oung 
Marshal Zhang decided to challenge the Soviet Union in North Manchuria at first. The Nanjing 
government also supported Zhang against the Soviet Union. Michael M. Walker observes that 
“A path to war was created when Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang miscalculated, both 
diplomatically and militarily, as they viewed the Soviets as politically isolated and militarily 
weak and were convinced that the time was right to reassert full authority over the CER.”266  
The Sino-Soviet War started in May 1929, when Zhang “ordered police to raid the Soviet 
legation in Harbin.”267 On July 10, 1929, Zhang’s troops “seized complete control over the 
CER.” 268  On July 17, Moscow recalled from China “all Soviet diplomatic, consular, and 
commercial representatives” and “all persons appointed by the Soviet government to the 
CER.”269 Stalin broke off all relations with the Nanjing government and prepared for war. On 
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November 17, 1929, “Soviet ground troops, its riverine Amur fleet, and a number of air-planes 
invaded China on several fronts. The Soviet forces quickly took control of Manzhuli and heavy 
fighting focused on the Chinese city of Hailar.”270 Zhang Xueliang’s military defence was a 
complete failure. On November 26, Zhang “was ready to sue for peace on Soviet terms.”271 The 
Nanjing Government asked for Britain, the United States and France to intervene, but Stalin 
refused any third party intervention. “On 22 December 1929, an agreement was signed at 
Khabarovsk by the USSR and the Nanjing government,” that meant returning “the USSR’s Asian 
relations to the pre-war status quo.”272 The consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict was not only 
that Russia controlled North Manchuria once again, but it also aroused Japan to invade 
Manchuria by force in 1931 in the wake of the weakness of the Chinese military.  
Bruce Elleman observed that USSR’s quick win in the Sino-Soviet war cannot be 
separated from Stalin’s Siberian migration strategy. In the war period, Stalin “called for a ‘Great 
Leap Forward’ in collectivization; many rich peasants, known as kulaks, were deported to 
Siberia to help prop up Soviet security in underpopulated regions adjoining Manchuria. In line 
with the decision to exile his opponents, Stalin also ordered the creation of prison camps, the first 
of what would soon be popularly known as the ‘gulag archipelago.’”273 The development of the 
Siberian labor camps “played an essential role in helping to prop up the USSR’s Siberian 
defenses, initially against China, but later against Japan, by sending millions of Russians into 
exile into the unfortified regions directly to the north of the disputed Sino-Soviet border.”274 
Elleman called the buildup of Soviet infrastructure in Siberia “the creation of the Stalinist 
state,” but he ignored the establishment of the Jewish Region in Birobidzhan, which was about 
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750 km from Harbin, during the same period. Besides the peasants and the prisoners, the Jews 
were another unpleasant subject for Stalin. According to Benjamin Pinkus, in March 1928, the 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union and the Migration Committee 
of the Soviet Union passed a resolution of creating a Jewish national unit in Birobidzhan. Pinkus 
observed that “On 30 September 1931, a decision was taken by the same body on ‘Means for 
implementing the 1928 Resolution on establishing a Jewish Federative national unit in the 
Birobidzhan Region of the Far Eastern Provinces.’ Even if internal policy played a part, it was no 
accident that this date was ten days after the Japanese crossed into Manchuria (19 September 
1931).”275 The Soviet Government formally declared Birobidzhan a Jewish Autonomous Region 
(oblast) in 1934 in the wake of Japan’s expulsion of the Soviets from Northeast China.276 The 
mass Siberian migration policies as a result of the growing security threat from Northeast China 
rightly explained why the Jewish Province of the USSR was not established in the Jewish 
population concentrated East Europe or regions of the shores of the Black Sea, but unexpectedly, 
in the Far East on the Sino-Soviet border.
277
  
Even though the Soviet Union’s promise of equal nationalism against imperialism won 
over the Chinese and the Jewish revolutionaries, not only was Stalin’s policy on China and the 
Chinese Eastern Railway in continuity with the policies of the Tsars, but also Stalin’s policy on 
the Jews, which set Jews in regions of conflict spreading Russian culture, once again poured old 
wine in a new bottle. Russia’s revolutionary goal finally gave in to its national interests.  
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After WWI, both Chinese and Jewish nationalism rose up in the spirit of national self-
determination. The Chinese endeavored to build a civil government in Harbin. As a result, both 
the Chinese and the Jewish communities were prosperous. In addition, the large number of 
Jewish émigrés brought by WWI made Harbin the major East European Jewish Center in Asia. 
The American Jewish immigration and relief branches in Harbin, such as HIAS and JDC, played 
an important role in supporting and transporting these Jewish refugees to America. The route of 
the Trans-Siberian railway from Eastern Europe to the Far East and the ship via Japan to the 
United States functioned until WWII.  
Furthermore, the conflicts in Northeast China contributed to the first encounter between 
the Jews and the Chinese. As oppressed nations, both of them were experiencing a similar 
national reconstruction in the first half of the twentieth century. Supporting Zionists against 
Bundists became the earliest Chinese policy with respect to the Jews.  
In the end, the regional, national and revolutionary clashes among the Chinese, the White 
Russians and the Soviets in North Manchuria made the Harbin Jews’ situation more precarious. 
The misplacement and destabilization of status of all these nations in Manchuria turned to 







Chapter IV: Anti-Semitism in the Puppet State of Manchukuo 
 
Scholars working on Jewish history in Asia mainly pay attention to Nazi Germany’s 
influence on Japan during the holocaust period since 1938, but they seldom notice the 
cooperation of the Russian Fascist Party (RFP) and the Japanese Guandong Army in Manchuria 
and their severe anti-Semitic activities since the Japanese controlled the region and established 
the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. 
By contrast, experts on Russian fascism, John J. Stephan
278
 and Susanne Hohler
279
, as 
well as the Japanese scholar of Jewish studies, Takao Chizuko
280
, have shed light on the 
desperate situation of Jews in Manchuria under the Japanese militarists’ control. Stephan 
analyzes the historical development of the Russian Fascist Party and its anti-Semitic activities in 
Manchuria from 1925 to 1945. Analysing the RFP’s newspaper  as  Pu ’, Hohler recounts the 
internal organizations of the RFP and its anti-Semitic propaganda in Harbin. According to 
Hohler, it was the RFP that smeared Harbin Jews and separated the Jews from the Japanese 
authorities and the rest of the Harbin population. But in her articles, Takao suggests that 
Japanese authorities’ pandering to the RFP and their repression of the Jews delivered a coup de 
grace to the Harbin Jewish community.  
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In this chapter, I will underline the background of the development of anti-Semitism in 
the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in the context of the history of the worldwide rise of 
anti-Semitism between the two World Wars. 
4.1. Military Manchukuo 
4.1.1. Manchurian Incident – Japanese Plot 
 
In September 1931, seizing on the regional disorder caused by the Sino-Russian War, the 
Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army invaded Northeast China, arguing that “the thirty million 
suffering people of Manchuria were eagerly awaiting Japanese liberation.”281 However, “in a 
larger historical context,” the post-colonial historian of Japanese imperialism, Yoshihisa Tak 
Matsusaka, argues that the Japanese “conquest of Northeast China must be understood as a 
protracted, decades-long endeavor in which the so-called Manchurian Incident of 1931 
represents only a brief, climactic episode.”282 
  As early as in the 1840s, keeping an eye on the Sino-British Opium War, the Japanese 
were clearly aware that “the Western barbarians, ‘who for hundreds of year…have desired and 
resolved to subvert enemy nations through their occult religion [Christianity] and thus conquer 
the whole world’ were on Japan’s doorstep.”283 Learning from the Chinese lesson, the Japanese 
quest for reform started in the Meiji era (1868-1912), which “was an outgrowth of a predatory 
international environment and a corollary of the nation-building process of the late nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries in which Japan self-consciously emulated Western models in both 
international and domestic affairs.”284  
Victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 enabled Japan to escape the colonial fate 
suffered by other Asian nations. Having transformed itself into a world imperial power, Japan 
joined the rank of the “carving up” countries and expanded its power into China by obtaining the 
rights to build the South Manchurian Railway (SMR). Originated from the Russo-Japanese War, 
the Japanese Guandong Army, which was analogous to the Russian railway guards of the CER, 
firmly located in South Manchuria and finally developed into an independent administration 
system. Matsusaka observes that: “exploiting the geography of Northeast Asia, the Japanese also 
used railway policies to enhance Manchuria’s ties to colonial Korea while weakening 
connections to China south of the Wall. The railway had served as a vital national-building tool 
in Europe and North America. In the hands of the Japanese in Manchuria, it became an 
instrument of imperialist reconstruction.” 285  
It is notable that, unlike British and U.S. China policy, “territory rather than trade lay at 
the heart of Japanese aspirations in Manchuria.”286 The American Open Door Policy, which 
proposed to open China to trade equally with all countries while restricting foreign political and 
military influence, obstructed Japan’s “attempts at territorial aggrandizement.”287 The Japanese 
Army and its allies after WWI “had regarded the Washington system as nothing more than 
imperialism, American style.” 288  The Prime Minister of Japan, Hara Takashi, saw Wilson’s 
National Self-Determination policy as empty.
289
 Unsatisfied with the existing Western led 
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colonial system, Japan sought to develop on her own terms (later known as Pan-Asianism) in the 
wake of the collapse of international cooperation in the 1920s.  
In addition, “the global depression and the concomitant rise of militarism in domestic 
politics” in the early part of the Shōwa era (1926-89) caused an organizational chaos in the 
government and spurred Japanese jingoism in the form of state Shintō ultra-nationalism.290 The 
Guandong Army in Manchuria seized the economic depression as an opportunity for military 
expansion. Two new leaders of the Guandong Army in the end of the 1920s, Lt. Colonel Kanji 
Ishiwara and Colonel Seishirō Itagaki “openly advocated the occupation of Manchuria, which 
they proposed to use as a bulwark against a Soviet southern advance and as a supply base in the 
event of war with the United States.”291  For these reasons, Japan’s militarism “is generally 




Moreover, China’s attempt at unification and the rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s 
threatened Japan’s profits in Shandong, Manchuria, Mongolia and other colonies. During the 
Chinese Nationalist Party’s North Expedition in 1926-28, the Japanese Guandong Army hoped 
that the Old Marshal Zhang Zuolin could separate Manchuria from the rest of China so that the 
influence of Japan and the Old Marshal could both be preserved. However, as a rival of Jiang 
Jieshi and his nationalist troops, Zhang and his Fengtian clique won over the other warlords and 
occupied Beijing in 1927. Zhang himself became the last “emperor” of the Beijing Government. 
In this time, Zhang not only dreamed about an integral China under his leadership, but also tried 
to get rid of Japan by denying their excessive railway privileges in South Manchuria. The 
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partnership between Zhang and Japan became more and more troubled. When Zhang was 
defeated by the Chinese Nationalist Party and retreated to Manchuria in June 1928, the impatient 




Scholar Kwong Chi Man argues that Manchuria was not destined to fall to the Japanese 
in 1931, if the Guandong Army had not assassinated the Old Marshal: “Although internal 
dissension might exist, the presence of Zhang Zuolin (who was only 53 years old when he was 
killed in 1928) as a central figure might have prevented this bloc from falling apart.” 294 
Examining the development of Japanese militarism, scholar Danny Orbach regards the rebellious 
Japanese Army as terrorists in name of patriotism. Orbach argues that, from their assassination of 
Queen Min of Korea in 1895, to the assassination of Marshal Zhang Zuolin in 1928, the radical 
Japanese Army officers finally turned to assassinate their own ministers and generals and 




4.1.2. Japan on Her Own 
 
On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Guandong Army engineered the Manchurian 
Incident by “blowing up the South Manchurian Railway line north of Mukden (Shengyang) and 
blaming the explosion on the Chinese,” giving the Japanese the excuse to resort to violence.296 
Within only five months after the invasion of Shenyang, the Japanese Guandong Army occupied 
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Manchuria thoroughly. In 1932, the Japanese Guandong Army established a puppet state called 
Manchukuo by installing Puyi, the last emperor of Qing China, as its head.  
The triumph of the Japanese Army’s blitzkrieg in Manchuria was partly due to the Young 
Marshal Zhang’s non-resistance policy. The Young Marshal dared not fight again after his troops 
had lost to the Soviet Union in 1929. Considering that the Japanese military was even stronger 
than the Russians, the Young Marshal Zhang did not want to fight a war that he had no hope of 
winning. Consequently, Zhang retreated to the south and consulted with Jiang’s Nationalist 
government in Nanjing. Resorting to a policy of “nonresistance, noncompromise and nondirect 
negotiation,” the Nanjing government “appealed to the Council of the League of Nations under 
Article 11 of the Covenant and to the United States under the Pact of Paris.”297  
Thus, the Japanese aggression turned from a war incident into a political and diplomatic 
one. On 7 January 1932, “as a sort of rider to his ‘parallel and incessant activities,’” Secretary of 
State Henry L. Stimson, “handed to the Chinese and Japanese ambassadors in Washington 
identical notes, known after him as the Stimson Doctrine,” stating that “American Government 
would not recognize any treaty or agreement which impaired the sovereignty, independence, or 
territorial integrity of China or infringed the Open Door policy, nor would recognize any 
situation, treaty, or agreement which was brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris.
298
 
However, America’s position was not supported by the League members in Europe, who 
were trapped in their own economic and political crises at home in the Great Depression. The 
British even saw Japan’s aggression as reducing the menace from the Comintern (the Communist 
International). The French were only worried about their interests in South China and considered 
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it was better for the Japanese to be fighting in the north rather than moving to the south. 
Subsequently, the Americans preferred verbal protests against Japan rather than taking action. 
After all, the American investment in Manchuria was limited. Not taking a long term 
perspective, the American policy makers basically saw nothing lost in the Manchurian Crisis – 
the beginning phrase of Japan’s ensuing wars.299  
Going through the motions, the inert League finally sent Lord Lytton to the Far East to 
investigate, and he submitted a report describing “the new Manchukuo as a puppet creation.” 
However, “in September 1932, on the eve of the publication of the report, Japan made a defiant 
gesture and formally recognized Manchukuo. In February 1933, the League at least adopted the 
report, and in the following month Japan gave notice of her withdrawal from League 
membership.”300  
The American historian Sara Smith regarded the Manchurian Crisis of 1931 as “the 
opening phase of the second World War,” resulting from a tragedy in international relations.301 
Keeping a cold war perspective, the British historian Ian Nish found reasons or excuses for 
Japan’s aggression, arguing that if the League firmly took action, Japan would not have pursued 
a solution on her own terms in East Asia.
302
 The post-war Chinese communist historians blamed 
the Chinese Nationalist Party, arguing that if the Nationalist Party had fought against the 
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Japanese instead of persecuting the Chinese communists everywhere, Japan would not have 
ambitiously invaded mainland China in 1937.  
However, history does not answer “if” questions. The Second World War, the darkest 
period in human history, was fermented in Asia initially. Dredging up the last emperor of the 
Qing dynasty, Puyi, as the head of puppet Manchukuo, the Japanese Guandong Army tightly 
controlled the Chinese, simultaneously facilitated Japanese and Korean immigration, and 
expelled the Russians and western foreigners from Northeast China.  
A more important influence of the Manchurian Crisis is that Hitler, following Japan’s 
lead, left the League in October 1933. Japan’s unchecked expansionism and “its unpunished 
defiance of the League of Nations created an image of ‘dynamism’ that favorably impressed the 
Nazis, encouraging them to act aggressively.” 303As a result, “Hitler’s subsequent successful 
expansionism and the Western powers’ weak response in turn affected the decisions of Japanese 
leaders as they headed down the path to disastrous war with the United States and Great Britain 
in 1941.”304 
4.1.3.  The Soviet Union’s Retreat 
 
In January-February 1933, “the Japanese launched a further assault on China, attempting 
to seize Jehol in Inner Mongolia. This was vital strategic position if the Japanese hoped to attack 
in the direction of Peking (Beijing) or, more ominously for Moscow, in the direction of Outer 
                                                             
303 Bruce Reynolds, Japan in the Fascist Era (New York , N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), XIII; For the influence 
of Japan on German, see John P. Fox, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931-1938 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982). 
304 Reynolds, ed., Japan in the Fascist Era, XIII. 
111 
 
Mongolia and the Soviet Far East.”305 At this time, both the Chinese and the League of the 
Nations hoped the Soviet Union could fight against Japan, but they only gained the Soviets’ 
taunt. According to Jonathan Haslam, on February 24-5, 1933: 
The Secretary-General of the League, Eric Drummond, wrote to the Soviet 
Government asking for cooperation. The Chinese (Nationalist) Government was not 
alone in hoping for Soviet agreement. But they were to be disappointed. On 7 March 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov wrote to Drummond rejecting the 
invitation. His letter emphasised the USSR’s ‘strict neutrality’ with respect to the 
hostilities in the Far East. ‘The League of Nations has “resolved” the Manchurian 
problem, and after the League of Nations decision Japanese forces have begun their 
attack on Jehol. This serves as the best illustration of what a decision of the League of 





As early as the end of December 1931, three months after the Manchurian Incident, “the 
Soviet Government had offered the Japanese a non-aggression pact.”307 However, this did not 
avoid crises over possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway. By mid-April 1932, the Japanese 
controlled almost the entire line. The Soviet government in Manchuria was completely oppressed 
by the Japanese Guandong Army, who arrested the Soviet department chiefs and replaced them 
with Manchukuoan officials “as the first step in a concerted effort to seize the railway.”308 
According to Lensen, 
 As the Kwantung Army had overrun Manchuria, dozens of Soviet railway 
officials and employees had been arrested. When one of them, a man by the name of 
Vasil’ev, had died in a Harbin jail in the summer of 1932, Consul General Slavutskii had 
written to Shih lu-pen, the Harbin representative of the Manchukuoan Foreign Office, to 
inquire about the cause of death, but had received no reply. In January 1933 the suicide of 
Engineer A.F. Voronin, who along with some sixty countrymen had been imprisoned and 
apparently mistreated for the past nine months at Hsinking (formerly Changchun), 
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prompted Slavutskii to send a strong letter to Shih demanding an investigation of the 
incident and a reply to his query about Vasil’ev’s demise…. Shih responded in a letter, 
dated January 25, that Vasil’ev had died of typhoid and that Voronin’s suicide had not 
been the fault of the Manchukuoan authorities. He added verbally that the charges of the 




Likewise, Robert T. Pollard reported in 1934 that: “The Chinese Eastern [Railway] was 
rapidly ceasing to have either strategic or commercial value to the Soviet Union. Military 
operations coupled with continued disorder in northern Manchuria had almost wrecked the 
railway. The manager of the eastern section, between Harbin and Pogranichnaya, reported that 
during 1932 some 56 railway employees had been killed, 825 wounded, 593 captured by bandits, 
and more than a thousand robbed. In addition, much damage had been done to rolling stock, the 
track had been destroyed in 52 places, and the telegraph line broken 775 times.”310 
Facing these difficulties, the Soviet Union decided to get rid of the troubled waters in 
Northeast China as soon as possible. Bearing in mind the humiliations of 1904-5 Russo-Japanese 
War and the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention, the Soviets’ impulse to take revenge finally gave 
way to a compromise solution – selling the railway to Japan.  
For the sale of the CER with its enterprises and properties, the Soviet Union requested 
250 million gold rubles, amounting to 625 million Japanese yen, but the Japanese only offered 
50 million yen, less than one tenth.
 311
 The negotiation lasted for more than two years and finally 
the two governments signed an agreement for a deal of 140 million yen. In March 1935, despite 
a Chinese protest, the Soviet Union ceded to Manchukuo all its rights concerning the CER, with 
its subsidiary lands, buildings, schools and hospitals. All the employees and the officials of the 
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Soviet Union citizen were dismissed. They and their families could take the train back to Russia 
at any time for free.
312
 Stephan estimates that “more than 25,000 returned to the USSR in the 
summer of 1935 alone. Only five thousand remained in Manchukuo at the end of 1936 and fewer 
than a thousand in 1939.”313 
Hence, the half-century long influence of the Russian government in Northeast China 
was finished by the Japanese, rather than by the Chinese. When the Chinese dominated 
Manchuria, they shared the power with the Russians. However, the Japanese authorities of 
Manchukuo expelled the Russian workers from the CER, and replaced them with puppet Chinese 





Map 5: Japan Renamed Manchuria “Manchukuo” 
(Map from https://inter-wars.weebly.com/japan-invades-manchuria-1931.html, accessed January 10, 2019)  
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4.2. Decline of the Harbin Jewish Community 
 
Concerning Manchukuo’s power structure, scholars share a historical consensus that it 
“was a disguised imperialism in which Japanese military and industrial interests exploited the 
people and resources of Manchuria for their own enrichment and to further Japanese war aims. 
As a result, the regime form was military fascist, with ample use of violence by the Japanese 
military to sustain its rule.”315 Japanese scholar Shin'ichi Yamamuro describes Manchukuo as a 
Chimera, with the Guandong Army as the head of a lion, Manchuria as the body of a sheep, and 
the Chinese as the tail of a dragon; though powerful, the beast actually violated both the Japanese 
and the Chinese people.
316
 Recent studies show that this Chimera also brought disasters to the 
Jewish people, a small community that suffered tremendously during the nightmare in 
Manchuria.  
4.2.1. Japan’s Economic Oppression 
 
Northeast China, under Japanese domination, experienced rapid industrialization; 
however, the industrial development by military forces cannot compare to ordinary 
industrialization. Reviewing the hegemony of wartime Japan and Germany, scholars in the book 
Economies under Occupation: The hegemony of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World 
War II, condemned the economies that developed under occupation for the reasons that: first, the 
industrial development in the occupied countries was “accompanied by huge sacrifice” on the 
part of oppressed populations with harsh forced labor; and secondly, the “profit incentives” were 
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used officially “as a tool for promoting war production.”317 In Manchuria, the Japanese economic 
developments were based on Chinese labor camps and the ouster of foreign industries with 
horrifying abuses of human rights and coercive exploitation. 
On the one hand, advocating Pan-Asianism, the Guandong Army set up the Kyowakai 
(Concordia Association) in July 1932, uniting the five major races of Manchukuo: Chinese, 
Manchus, Mongols, Koreans and Japanese. However, discrimination, abuse and violence by 
Japanese toward Chinese were universal, for instance, the forced sale of Chinese land for a plan 
to settle 3,000 Japanese farmers, provoked a Chinese peasant uprising in 1932.
318
 Despite this, 
the Japanese government kept recruiting tens of thousands of peasants in Japan and sending them 
to Manchuria to occupy the region.
319
  
Another example of discrimination is that “the Japanese authorities decided that food 
would be rationed and distributed according to nationality. They decreed that the Japanese 
residents would eat rice, the foreigners would get wheat and rye, and the Chinese would be 
restricted to sorghum. Sorghum, although perfectly edible, was nonetheless better known as 
chicken feed” 320  Alexander Menquez, a Jew growing up in Manchuria, witnessed that the 
Japanese police badly beat the poor screaming Chinese, “whose only crime was that they wanted 
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to buy bread.”321 Japanese Manchukuo was built on the humiliation and enslavement of the 
Chinese people.  
On the other hand, Japanese economic penetration not only squeezed Chinese blood, but 
its expansion also oppressed foreign interests. The importance of Manchuria as a market for 
Japan was that “Japanese goods could be given a measure of protection against competition from 
more advanced industrial nations. Manchuria and Korea had already performed this function for 
Japan’s light and textile industries before 1914, but Japan’s heavy industries badly needed a 
similarly advantageous market in the 1920s and 1930s.” 322  Accordingly, all the stores in 
Manchukuo had to sell Japanese goods, “not only by Chinese and Russian stores, but by 
American, English and French concerns as well. Nationality makes no difference: ‘Japanese 
goods must be sold!’”323   
To monopolize the Manchurian market, the Japanese had to exclude foreign finance 
capital and industrial influences, such as the Russians’ share of the CER company, the Russian 
banks, the Jewish industries of grain, soybeans, sugar and so on. According to Dicker, 
On the eve of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and 1932, fifty-eight 
per cent of Harbin’s private industries were owned by Chinese capital; thirty-three per 
cent by non-Soviet Russians and Russians Jews, eight per cent by the Japanese and one 
per cent by American and Western European interests. Russians controlled large segments 
of the grain and lumber trades and other commercial industries. 
Yet in 1934, only two years after the Japanese moved in, the Japanese held all the 
ship-building enterprises in the city, as well as many of the soya bean and the flour mills. 
They reorganized the grain exchange, and forced Kabalkin to resign his post….By 1939, 
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therefore, the Japanese owned twelve per cent of all the most important industries, 
handling some thirty per cent of the entire trade in Harbin.
324
  
Not only the president of the Harbin Exchange, Y.R. Kabalkin, mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a Jewish entrepreneur whose family led the Manchurian soybean exportation and oil 
pressing factories, was forced to resign his post; but also almost all influential Jewish businesses, 
as well as those of the Chinese and the Russians, were under the full control of the Japanese or 
were forced to be operated jointly with the Japanese.  
As we have seen previously, Jews played a predominant role in Harbin’s commercial 
development. The Jewish trade in Harbin was prosperous as never before around the WWI 
period. Though, the Soviet-Sino Conflict of 1929 brought negative effect on regional security 
and economy, it could not compare to the huge damage caused by Japanese coercive monopolies. 
From 1932 to the first half of 1936, more than thirty Jewish stores of Harbin were closed, losing 
the amount of 1,961,000 yuan.
325
 A JTA article in February 1935 reported that: “The Japanese 
policy in Manchukuo has long been anti-Jewish. Anxious to control commercial life there, the 
Japanese officials in Manchukuo are doing their utmost to force the Jewish firms in Harbin to 
liquidate….The purchasers of the Jewish firms are usually Japanese merchants. Those of the 
Jewish storekeepers who are not anxious to liquidate or to transfer their firm into Japanese hands 
are under constant terror and their lives and property are not entirely safe.”326 
Those not conversant with conditions in Manchukuo might consider the criticism unduly 
severe, but a careful examination of this history shows that JTA’s commentaries were much more 
conservative than reality because they tried to avoid direct conflicts with the Japanese authorities 
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for the good of Harbin Jews, whose lives were in hazard under the Japanese militarists’ 
domination.  
4.2.2. The Japanese Army Cooperated with the Russian Fascist Party  
 
To wield its power in North Manchuria, a traditional Russian sphere of influence, the 
Japanese extended its two military agencies from Changchun (Hsinking) to Harbin: the Tokumu 
Kikan (Japanese Military Mission), responsible to the Imperial Army General Staff in Tokyo, 
and the Kempei (Japanese Military Gendarmerie), the branch of the Guandong Army in South 
Manchuria. Providing internal guidance, an irresponsible and corrupt class of subordinate 
Japanese army officers were attached to all administrative organizations, the Harbin Municipal 
Council, the Harbin Supreme Court and the CER Police, and non-administrative organizations, 
such as schools, hospitals and enterprises. “Persecuted incessantly by gendarmerie and deprived 
of means of livelihood and opportunities for advancement by the great incursion of Japanese,” 
the small Chinese educated class was gradually replaced by Japanese army officials.
327
  
Moreover, the Japanese directly arrested and expelled Soviet officials from the CER, in 
the name of “Asia belonging to Asians.” For the stateless Russian émigrés, the Guandong Army 
chose to cooperate with the Russian Fascist Party (RFP).
 
The radical anti-Communist minister of 
the Imperial Japanese Army, General Araki Sadao, backed the RFP against the USSR. The 
Japanese supported Konstantin Rodzaevsky, the chief editor of Russian Fascist Party’s 
mouthpiece  as  Pu ’, as the leader of the RFP. RFP’s collusion with Japanese Intelligence 
facilitated Japanese enslavement of Manchuria. 
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From its establishment in 1931 to its end in 1945, the Russian Fascist movement was 
mainly based in Manchukuo. The RFP published not only the daily newspaper  as  Pu ’, and 
the journal, Natsiia, but also numerous books and pamphlets spreading anti-Communism and 
anti-Semitism to solidify the White Russian nationalism in exile. Resembling propaganda of 
German Nazism, the Russian fascist ideological book, “The ABCs of Fascism” (Azbuka 
fashizma), claimed its two enemies to be the Soviet Union and the Jews in the book’s first part; it 
outlined a future fascist state in Russia in the second part.
328
 The Japanese occupation of 
Manchuria saw RFP membership soaring dramatically, from 200 in 1931 to 5,000 in 1933, a 
twenty-five-fold increase in two years.
329
 Rodzaevsky had 12,000 followers throughout the Far 
East, China, Korea and Japan. Adapting to local conditions to survive, most ordinary White 
Russians joined the RFP for practical purposes. Puppet Manchukuo hosted the largest Russian 
Fascist Party in the world with Harbin serving as its center.  
In Manchuria, the Russian Fascists received support from Japanese militarists. The 
Japanese Gendarmerie utilized the Russian fascists as spies, racketeers, and saboteurs within the 
USSR. The Russian fascists brought the political dissidents, special offenders, and military 
criminals to the second floor of the Kempei, the Japanese Gendarmerie headquarters, which was 
“located on Pochtovaya Street near the intersection with Vogzalnaya, a broad avenue that 
connected Cathedral Plaza with Central Railroad Station.” Stephan reviews that “So sinister was 
its reputation that ‘second floor’ became a synonym for a terrible fate among White Russians. 
Such expressions as ‘My wife put me on the second floor last night’ or ‘Watch out, or you’ll be 
on the second floor’ gave the Kempei an arcane currency in local slang”330 
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Worse, both the Japanese Military Mission and the Japanese Military Gendarmerie used 
their power for profit, with lucrative forays into the drug trade, gambling, and blackmail. The 
worst was prostitution. Women in military Manchukuo were the most helpless group. Countless 
Chinese and Russian women were raped by the Japanese soldiers, and the Japanese girls were 
encouraged to voluntarily serve the army as the notorious “comfort women.” 70,000 Japanese 
girls served in 550 licensed brothels across North Manchuria; “In Harbin alone, in 1936, there 
were 172 brothels, 56 opium-dens and 194 narcotics shops.”331 
The fastest way to make money was kidnapping, which was so rampant in Manchukuo 
that it was difficult for ordinary people to walk on the street without a gun or bodyguards. Even 
the American Consul-General, George Hanson, was so afraid of being kidnapped that he kept 
rifles and bodyguards all the time in his home in Harbin.
332
 Amleto Vespa, who served in the 
Japanese Gendarmerie, witnessed that: “The 10 bandits in the employ of the Gendarmerie hardly 
let a day pass without ‘snatching’ some rich Chinese or Jew. A reign of terror spread all over 
Manchuria. Every one of the different Police Services had its group of bandits who kidnapped 
people for ransom. In all the principal cities, rich Chinese and Jews were thus forced to pay large 
sums of money in order to be set free.”333 In 1937, the author’s great grandfather, a Manchurian 
landlord in Shuangcheng city, was shot by one of these bandits. When the dead body was sent 
home, my grandfather was shocked. My grandfather was a 13-year-old boy at that time so that 
his grief and trauma lasted his entire lifetime.   
The Japanese armies’ official violation of human rights wreaked havoc and created a 
fascist atmosphere of terror. Crimes were flourishing as never before in Manchuria in general 
                                                             





and in Harbin in particular. The East “Auschwitz” – Unit 731 of Harbin – Japanese Army’s 
human experimentation and biological warfare will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
American journalist Edgar Snow, in an article entitled “Japan Builds a New Colony,” wrote in 
1934 that: “Harbin, once delightful, to-day is notorious as a place of living death … Probably in 
no other great city of the world is life so precarious. Harbin residents, including about 100,000 
White and Red Russians, risk their lives if they go unarmed anywhere, even in broad daylight. 
Holdups, robberies, murders, kidnappings, are common occurrences.”334 The cooperation of the 
Japanese Army and the RFP made Manchuria a veritable “hell on earth.” 
4.2.3. The Kaspe File and the Rise of Anti-Semitism  
 
The Chinese and Jews were the favorite target of Manchukuo’s kidnapping business. 
However, as the Jewish population was relatively small, the proportion appeared far higher. In 
the article, “Alarming number of kidnappings of Jews reported in Harbin,” JTA listed three cases 
of kidnappings of Jews in 1932: a 3-year-old child of Subotowski, who was a manager of an 
American motor car firm; a Jewish butcher named Greenberg; and a Jewish physician named 
Eliason.
335
 Among them, the most pathetic case was Greenberg, whose wife was abused by the 
bandits. JTA reported that: “a Jewish butcher named Greenberg who was kidnapped and tortured 
when he was unable to produce $5,000 as ransom. Finally, Greenberg’s wife offered herself as 
hostage for her husband to enable him to raise the ransom sum. When Greenberg finally brought 
the money, the bandits refused to release his wife and demanded additional sums. Greenberg was 
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completely wrecked by the experience and by the knowledge that his wife was being subjected to 
inhumane torture.”336 
The situation became even much worse in the year of 1933. On the night of Yom Kippur 
1933, when Sherel de Florence, a son of a Jewish merchant, was leaving the Synagogue, he was 
seized by six armed Russians in the service of the Japanese Gendarmerie, in the presence of over 
200 witnesses.
337
 Threatening letters in connection with the ransom for Sherel were sent to the 
Jewish leaders. When the Jewish community was unwilling to pay the $100,000 ransom, the 
kidnappers bombed the home of Dr. Salomon Ravikovitch, the president of the Harbin Jewish 
Community.
338
 Finally, Sherel was released by paying about $ 20,000 ransom after more than 
100 days of captivity.
339
  
When the drug-store owner Meir Koffman, who was the ex-chairman of the Harbin New 
Synagogue,
340
 was not capable of paying the ransom of $30,000, the Japanese Chief asserted that 
“If Koffman is not as rich as ‘we’ thought he was, the Jewish Association can raise the money 
and pay the ransom.”341 Like any Jews in Diaspora, the wealth of Harbin Jews only brought them 
disaster when their civil rights could not be guaranteed. At the quarters of the Japanese 
Gendarmerie, Radzoyevsky, the head of RFP, burned Koffman’s face, hands and feet, and 
tortured him to death. Radzoyevsky believed “this is the way all the dirty Jews, enemies of 
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Russia, should die.”342 The Jewish Association sought to find Koffman’s dead body in order to 
bury him in the Harbin Jewish cemetery, but in vain.
343
  
It was roughly estimated that about two thirds of the kidnapped victims were Jews and 
one third of them were killed or died in captivity.
344
 Most of the Chinese and the Jewish victims 
kept silent and paid the ransom because they knew the police and the kidnappers were the same 
group of people. However, the Kaspe File was an exception. The Kaspes held French citizenship, 
so it caused an international sensation. Furthermore, the Japanese unjust arbitration of the Kaspe 
File marked the decline of the Harbin Jewish community.
 
 
Josef Kaspe, mentioned in chapter one, was a Jewish cavalryman, who settled in Harbin 
after the Russo-Japanese War. He became a millionaire by years of hard work. He owned several 
jewelry stores, a theater, and a world-class hotel – the Moderne Hotel, which hosted the League 
representative Lord Lytton in 1932. Kaspe was aware of the Japanese intention to annex his 
estate, so he transferred ownership of his property to his two sons who studied in Paris and 
obtained French citizenship. In the summer of 1933, the younger son Simeon Kaspe, the 24 year 
old pianist, came back to Harbin after giving a performance tour. Toward midnight on August 
24, the Japanese Gendarmerie kidnapped the young Simeon Kaspe and demanded a $ 300,000 
ransom. The Japanese Gendarmerie’s Russian interpreter, Kostya Nakamura, organized the plot 
and enlisted Konstanitin Rodzaevsky and a Harbin Municipal Police inspector named Nikolai 
Martinov, who had a gang of about 15 criminals at his disposal.
345
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Josef Kaspe refused to pay the ransom and called on the French Consul in Harbin to 
intervene. In response, the Vice French Consul of Harbin, Albert Chambon, initiated a private 
investigation, aiming to expose the rampant crimes of Manchukuo. Thus, the Kaspe affair 




One month later, the impatient kidnappers cut off Simeon’s ears and sent to the father, 
with a note that fingers would soon follow. Just before the chief kidnappers were exposed, the 
Gendarmerie announced that Simeon had been killed on December 3. After ninety-five days’ 
torture, Simeon’s cheeks, nose and hands were frozen and pieces of the flesh had fallen off and 
gangrene had set in.
347
  
This inhuman outrage provoked Harbin Jews, as well as Russians, Chinese and even 
some Japanese. In Harbin, there never was such a funeral as that of the young Kaspe: thousands 
of Harbiners of different nationalities followed the hearse all the way to the Jewish cemetery, 
crying “Death to the Japanese Militarists!”348 All the Jewish stores of Harbin completely shut 
down. Afraid of the demonstration escalating, “250 gendarmes and a whole regiment of Japanese 
Infantry came from Tsitsihar to reinforce the local forces.”349 When Kaspe’s funeral procession 
passed the New Synagogue, the Zionist leader Dr. Kaufman gave the following speech: “The 
Jews were the first people in the world to declare the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ We do 
not pursue revenge, but we seek legal protection of our lives and properties. The state authorities 
                                                             
346 See Breuillard Sabine, “L'Affaire Kaspé revisitée. Documents publiés et présentés par Sabine Breuillard,” Revue 
des études slaves, tome 73, fascicule 2-3, (2001): 337-72; Dan Ben-Canaan, The Semion Kaspe File: A Case Study 
of Harbin as an Intersection of Cultural and Ethnical Communities in Conflict 1932-1945 (Harbin: Heilongjiang 
University, 2008). Both Sabine’s article and Ben-Canaan’s book collected the letters that the young Kaspe wrote to 
his father in captivity and documents of the investigation of the Vice French Consul Chambon.   
347 Vespa, Secret Agent of Japan, 207. 




have an obligation to establish peace. The [Japanese and Manchurian] authorities must fight 
against and sweep out the bandits who foment the hatred of citizens against Jews and sow seeds 
of discord among citizens.”350 
Kaufman’s public speech on the street more or less expressed his dissatisfaction to the 
authorities. Moreover, “according to the memoirs of Evsey Pratt, who grew up in Harbin, 
Kaufman held a ‘rather strong speech’ at a public meeting of the Jewish community.”351 Teddy 
Kaufman confirms that his father pointed out that Kaspe “had been assassinated on anti-Semitic 
grounds and that his murderers had enjoyed the protection of the authorities.” Dr. Kaufman 
declared that “a country which allows bandits and assassins to harm innocents has no right to 
exist.”352 
Dr. Kaufman’s speech brought him big trouble. Condemning the existence of the puppet 
state was the most sensitive taboo for the inhabitants of Manchukuo, because Japan had just 
withdrawn from the League of Nations in March and the legitimacy of Manchukuo was denied 
by almost all the nations in 1933. Thereupon, according to Takao, Manshu Nippo (The 
Manchurian Daily News), a Japanese-language newspaper published in Dairen, criticized the 
closing of the Jewish stores on the day of the funeral on December 5.
353
 Furthermore, Manshu 
Nippo reported on Kaufman “delivering a fierce anti-Manchukuo speech on the street.” 354 
Following that, right-wing newspapers in Harbin all criticized the fact that Kaufman had 
protested against the Manchukuo authorities.
355
 The Russian fascists contentedly added fuel to 
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the fire: “Radzoyevsky wrote in the iniquitous Nash Put a long article in which he demanded the 
arrest and punishment of the Doctor for having insulted those patriotic Russians who had only 
done an act of justice in killing a dirty Jew whose father was an agent of the ‘Third 
Internationale.’”356 
In consequence, the Tokumu Kikan (Japanese Military Mission) summarily summoned 
Dr. Kaufman, and “hurled at him every insult they could think of, and threatened to expel him 
from Manchuria.” 357  The Japanese forced Kaufman and other leaders of the Harbin Jewish 
Council (HEDO) to retract their words and to rehabilitate the “prestige” of Manchukuo. On 8 and 
10 March 1934, the poor Doctor and the Jewish Council published open letters in the Jewish 
newspaper Rupor and the Japanese-owned Russian daily Kharbinskoe Vremia. According to 
Hohler, 
In this letter Doctor Kaufman disclaimed that he had never said anything to 
question the work of the police or the integrity of the authorities in Manchukuo. He also 
declared that he had spoken purely as a private person, not as a representative of the 
Jewish community. In its letter the Jewish community declared that its members were 
totally satisfied with the police’s handling of the kidnapping and expressed their gratitude 
for the work of the police. The letter continued, expressing HEDO’s appreciation of the 
equal treatment of all citizens in Manchukuo, irrespective of their nationality or religion, 
and its gratitude for the support the Jewish community of Harbin had received from the 
new authorities since the establishment of Manchukuo. The letter closed by calling on the 
Jewish inhabitants of Harbin to “control themselves and attend to their affairs peacefully 
and quietly.”358  
In this way, the Japanese authorities completely silenced the Jews in Harbin. When 
Harbin Jews had to “control themselves” and kept “peacefully and quietly,” the media was 
totally occupied by the RFP’s  as  Pu s’. Following Kaspe’s funeral,  as  Pu ’ published over 
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30 articles to humiliate and slander Harbin Jews.
359
 First, Jews were described as unwanted 
people of Manchukuo and that they should leave: “Dr. Kaufman’s speech clearly shows that this 
Jew thinks himself above the law and takes the liberty to criticize the Government. As Moses led 
the Jews out of Egypt, so must Dr. Kaufman follow his example and lead the Jews out of 
Harbin.”360  
Furthermore,  as  Pu ’ launched personal attack on Kaufman maligning him as a 
heartless Jewish doctor who persecuted Orthodox Christians in Harbin. Evoking anti-Semitic 
stereotypes,  as  Pu ’ fabricated a tragic story of an innocent Russian girl named Lydia 
Telezhnikova, who fell sick with cholera, being killed by Dr. Kaufman.
361
 The cholera epidemic 
was brought about by the great flood in 1932, the year when Japanese army occupied Northeast 
China. When the cholera epidemic struck Harbin, Dr. Kaufman and the Jewish hospital in fact 
saved many lives, both Jews and non-Jews.  as  Pu ’ basically reversed right and wrong.  
At last,  as  Pu ’ published a series of articles attacking the Harbin Jewish merchants. In 
the Russian fascists’ opinion, the Jews were both capitalists and communists, who destroyed 
their Russian homeland by means of Jewish economic strength. One article mocked Harbin’s 
“Sugar King,” Lev Zikman, “because a bust of him, made for him by the wife of a consular 
employee, broke on delivery.”362 Zikman owned Manchuria’s largest sugar mill, the Ashihe 
Sugar Mill. In 1934, the Japanese forced him to jointly operate the Ashihe Sugar Mill and 
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usurped more than fifty percent ownership of the mill.
363
  as  Pu ’ probably seized this 
opportunity to humiliate Zikman.  
To add insult to injury, the Russian fascists posted these slanderous articles on Harbin’s 
main commercial streets, making them visible to the victim Simeon Kaspe’s old father in the 
Moderne Hotel. When the Jews peeled off these fascist posters and appealed to the police, they 
were told that “because  as  Pu ’ was under government supervision, like all other newspapers, 
the posters were published with official consent and destroying them was a crime.”364 
No matter how ridiculous these accusations sounded, the Harbin Jewish community was 
completely isolated from the rest of the population. Dr. Kaufman, once respected by both Jews 
and gentiles, was then attacked personally on the street. In addition, the Japanese Gendarmerie 
“assigned two Russian thugs to go at night and smash all the windows of the two synagogues. 
Each time that the glass was replaced it was broken with stones and bricks, until finally all 
repairs had to be given up. Religious services had to be held with broken windows, in a 
temperature thirty degrees below zero.”365 In the night of the first of March [1934], all panels and 
windows of the New Synagogue in Diagonalnaia Street were destroyed, “so nearly no window 
was unbroken, and in the morning no service could be held, because no one could stay there 
because of the cold.”366 
The Kaspe affair and Harbin Jews’ protest against the persecutions provoked Russian 
fascists’ intensive anti-Semitic activities and the Japanese militarists’ brutal oppression. As a 
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result, a pogrom-like atmosphere pervaded Harbin from 1933 to 1937.
367
 These insults to the 
victims finally forced Dr. Kaufman and “Sugar King” Zikman to cooperate with the Manchukuo 
authorities at the end of 1937 when the Japanese remade their Jewish policy, which will be 
analyzed in the next chapter.  
4.2.4. The Trial of the Kaspe Affair 
 
In October 1934, the kidnappers of Simeon Kaspe were arrested, including Nikolai 
Martinov, Harbin Municipal Police inspector, and his five associates.
368
 However, afraid of their 
involvement being exposed, the Japanese authorities transmuted the “sordid criminal case into a 
political cause celebre.”369  In November, Osamu Eguchi, Chief of the Criminal Affairs Division 
of the Harbin Police Agency, reported on Kaspe’s affair, a report of sixty pages of Japanese text 
and thirty-two pages of Russian, in which he concluded that the murders of Simeon Kaspe were 
“Russian patriots,” raising funds by kidnapping Jews to save their homeland.370 The Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency reprinted the synopsis of Eguchi’s report in English. Writing in 
chronological order, Eguchi first pointed out that the Jews constituted the main force of the 
Communist movement that had caused the collapse of the Russian Empire: “The accused are 
perfectly sure that those guilty for the ruin of Imperial Russia, the murder of the Emperor himself 
and his family, are Communists and leaders of the Communist movement Jews, and, therefore, 
the accused decided to have revenge for their homeland, being imbued with extreme anti-Soviet 
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and anti-Jewish feelings.”371 The report further groundlessly blamed the victims, the Kaspes, 
were not only the agents of Comintern, but were also dirty capitalists who had stolen the Tsar’s 
treasures and made a great fortune out of them during the revolution. Finally, the Japanese Chief 
of Police defended the murders as heroes, showed his sympathy and described extenuating 
circumstances:  
Thus the accused considered that Joseph Kaspe had made his money in a criminal 
manner and decided to take his money away from him and spend it in a struggle against 
the Bolsheviks. They considered that such action would enable them to commence a 
struggle against the Bolsheviks, and also to avenge themselves on the Jews. In their 
opinion, acting in this manner, they would kill two birds with one stone. 
However, leaving their action to the conscience of the accused, and not going into 
consideration of whether it was bad or good of them, the fact must be stated that they 
showed themselves staunch fighters for their native land, who considered all means good 
to accomplish their aim. We know of many such cases in history. These people have lost 





These despicable anti-Semitic slanders which considered slaying Jews as the act of 
patriotic heroes read bizarrely today, but they indeed prevailed and roused hatred among gentiles 
against Jews during the two world wars. The Japanese militarists utterly picked up the Russian 
fascists’ anti-Semitic views and saw the Jews as potential enemies. Subduing both the 
Bolsheviks and the Jews, the kidnappers were esteemed as “killing two birds in one stone.” 
Despite the remonstrations from Jewish communities in Shanghai, the U.S and Europe, 
newspapers published in Harbin carried articles full of such anti-Semitic propagandas since the 
Japanese imposed a blackout on the Jews’ voices. 
                                                             




However, the six accused criminals were eventually put in charge of the Courts of Justice 
in Harbin and taken into jail. The judges remained Chinese appointed during the period when the 
Chinese ruled Manchuria. It was in fact not difficult for the Chinese judges to make a just 
sentence, because they had experienced several such anti-Semitic cases during the period of 
Chinese rule, such as the Vilensky File in 1927. Amleto Vespa, an Italian mercenary who first 
worked for Marshal Zhang Zuolin and then served in the Japanese Gendarmerie, witnessed that 
“in spite of all the tricks and efforts of the Japanese to shift the issue on the ground of patriotism 
and politics, the Chinese judges could see nothing but plain banditry, kidnapping and murder.”373 
Regardless of the opinion of their Japanese “advisors,” the Chinese judges resolutely and 
determinedly declared the murderers guilty. In June 1936, the Chinese judges of Harbin District 
Court pronounced death sentences on four of the kidnappers, and sentenced the other two to life 
imprisonment.  
The news subsequently encouraged Harbin Jews. Kaufman praised the Harbin court 
decision saying that: “The trial for the criminals who kidnapped and murdered Simon Kaspe is 
over. The blackguards have been found guilty. Four have been sentenced to death, and two have 
been sentenced to life imprisonment. Punishments have been assigned to these bandits. We have 
not made any comments until now, because […] we have been waiting until details of the case 
were clarified before the court and fair decisions were handed down.”374  
Nevertheless, Harbin Jews found that they rejoiced too soon. Two days later, the 
Japanese arrested the presiding Chinese judge and declared the sentence null and void. The 
Japanese-owned Russian newspaper Kharbinskoe Vremia published articles continually 
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politicizing the Kaspe file and asking for “fair justice” and a “retrial” for the murderers.375 Seven 
months later, in February 1937, the Japanese judges of the Supreme Court of Changchun, the 
capital of Puppet Manchukuo, dismissed the case of Kaspe and granted amnesty to all the six 
kidnappers on the ground that they had acted as patriots. The principal criminal, Martinov, 
resumed his position as the Harbin Municipal Police inspector.
376
 
Adding insult to injury, arresting the judges and releasing the criminals, Manchukuo- 
style justice, shocked all decent-minded people. Japanese scholar Takao exclaims that “the trial 
of the Kaspe Affair and its outcome may lucidly illustrate the true nature and fraud of what was 
called Manchukuo, how the ‘rule of Law’ operated there.”377 
 
 
Figure 9: Hotel Moderne, flying the French flag, 1930s. 
(Image from http://www.eastasianhistory.org/37/gamsa, accessed March 26, 2019) 
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Figure 10: Simeon Kaspé in 1933 
(Image from https://kehilalinks.jewishgen.org/harbin/simeon_kaspe.htm, accessed March 27, 2019) 
 
4.3. Expel Jews from Puppet Manchukuo  
 
While the divergent powers were still locking horns on the Kaspe Affair, the sale of CER 
by USSR to Manchukuo, the official expansion of the Russian Fascist Party, and the Japanese 
anti-Jewish policy, almost crushed the Harbin Jewish community in 1935.  
4.3.1. The Bureau for Russian Emigrant Affairs (BREM) 
 
On 8 October 1934, the Soviet government ordered the Harbin Consulate to prepare for 
the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to retreat from Manchuria.
378
 By the middle of 1935, 
more than 20,000 Soviets had returned to Russia. To eradicate the Soviet influence and to more 
effectively control the remaining Russian population in Manchukuo, the Japanese Military 
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Mission established the Bureau for Russian Emigrant Affairs (Biuro po delam Russiskikh 
Emigrantov, BREM) in December 1934. 
The establishment of BREM endowed the RFP a legal status in Manchukuo, so it in fact 
enhanced the power of the RFP. In March 1934, the expanded RFP, changed its name to All-
Russia Fascist Party, by merging with the branch in the United States. The All-Russia Fascist 
Party officially took full charge of all the Russian communities, constituting of 30,000 to 40,000 
stateless émigrés in Manchuria. BREM divided into seven departments and had 188 
organizations, covering agricultural settlement, education, administration, finance and welfare, 
legal and military affairs. The RFP took all the key positions in BREM. Rodzaevsky served as an 
adviser to the BREM directors and headed the cultural department in educating Russian youth. 
Mikhail Matkovsky directed the Administration Department, “which issued residence permits, 
employment cards, and passports required of all White Russians in Manchukuo.”379 “All BREM 
officials were responsible to” a Japanese Major named Akikusa Shun, “who met with them at 
regular intervals.”380 According to Stephan, “by the middle of 1935, BREM was operating in 
White Russian communities throughout Manchukuo. Branches sprang up in Mukden, Hsinking, 
Manchouli, Hailar, Aigun, and Pogranichinaya.”381 
All Russian émigrés over the age of eighteen were required to register with BREM. 
Without the BREM identification card, residence permits, and travel documents, the émigrés 
could hardly move or find a job in Manchukuo. Thus, “Russians called BREM ‘our consulate’ as 
a joke.”382 According to Stephan, “BREM wielded jurisdiction not only over ethnic Russians but 
over other nationalities who had lived within the old Russian Empire: Ukrainians, Poles, 
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Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Armenians, Tartars, and Baltic Germans. 
Collectively, these non-Russians comprised about 10 percent of Manchukuo’s ‘White Russian’ 
population.”383 However, the Jews were excluded.  
Takao’s research showed that “According to Harbin police data in the mid-1930s, out of 
7000 Jews in Harbin, 4500 were stateless, 1200 had Soviet passports, 350 had Polish, 160 had 
Lithuanian, and 150 had Chinese passports.” 384  The data was incomplete, but it shows the 
majority of Harbin Jews were stateless. For practical purposes, Jews had to apply to join BREM, 
otherwise Jews had no official status or identity in Manchukuo. The Hadegel, the journal of the 
Zionist youth organization, the Betar, wrote an article in January 1936, insisting on “their right to 
[BREM] membership as anti-Communist, Russian-Jewish nationalists”: “It is clear the [BREM] 
should include within its ranks Jewish emigrants as well. They cannot be excluded from the 
constructive forces that will rebuild Russia after the yoke of Bolshevism has been removed. For 
these reasons, the leaders of our organizations, being emigrants, applied for membership in 
BREM and advised the Jewish population to do the same.”385 
Even though Harbin Jews strove to obtain a legal status recognized by the government, 
the BREM administrators excluded the Jews and saw them as enemies. When three Jewish 
families applied for émigré status at the BREM branch in Manchouli, the BREM officers cried 
“Down with the Communist Party” and then shouted “Down with the Jews.”386 As a result, those 
who failed to register with the BREM were denied employment and education. Mara Moustafien 
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recounted that her mother Inna “was excluded from school and had to study at home with a 
tutor.”387 
BREM as the only official organization for Russian émigrés after the Soviets withdrew 
from Manchukuo, was supposed to receive the remaining Jews, but apparently, the Russian 
fascist officials were very reluctant to or even refused to include the Jewish population. 
Consequently, the Jews of Manchukuo were not only stateless, but also lost their legal status. 
Stephan called them “double refugees,” first from Bolshevism, then from fascism.388 It means 
Jews were deprived of all identities and all rights de facto and de jure, not only equal rights, but 
all human rights, economic, political, and religious. All Jewish properties were free to be 
relinquished and Jewish lives were free to be taken. The persecution of Jews in Manchukuo was 
comparable to that in Nazi Germany, though in a lesser degree. That is the reason why German 
scholar Hohler observes that “starting in late 1934 … attacks and assaults on Jewish inhabitants 
of Harbin became more common:”389  
On the night of 18 December 1934 a young Jewish married couple, named 
Al’tman, was assaulted by a group of drunken students from the Polytechnic Institute on 
Kitaiskaia Street, the main street of Pristan. They first insulted Mrs Al’tman, then started 
to beat her husband and tried to take his hat, possibly aware of the importance and 
meaning Jews ascribed to covering one’s head. The offenders finally fled when the police 
arrived on the scene. Only days later, on 4 January 1935, a young Jewish man named 
Veizman was attacked by four Russian youths at the skating rink, one of the most popular 
meeting places for adolescents in the winter. Two of the attackers held him while the 
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 Around the middle of 1935, anti-Jewish kidnappings and murders started a new round. A 
brother of Jacob Mali, a prominent contractor for CER, was kidnapped and killed by bandits. 
Before long, Jacob’s son Leib was kidnapped near the synagogue in the heart of the Jewish 
district in June 1935. Leib was returned for a ransom of $3,000.
391
 In the same month, a 
shopkeeper called Leonson was kidnapped and disappeared.
392
 It took another two years, in May 
1937, for Leonson’s decomposed body to be found “in a well in a newly developed urban area of 
Harbin.”393 
4.3.2.  Western Jews Protest 
 
Even though the Censorship Bureau of Manchukuo forbade any reports on 
kidnappings,
394
 these anti-Jewish persecutions, especially the Kaspe case which was justified by 
the Japanese authorities, aroused protest and indignation in the Jewish communities of China in 
particular and among world Jewry in general.  
In August 1934, Nissim Ezra Benjamin Ezra, the secretary of the Shanghai Zionist 
Association and the chief editor of its official newspaper Israel’s Messenger, went to Tokyo and 
asked the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru to suppress anti-Semitism in 
Manchuria.
395
 When Nazi Germany persecuted and expelled Jews from Europe, both Shanghai 
Zionist leader, N.E.B. Ezra, and Japanese diplomat, Yotara Sugimura, sought to settle German 
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Jewish refugees in Harbin.
396
 However, as the situation of Harbin Jews only became ever worse, 
Ezra was anxious at all cost to remonstrate with the Japanese authorities. Ezra was probably “the 
most zealous and militant Zionist in the whole of the Far East,” as Israel Cohen, the World 
Zionist Organization’s first representative to East Asia, described him.397 
From December 1934 to February 1935, Ezra first headed a delegation consisting of 
Rabbi M. Z. Ashkenazi, Hillel Epstein, and B. Topas, representing the Jewish community of 
Shanghai, that approached Minister Ariyoshi, Japan’s Minister to China, at the Japanese 
Legation in Shanghai. Ezra complained to the Japanese Minister Ariyoshi about the persistent ill-
treatment of Harbin Jews in the past twenty months. He further pointed out that those Jewish 
pioneers, such as Skidelsky and Soskin, rendered yeoman service to the initial economic 
development of Harbin. Thus, he hoped Jews in Harbin could be fully protected and considered. 
Ezra also conducted similar interviews with the U. S. Consul-General, Edwin S. Cunningham, 
and the British Consul, Alexander Cadogan. Those authorities who received Ezra all showed 




At last, Ezra petitioned the American Jewish Congress (AJC) concerning the desperate 
situation of Harbin Jews.
399
 The AJC immediately lodged a protest with Japanese Ambassador 
Saito in Washington. On February 5, 1935, the president of AJC, Dr. Stephen S. Wise and 
Professor Horace M. Kallen called upon Saito and publicly expressed American Jewry’s hope 
that Japan would take appropriate action to stop the anti-Semitic campaign in Harbin during the 
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last year and half. Mr. Saito “expressed himself in complete accord with the assurances made by 
the Minister to China and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and agreed to forward to his 
government the request submitted to him, which he said has his full sympathy.”400 
Similar demonstrations were held by the Joint Committee of the British Jewish Board of 
Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association throughout 1936 to 1937.
401
 Representatives of the 
British Jews protested to the Japanese Ambassador in London concerning the anti-Jewish 
agitations by White Russians in Harbin and “for the wholesale arrest of Jewish businessmen who 
were ‘charged with fictitious offenses in order to force them to offer bribes.’”402 
Japanese sources show that these protests from American and English Jewry did alert 
Japan. According to Takao, on January 14, 1935, the Harbin vice consul Hanroku Nagaoka 
submitted a report to Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, in which he “candidly admitted that the Jews 
were suffering military-sanctioned persecution committed by the Russian Fascist Party in 
Harbin, but expressed his view that taking a policy of siding with the Jews, who comprised a 
minority of the Russians living in Harbin, would never be convenient for the sake of governance, 
because that policy would alienate the White Russians.”403 Moreover, in a reply from Harbin to 
London on September 19, 1936, the Harbin Consul-General Shoshiro Sato reported to Shigeru 
 oshida, then ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Great Britain, “admitting that 
Jews [were] being persecuted throughout the world, but the degree of persecution was 
particularly serious in Harbin.”404 Sato further explained the reasons in full accord with the 
Russian fascists’ “patriot theory” that was pervading in Harbin. Finally, almost all the Japanese 
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authorities acquiesced to the current Japanese policy on the Jews in Harbin which they believed 
was good for the governance of Manchukuo and its official principles of racial harmony.  
 
 
Figure 11:  N.E.B. Ezra (left) with two associates  
(Image from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N.E.B._Ezra, accessed April 1, 2019) 
 
4.3.3. “Those Unsatisfied were Free to Leave” 
 
In March 1935, encouraged by Ezra and the Jews in the U.S. and Britain, Dr. Kaufman 
and a member of the Harbin Kehillah, Mr. I. Berkovich, representing the Harbin Jewish 
community, went to talk to the Japanese Consul General Marishima in Harbin. Consul 
Marishima remarked that Harbin Jews were facing hardships and hostilities, and he further 
expressed that he would like to hear from the Jewish leaders “what grievances they had so that 
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he could render them full assistance.”405 Kaufman and Berkovich emphasized that the White 
Russian newspapers constantly attacked the Jews without foundation. “After becoming 
acquainted with the facts,” Marishima promised to suppress the anti-Jewish turmoil in Harbin 
and “asked the Harbin Jewish leaders to assure Jews abroad of the friendly feelings which the 
Japanese Government has toward the Jewish people.”406 Recent studies show that Marishima 
“was apparently also quite upset about unfavorable articles in the foreign press on anti-Semitism 
in Harbin” and he “wanted the names of those Jews who complained to the foreign press.”407 
“Kaufman is said to have answered that the anti-Semitic bias in some of the Russian press is so 
obvious that no one actually needed to complain explicitly about it to garner foreign 
attention.”408 
The Japanese soon took revenge on these complaints and demonstrations conducted by 
Ezra, Kaufman and Jews abroad. In August 1935, the secret police surrounded and searched the 
Great Synagogue.
409
 Israel’s Messenger reported that “the entire compound was encircled by 
police and every corner of drawers, boxes, including the Holy Ark, where the sacred scrolls of 
the law are deposited, was submitted to a search for arms and banned literature.”410 A month 
later, on the day of Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), the Japanese Gendarmerie raided the 
Great Synagogue, the house of Rabbi Levin, and the home of Kaufman.
411
 Teddy, son of Dr. 
Kaufman, wrote in his memoirs that:  
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I must have been about 10 years old – I remember being sick and in bed on the 
morning of Yom Kippur. The Japanese gendarmes suddenly appeared at our house, at 
Rabbi Kiselev’s home and at the Main Synagogue. While guards surrounded our house, 
the soldiers carried out a thorough search on the provocative grounds that we had hidden 
arms. It was of course mere provocation. They made me get up and checked under my 
mattress. I was afraid they might hide weapons there and then claim that they had found 
them in our home. My father, who had never as much as held a firearm, told them 
courageously: “This child is sick and running a high temperature. Please leave him alone. 
If you want you may search the entire house. Please do.”412 
 
Similar raids on the Synagogue and other Jewish institutions happened again in the fall of 
1936.
413
 Raiding the Synagogue and searching the Holy Scrolls of the Law on the holiest day of 
the Jewish calendar year, the savage Japanese Gendarmerie once more silenced the Harbin Jews 
and provoked the Shanghai Jews: “In an open letter to the editor of the Shanghai Times, on 30 
October 1935, Ezra called for a public apology for this flagrant disrespect for the Jewish people 
and their holy day.”414 It reminded people of the darkest period of Jewish history in Europe. A 
reader’s letter in Israel’s Messenger criticized the Japanese Gendarmerie, saying that “It is 
unheard of that Government officials would make a raid on a sacred place of worship on the 
strength of some accusation by irresponsible Jew-haters. Has it ever occurred that in the 
twentieth century a whole congregation can be accused by some irresponsible people, and the 
government will act on the strength of it?” 415 Unfortunately, fighting against anti-Semitism, 
N.E.B. Ezra, editor and founder of Israel’s Messenger, died of heart attack in his fifties in 
December 1936.
416
 Shanghai Jewry then turned more furious with the Japanese government.  
At the end of 1935, Harbin Jews were almost crushed: “Jews are attacked daily on the 
streets, but no one dares complain for fear of imprisonment by the gendarmerie in cellars, where 
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they are reported kept indefinitely and tortured. The attacks are conducted without interference 
by the police.”417 Moreover, the Japanese ousted the Jews from commerce in Harbin and other 
Manchukuoan cities, which forced these bankrupted Jewish businessmen to leave for Shanghai, 
Tianjin and other Chinese cities.
418
 Jews in Tianjin only hoped that the Japanese militarists not 
march to this old Chinese harbor city, otherwise they might suffer the same difficulties as the 
Jews in Harbin.
419
 A Hebrew article “Hurban Harbin” published in the newspaper ha-Aretz in 
1936 summarized the situation that: 
The Jews of this city say it is called “Harbin” as a prophecy of the “destruction” 
“Hurban” which is their present reality.  It is a fact that the Jewish community of Harbin 
is being destroyed.  Day by day the community is emptying.  It should be emphasized 
that Harbin was one of the nicest and best Jewish communities in a Jewish communal 
sense…. While Harbin was under Chinese rule, the White Russians had no influence.  
Not so now.  In the area of Japanese domination there are tensions with Soviet Russia and 
the White Russians rose to become helpers and advisors to the new regime and their 




As Harbin became “Hurban” (a Hebrew word literally means the destruction of the 
Temple in Jerusalem), of those Jews who wished to remain in China, 2,000 escaped to Tianjin 
and 4,000 to 5,000 to Shanghai.
421
 Subsequently, the Tianjin and Shanghai Jewish communities 
expanded as never before. Tianjin Jewry reached its highest number about 2,500 persons in 
1935. Tianjin’s first synagogue was built in 1937 and was inaugurated by Harbin Rabbi, R. 
Levin. In Shanghai, there were only 500 to 700 Sephardic Jews and 800 to 1000 Ashkenazi Jews 
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 However, by the end of the 1930s, Shanghai, replacing Harbin, grew into the 






On June 29, 1936, in a letter to London, the British Consul-General Paul Butler at 
Shenyang (Mukden) gave an evaluation of the four years of Manchukuo administration, in which 
he pointed out that “the Kwantung army rely on terrorism as an instrument of policy” and the 
methods of the military despotism “can only be described as savage:” 
Many well authenticated instances of the killing of Chinese, either outright or be 
torture, by Japanese gendarmerie or police have been reported to this consulate-general 
and that at Harbin. Moreover there are the strongest grounds for believing that a British 
subject, a German and an American, as well as several ‘white’ or Soviet Russians have 
met similar fates. Obviously, it is only in very rare instances that crimes of this kind 
become known to us. The employment of methods of torture, so far from being 
exceptional, appears to be a matter of routine especially in the more lawless regions, 
where Japanese troops and gendarmerie have absolute power, may be surmised without 
much difficulty, but the full story of the sufferings of the Chinese at Japanese hands will 




Not only has the full story of the sufferings of the Chinese rarely become known, but also 
that of the Jews, which the British Consul-General Butler carelessly ignored. The Japanese 
Gendarmerie almost did all that the darkest regimes treated Jews in history, by extorting the 
Jewish money in the means of slander, kidnapping and murder, and finally expelling them.  
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Far from a knee-jerk reaction against the Soviet Union, wartime Japan had been turning 
into extreme militarism and fascism. The JTA sighed that “For some unaccountable reason, the 
latter [refer to White Russians] are allowed to pursue their nefarious deeds unmolested by the 
Harbin police and given a free rein to do as they please. East is being made to feel what West is 
like when it comes to racial hatred and prejudice.”425 Before very long, the union of the Japanese 
military and the Russian fascists – “the Manchurian Mafia” referred to by scholar Stephan – 
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Chapter V: The Miracle that Jews Survived in China during World War II 
 
In WWII, nearly six million Jews were massacred during the Holocaust in Europe, but it 
is less-known that at least 20 to 30 million Chinese were killed bloodily and tens of millions 
became refugees. Moreover, when the Jews were uprooted and transformed their tradition in the 
new world, the inherent Chinese society bonded by traditional familial ties was thoroughly 
destroyed on its own soil.
426
 China was ruined and the people lost (guopo jiawang 家破人亡).  
But in the West, scholars observe that “most books and articles dealing with the war in 
China focus on the American or Japanese points of view, plans, and experiences … Rarely ... 
have the problems, hardships, and survival of the Chinese people in various areas been explored 
… The lack of studies has distorted the contributions of the country and its people and the 
profound effects of the war on it.”427  
In our study, distorting China’s role in WWII and covering-up Japan’s atrocities directly 
resulted in the Jewish illusion that the Japanese only persecuted the Chinese, but they treated 
foreigners well and saved the Jews in the war. However, when we re-examine the co-operation 
of the Japanese Guandong Army and the Russian Fascist Party and their anti-Semitic outrages in 
Harbin, we found that in the ensuing WWII, all Japan did was to keep taking advantage of the 
vulnerability of the suffering Jews.  
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Within the context of Japan’s wars of aggression in Asia and international diplomacy 
during the Pacific War, this chapter will argue that China was in fact a forgotten ally to the 
United States in WWII. It is the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, that saved the Jews. The Jews 
were also a victim of the Japanese militarism in the war. The complicated relations of the Harbin, 
Shanghai and American Jews are the keys to understand both Chinese and Japanese policy on the 
Jewish refugees.  
5.1. World War II in Asia 
5.1.1. Japan’s Wars of Aggression 
 
During WWI, Japan grew into a great power in Asia, the following decades saw a series 
of wars that Japan waged alone to challenge the West-dominated world order (the Washington 
System) in Asia. The first phrase of wars began by occupying Manchuria in 1932. Japan was not 
punished by the League of Nations, so it became even more powerful. To eradicate Western 
influence in Asia, Japan’s second phase of war was to invade China in 1937 and the third phase 
aimed at East Asia and the South Pacific in 1941.
428
 Hans Van De Ven concludes that “Japanese 
imperialism – that is, Japan’s desire to drive Western countries from east and south-east Asia and 
then colonise these areas – was the deep cause of the Second World War in east Asia.”429 
When “Japanese forces in China pushed beyond the Great Wall and resumed their 
advance westward and southward into Chahar and Hopei” in 1935, Chinese nationalism and anti-
Japanese sentiment increased.
430
 However, Jiang Jieshi, the Chinese Nationalist leader, was 
reluctant to fight against Japan. Instead, pursuing a policy of domestic consolidation before an 
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external war (rangwai bixian annei), Jiang ordered the Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang to 
eradicate the Chinese communists in the Northwest.  oung Marshal Zhang’s father was killed by 
the Japanese as previously mentioned, so the Young Marshal full of hatred to the Japanese, was 
in no mood for an internal war. On December 12, 1936, Young Marshal Zhang dramatically 
captured Jiang in Xi’an and forced him to terminate all civil strife. Under the influence of the 
Soviet Union, which feared disorder in China would further advantage Japan, the Chinese 
nationalists and communists agreed to form the second United Front against the aggressor, and 
Jiang was honored as the Generalissimo.
431
 
The unification of China alerted Japan. In Tokyo, the young Japanese militarists urged 
the renewal of war against China: “On February 26, 1936, their discontents exploded in an 
incident popularly known, from its date, as the “Two Twenty-Six.” It was all very similar to one 
of the contemporaneous Nazi purges in Germany and Austria, which indeed may have inspired 
it. Fourteen hundred men, mainly of the Imperial Guard, under their captains and lieutenants, 
started out on a systematic assassination of their political opponents. Old Viscount Saito was 
disposed of at dawn in his own house. Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo … was shot as he 
lay in bed …”432 
The militarists finally secured the cabinet in June 1937 when Prince Konoe Fumimato 
took office as the prime minister with an ambitious Pan-Asian program. The war of aggression 
against China ensued in the following month. On the night of July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops 
started firing at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, on the pretext that the Chinese garrison 
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refused the Japanese entrance in the nearby city to search for a missing soldier. In late July, the 
Japanese Army captured Beijing. Undeclared war between China and Japan began.
433
  
Once again, like the Manchurian Incident of six years before, China appealed to the 
League of Nations. The League, as well as the United States, condemned Japan’s aggression 
positively. However, wars were “not likely to be brought to an end by manifestations of 
disapprobation on moral or legal grounds.”434 To cover up the international publicity directed 
against Japan, the Japanese continued to pretend that the hostility was a “China Incident” so 
Japan’s war was no more than chastisement. Less powerful than the West, the “wild dog” Japan, 
as Antony Best described it,
435
 was good at making an “incident” to pass the buck on the others.  
From July 1937 to October 1938, the Japanese successively captured Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Xuzhou, Wuhan and Guangzhou. The Japanese occupied almost all eastern and southern 
developed cities with railways and ports to enter China. In November 1937, the Chinese 
Nationalist government was forced to remove to the mountain city of Chongqing in the far 
Southwest, near the border with South Asia. The Chinese communists fought in the Northwest 
and part of central China.
436
  
Regardless that its main forces were bogged down in China, Tokyo was encouraged by 
Hitler’s war in Europe in 1939. The Tripartite Pact of 1940 revealed Japan’s ambitions to 
conquer all Asia, especially the natural-resource-rich Southeast Asian region, and to establish the 
so called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Hitler’s victory in Europe gave Japan the 
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chance to move on French Indo-China, and further pose a threat to Dutch East Indies, the 
Philippine Islands and Australia.  
The Japanese move directly threatened America’s security and defense supplies in the 
South Pacific. In his testimony on the lease-lend bill before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on January 15, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared:   
It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad 
and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of 
the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and 
maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area 
containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they 
would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region. 
Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed ‘new 
order’ in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, 
economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that 
country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the 
interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the 




To hold off Japan, President Roosevelt ordered the freezing of Japanese assets in the 
United States, and embargoed exports of petroleum to Japan in July 1941. Led by the United 
States, the ABCD powers’ (America, Britain, China, and Dutch) coalition against Japan 
emerged. 
To resist America’s containment, the Japanese Prime Minister, Hideki Tojo, ordered the 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Swiftly, “Japan’s offensive in the Pacific had 
begun, like an explosive discharge, in all directions. Within four days of Pearl Harbor, her air 
forces had attacked Singapore, Manila, Midway, Wake, and Guam, and her land forces had 
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seized footholds in Malaya, Burma, Hong Kong and Luzon.”438 Within six months, Japanese 
forces rapidly advanced throughout Southeast Asia, as well as small islands across the southwest 
Pacific, New Guinea and Australia. Japan’s attacks achieved striking military successes.  
5.1.2.  Japan’s War Crimes  
 
Japanese historian Conrad Totman regards the decades to 1940 as “the most vibrant” 
period in Japan’s entire history with respect to its industrialization accomplishments and global 
expansion.
439
 However, Japan’s vibrancy was built on self-militarization and sacrifice of the 
other nations, so it is also the darkest period in Japan’s entire history, the same as Germany. But 
unlike Germany’s acknowledgement of guilty in postwar, the Japanese war crimes were covered 
up both in Japan and in the West.  
 Toshiyuki Tanaka, in his book Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War 
II, conservatively estimated the death tolls of each nation under the Japanese control in the Asia-
Pacific War are: “200,000 Koreans, 30,000 Taiwanese, more than 10 million Chinese, 2 million 
Vietnamese (mainly due to famine), 1,1 million Filipinos, 4 million Indonesians; 100,000 Malays 
and Singaporeans, 150, 000 Burmese, and 1,5 million Indians (due to the Bengal famine of 
1943). In addition, apart from soldiers who were killed in action, more than 60,000 Allied POWs 
and civilian detainees died.”440  
Jews were not the sole sacrifice in WWII; almost all Asian natives experienced massacre 
because in the colonial period of Asia, only Japan completed advanced modern military. In the 
Rape of Nanjing in 1938, known as the “Asian Holocaust,” the Japanese killed about 300,000 
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 The Japanese army adopted a “Three Alls Policy” in its wars: “kill all, burn 
all, loot all.” When the Japanese looted private houses in Nanjing, they killed all men, women, 
children and elders, “whoever happened to be at home.” 442  20,000 to 80,000 women were 
raped.
443
 The Japanese troops established a comfort women system in every place they occupied. 
Hundreds of thousands of Chinese, Korean, Filipino young women and some Western women 
too became sex slaves for the Japanese troops. 
The most macabre sin that the Japanese army committed was Unit 731’s human 
experimentation and biological warfare. Unit 731 was based at Pingfang district of Harbin, 
where cruel Japanese doctors experimented with lethal bacteria on thousands of men, women, 
elders and children. The Japanese Army transported the Chinese captives to Unit 731 for 
experiments “in black vans called ‘ravens’” and disposed of “prisoners’ bodies in incinerators; 
the tasks were made so routine that their moral sensibilities were numbed.”444 
When the plague transmission from animals to human hosts were “tested with success on 
captive Chinese and Manchu ‘guinea pigs’ at Pingfang, “Dr. Ishii Shiro, its founder and director, 
had developed a technique for infecting enemy populations with bubonic plague: planes flying at 
low altitude could spray millions of plague-infected Oriental rat fleas (Xenopsylla cheopsis) on 
city targets. The fleas would be released with bundles of grain; the rats attracted to the grain 
would be bitten by the fleas, sicken, and die; then, as in a natural outbreak, the fleas would find 
human hosts. Or the biting fleas would directly infect the targeted humans.” 445 In her book 
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Hidden Atrocities: Japanese Germ Warfare and American Obstruction of Justice at the Tokyo 
Trial, Jeanne Guillemin wrote that: 
From its beginning in 1932, Ishii’s Manchukuo enterprise, an offshoot of the 
Army Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory in Tokyo, intended to exploit the 
region’s subjugated peoples to explore human reactions to wartime hazards for troops, 
such as freezing temperatures, shrapnel wounds, cholera, and syphilis. “Comfort women” 
coerced to serve the sexual needs of Japanese soldiers were infected, along with other 
women and men, with venereal diseases; in a special project in remote Qiqihar, Ishii 
subjected Chinese captives to blistering chemical agents. His foremost objective, though, 
was to conduct experiments with infectious diseases that had potential as germ weapons, 




In the wars of aggression against China, Ishii’s plague plans were put into practice. From 
1940, Japanese aerial plague attacks went through Ningbo, Quzhou, Jinhua and Changde. 
Hundreds of civilians, both Chinese and the Westerners, were affected and killed in these cities.  
In addition, the Japanese Army also threw the white émigrés and the Allied prisoners into 
the pool of guinea pigs for horrific biological warfare experiments in Unit 731 and other sites.
447
 
For an attempted war with the United States, “in the late 1930s, for instance, Japanese scientists 
demanded more Caucasian subjects for their anthrax and plague experiments. When the NKVD 
chief for the Soviet Far East, Commissar Genrikh Lyuskov, defected, 300 of his subordinates 
fled to Manchukuo fearing an imminent house-cleaning by Stalin, only to perish at the hands of 
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Unit 731’s cruel doctors.”448 Based on the terrible horrors and its antihuman nature, postmodern 
scholars found out that Unit 731 of Harbin was an “Auschwitz” in the East.449  
After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the germ weapon was added to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi 
campaign, where the U.S. air forces, led by Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle, began to arrive 
there in early 1942.
450
 Later, “officers at the General Staff in Tokyo proved amenable to germ 
warfare plans for the Pacific, in the Philippines and beyond,” so the plague attacks were also 
extended to Burma and Singapore.
451
 
Another horrible Japanese war crime is cannibalism, which developed into a systematic 
activity among Japanese soldiers toward the end of the war. In New Guinea and the Philippines, 
“Japanese soldiers referred to the Allies as ‘white pigs’ and the local population as ‘black 
pigs.’”452 The majority of victims of cannibalism were Australian soldiers, Asian POWs, and 
New Guinea locals. 
Notably, in WWI, the powers fought for colonial lands and profits; but during WWII, the 
aim of war escalated to include torturing and killing human beings bloodily. Human beings did 
not act like human beings any more: humans ate other humans alive; using plague to kill people 
and pollute the environment; or establishing gas chambers to exterminate an entire race. Finally, 
the war, as well as the so called “modern era,” ended with the application of the nuclear weapon 
which could ruin the entire Earth. Due to its scope and its lethality, it is fair to say that WWII 
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was the darkest period of human history, where people were killed like flies. What transformed 
human beings into monsters? Modern civilization remains mute.  
5.1.3. The World Reactions to Japan’s War of Aggression against China 
 
Soon after the war in China in 1937 began, Germany chose to assist isolated Japan and to 
abandon China.  In the early 1930s, China and Germany developed a close economic and 
military relationship. Jiang’s German military consultant, Hans von Seeckt, helped him to 
modernize the Chinese Nationalist forces. A secret fascist society “Blue Shirts” emerged within 
the Chinese Nationalist Party, but fascism never grew into an influential movement in China.
453
 
Moreover, in 1936, Jiang sent his younger son, Weiguo, to Germany to study military science 
(Jiang’s older son, Jingguo, as hostage, was already sent to the Soviet Union in 1925). However, 
the Japanese aggression war of 1937 nullified the impressive German accomplishments in China. 
In February 1938, Germany recognized Japanese-dominated Manchukuo. By the end of 1938, 




The Axis and Allied camps were in the process of shaping. After 1937, the United States 
and Britain supplied Jiang’s Chongqing Government through the transportation on the Burma 
Road. American air force aid, the Flying Tigers, operated in Kunming since August 1941. After 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States sent General Joseph Stilwell to assist Jiang in the 
China-Burma-India Theater of war. According to Hsu, “from 1942 to the end of the war in 1945, 
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United States credits to China reached the unprecedented mark of U.S. $500 million.” 455 
Roosevelt further made China one of the “Big Four,” along with the United States, Britain and 
the Soviet Union.
456
 Jiang, along with his wife and his English translator as well, Song Meiling (
宋美龄 1898-2003), achieved a splendid diplomatic success in wartime.  
The Soviet Union also offered its direct assistance to Jiang’s Nationalist Government in 
Chongqing, rather than Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in  an’an. At the beginning phase of 
Japan’s war of aggression from 1937 to 1939, the Soviet Union was the only country that sent 
substantial military aid to Jiang, with 2,000 pilots and 1,500 military advisers, and $250 million 
in loans.
457
 Nevertheless, abandoned by the Soviet Union, the Chinese communist leader Mao 
Zedong and his Eighth Route Army fought alone against the Japanese invasion in the 
Northwestern regions. Different from Jiang’s international diplomacy, Mao’s power was built on 
the grass roots.
458
 Mao’s troops effectively expanded during their anti-Japanese wars and finally 
won over all China. 
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Map 6:  The Military Situation, early 1939  
(Map from Van De Ven, “China at War,” xii.)  
 
 
Figure 12: China’s Forgotten Second World War 
(Photograph from https://www.historyextra.com/period/second-world-war/chinas-forgotten-second-world-war/, 





Map 7: Under Tojo’s Heel 
(Map from http://bhoffert.faculty.noctrl.edu/HST165/19.DarkValley2.html, accessed April 20, 2019) 
 
5.2. China’s Response to the Holocaust: Non - Abandonment  
 
After the Cold War, postmodern scholars discovered that China was a forgotten ally to 
the United States in WWII, as described above. Far more than that, the following sections will 
argue that China was also a forgotten rescuer for the Jews in the Holocaust, by tracing the 
process that Jews immigrated to Shanghai.  
5.2.1. China for the Jews?  
 
As early as in 1933-34, when Hitler came into power, a small group of German Jews 
immigrated to Shanghai. They were mainly Jewish professionals, like doctors, dentists and 
teachers, who suffered from the discriminatory Nuremberg laws, which made Jews second-class 
citizens, thrown out of civil service jobs, universities and other areas of public life in Germany. 
The Jewish professionals easily obtained “visas from the Chinese embassy in Berlin upon 
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presenting a recommendation from the German Foreign Office.”459 Refugee physicians were 
welcomed and well received in China. One observer regarded the arrival of these German Jewish 
doctors as a gift to China.
460
 As of 1937, German Jewish immigrants increased to more than 
1,000.
461
 From Shanghai, some of these Jewish doctors and other professionals went to settle in 
the interior of China, in places such as Tianjin, Qingdao, Hankou, and Guangzhou. 
In the wake of China being the only country that did not develop anti-Semitism, 
American Jews sought to “find a new home in China for German Jews.”462 Gaobei points out 
that in 1934, Maurice William, an influential Jewish dentist and socialist in New York, planned 
to establish a Jewish settlement in China. However, except for Albert Einstein, no one took 
William’s plan seriously.  
Maurice William (1881-1973), born in Kharkov, Ukraine, “immigrated with his family to 
the United States at the age of eight …. In 1907, he received his degree of doctor of dental 
surgery.”463 Later, “together with several colleagues, he established one of New  ork's first free 
dental clinics.”464 It was believed that William’s book The Social Interpretation of History: A 
Refutation of the Marxian Economic Interpretation of History inspired Sun Yat-sen to find out 
the solution for Chinese peoples’ livelihood. After Sun died, William kept a close tie with Sun’s 
son, Sun Ke ( 孙科 1891-1973).  
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In America, Albert Einstein wholeheartedly supported William’s plan to settle Jews in 
China. Among the American Jewish leaders, with whom William discussed his plan, were “U.S. 
Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis, James T. Shotwell, professor of history at Columbia 
University and founder of the International Labor Organization, and philosopher John 
Dewey.”465 They were all convinced that China was “the one great hope for Hitler's victims,”466 
but no one knew how William’s plan could be put into practise.  
William also presented his plan to the Chinese Minister, Shi Zhaoqi, in Washington. Shi 
agreed with William’s plan but seemed not to take it very seriously. At that time, China was 
suffering from Japan’s intensive aggression in Manchuria. China’s trouble was no less than that 
of the Jews. Moreover, in the early 1930s, the Chinese nationalists did not want to offend 
Germany by aiding Jews.  
In its initial stage, William’s plan seemed all wishful thinking, but one thing was certain: 
both sides that William had contacted, both the American Jewish leaders and the Chinese 
Nationalist Government, were aware of the possibility of settling Jews in China. In the letter to 
Einstein in February 1935, William wrote: “I trust some day in the near future, I may be 
privileged to discuss with you the details of our plan. Those who have studied the problem seem 
convinced that China offers unusual possibilities for German Jews.”467 
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Figure 13:  Maurice William 
(Image from https://www.international.ucla.edu/china/MauriceWilliamsArchives/bio, accessed April 23, 2019). 
 
5.2.2. Rescue of Jews to Shanghai 
Before long, the Annexation of Austria to Germany in March 1938 made the forced 
emigration of Jews inevitable. The 185,000 Jews of Austria, consisting of Europe’s third largest 
Jewish community, “were subjected to a reign of terror unprecedented in its swiftness even when 
compared to Nazi Germany…Public humiliation was more blatant and sadistic, expropriation 
better organized, forced emigration more rapid.”468  To expel Jews outright, Gestapo officer 
Adolf Eichmann set up the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna in August 1938. The 
Nazis began to persecute Jews in force across Germany and Austria. During Kristallnacht (The 
Night of Crystal, Nov. 9- 10, 1938), “Nazi thugs ransacked Jewish-owned shops and set 
synagogues ablaze.” 469  After Kristallnacht, “Jews were systematically eliminated from the 
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German economy, thus deprived of their means of livelihood.”470 Innocent Jews were arrested 
and sent to the Dachau and Buchenwald camps. They would be released only if they emigrated 
immediately.  
The increasingly severe German anti-Semitic persecutions caused world-wide concern. In 
July 1938, American President Roosevelt called the Evian conference, but it failed to solve the 
Jewish problems of emigration. The British had already closed the door of Palestine to the Jews 
in 1936. U.S. Department of State, according to Steve Hochstadt, “threw up a bureaucratic wall 
to limit Jewish immigration. The wait for a visa to the United States was years long.”471 Also, the 
Canadian government directly opposed Jewish immigration to Canada. Daniel Levy writes that, 
“From 1939 to 1945, Canada accepted only 500 Jews who escaped the Nazis and 2,250 German 
Jewish internees from Britain. The country was so hard to get into, so unreachable, that Jews in 
Auschwitz named the buildings in which the Nazis stored food, gold, diamonds, confiscated 
goods, and other luxuries “Canada.”” 472  Moreover, the Jews escaped to other European 
countries, like France and Switzerland, “were eventually captured and deported” by Nazis.473 
In such a situation, East Asian countries naturally emerged as optional destinations. The 
Jews, the western nations, and the Asian countries themselves were all well aware of the 
possibility to settle Jews in the East. The optimal destination was of course Harbin, which hosted 
more than 20,000 Russian Jews during WWI. However, the Japanese fascist government was 
completely anti-Semitic. The Japanese militarists preached racial equality for the Jews, but in 
reality, Tokyo de facto and de jure barred Jewish refugees from its controlled areas. The 
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Japanese policy on the Jews will be analyzed below. Another option was the Philippine islands, 
as there was a small Jewish community, less than 1,000 people, of various nationalities there. 
However, the Philippine islands were not an independent state at that time. Neither the leaders of 
the Philippines nor the Manila Jews had the ability to settle a large number of Jews.
474
 Finally, 
Shanghai, a place which consistently received Jewish refugees from Harbin and Berlin, 
automatically emerged as the only choice. After the Japanese Guandong Army crushed the 
Harbin Jewish community in 1935, Shanghai simply served as the new Jewish center in Asia. 
As Shanghai was at war in 1937, most German Jews were reluctant to leave their 
homeland and exile themselves to wartime Shanghai. However, after Kristallnacht, when the 
Gestapo began to arrest Jews and send them to concentration camps, Shanghai suddenly became 
the sole “Noah’s Ark.” The Third Reich was impatient to expel Jews, never mind where they 
went. In February 1939, Gestapo Adolf Eichmann sent Heinrich Schlie, head of the Hanseatic 
Travel Office in Vienna, to the Japanese and Chinese embassies, to ascertain if they accepted 
Jewish immigration. The Japanese denied, but the Chinese answer was positive.
475
 
The Chinese National government was sympathetic to the Jews. They saw Jews as an 
oppressed nation like the Chinese themselves, both suffering from fascist aggressions. It was 
well known that Sun Yat-sen supported Zionism in his letter to N. E. B. Ezra in Shanghai in 
1920. Moreover, one of Sun’s aide-de-camp, the well-known “Two-Gun Cohen,” was Jewish.476 
After Sun died, Sun’s widow Song Qingling (宋庆龄 1893-1981) “and the members of the China 
League for Civil Rights lodged a protest against Nazi persecution of Jews with the German 
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Consulate in Shanghai” in 1933.477 The contemporary dominant Chinese scholars, such as Luxun 
(鲁迅 1881-1936), Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培 1868-1940) and Lin Yutang (林语堂 1895-1976), all 
took part in the protest against Nazism.
478
 As the Jewish situation became worse in 1938, Kong 
Xiangxi (孔祥熙 1881-1967), the Chinese Finance Minister, who also served as president of the 
Executive Yuan, openly showed sympathy for the Jews and he mentioned a plan of settling 
Jewish refugees in China’s southernmost island, Hainan.479  
The Hainan plan, a Chinese plan to settle 30,000 Jews in Hainan Island, was well known 
among the Chinese authorities and the Jews of China.
480
 In late 1938, prepared for collaboration, 
Albert Raymond, the president of Ohel Leah Synagogue in Hong Kong, wrote to discuss the 
Hainan plan, with O. K. Yui (俞鸿钧 1898-1960), Mayor of Shanghai of 1937, and T.V. Soong (
宋子文 1894-1971), one of the prominent Chinese nationalist leaders. But these letters did not 
show any outcome. One reason was probably that Japan attacked and occupied Hainan Island, 
Nansha Island and Shantou in early 1939. The correspondences among Albert Raymond and the 
Chinese authorities ended with T.V. Soong’s assertion that “when conditions become more 
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normal, I shall be glad to discuss with you on what must command the sympathetic consideration 
of everyone.”481 
The Chinese planned to settle Jews in China partly because the Shanghai Jewish 
community kept a close relation with the Chinese government. In spring 1934, when Israel’s 
Messenger celebrated its thirtieth anniversary, N. E. B. Ezra received messages of greeting from 
General Jiang Jieshi, Sun Ke, president of the Legislative Yuan, and C.T. Wang (王正廷 1882-
1961), former Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. More significantly, Mayor Wu Tiecheng (吴
铁城 1893-1953) of the city government of Greater Shanghai, sent a message writing in Chinese 
about “The Revival of Judah.”482 Apparently, the influence of the hundreds of Sephardic Jews in 
Shanghai far exceeded their number. In June 1935, Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi, represented 
the Chinese National Government, decorated Elly Kadoorie (1867-1944) and Victor Sassoon 
(1881-1961), two of Shanghai’s foremost Jews, with the First Class Gold Medal: “Sir Elly was 
decorated for promoting educational and medical work in China, and Sir Victor for his gift…to 
Dr. Sun’s Memorial Hospital.”483 In addition, another Shanghai Jewish tycoon, Silas Hardoon 
(1851-1931), assisted by his Chinese wife Luo Jialing, successfully integrated into Chinese 
society and engaged in Chinese politics.
484
 The Jews in Shanghai had established a strong tie 
with the Chinese authorities.  
Therefore, the Chinese national government informed the Chinese consulates across 
Europe that they could issue visas to Jewish refugees whoever applied, even though the Chinese 
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authorities had not yet developed a coherent and official policy on Jewish refugees as China was 
busy with fighting against the Japanese aggression at the moment. Evidence showed that as early 
as October 1938, multiple Chinese visas were issued to Jews across Europe. In Paris, Walter 
Immergut obtained his visa from consul general Huang Zheng on October 6, 1938.
485
 With a visa 
from the Chinese consulate in Amsterdam, the engineer Hugo Dubsky sought his release from 
Dachau concentration camp in February 1939.
486
 In Hamburg, Arthur and Margarete Lubinski 
obtained their visas from Consul Zhang Gengnian on April 3, 1939.
487
 
Remarkably, Ho (He) Fengshan (何凤山 1901-1997), the Consul General in Vienna 
issued the largest number of Shanghai visas to the Jews. Ho arrived in Vienna in the spring of 
1937 and he became Consul General in May 1938. Before long, Ho was “stunned by the jubilant 
welcome that Hitler received in Austria.”488 Ho had compassion for the panic-stricken Jewish 
community in Vienna. He was aware that the Gestapo released Jewish victims if they could show 
evidence of speedy departure from Germany or Austria, such as an entry visa or a ship ticket to 




Ho’s efforts to save Jews appeared to have started when a 17-year-old Jewish boy, Eric 
Goldstaub, “who had tried unsuccessfully to obtain visas from 50 other consulates, visited the 
Chinese Consulate in 1938. Ho issued 20 visas for the boy’s relatives. But he did not stop there. 
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The boy’s relatives told their friends, and soon long lines were forming outside the consulate, 
from where Ho was soon issuing dozens of visas each day.”490 
When a young Jew named Norbert Lagstein tried desperately to bypass the long line 
waiting in front of the Chinese consulate, he got his visas by wit: “He went home and with his 
fountain pen carefully copied onto a clean envelope a series of Chinese characters gleaned from 
the family’s encyclopedia. He returned and told the policeman on duty that he had a special 
delivery for the consul. The policeman immediately let him in. Once inside, Norbert stuffed the 
envelope into his pocket, took out the passports, and applied for the visas. Thanks to Ho, the five 
younger members of the Lagstein family were able to leave Vienna in time and were saved.”491 
Legstein’s behavior might not be encouraged, but it at least illustrated the popularity of the 
Chinese consulate in Vienna. 
According to Ho’s memoir, one of Ho’s Jewish friends, Mr. Rosenberg, an executive of 
the Standard Oil Company in Vienna, “wanted to move with his entire family to the United 
States. But he could not get a visa in time. He decided to go to Shanghai first.” 492  Later 
Rosenberg “wrote a book, thanking China’s generosity.”493 Rosenberg admired Ho for “acting 
righteously in the face of a wrong.”494 
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The number of the visas that Ho issued to Jews in Vienna reached as high as 400 to 500 
per month.
495
 The large number of Chinese visas issued to Jews alarmed the Ambassador to 
Germany, Chen Jie. Chen was anxious that the apparent Chinese aid to Jews would anger Hitler. 
However, the relations between China and Germany were already cold in 1938. In addition, Ho 
had instructions to receive Jews from Minister Kong Xiangxi, who planned to settle Jews in 
Hainan. Ho knew of the Hainan Plan. So Ho continued issuing visas to the Jews.
496
 
During the two years in his post, from May 1938 to May 1940 (when the Chinese 
National Government sent Ho to the U.S.), Ho kept issuing visas to Jews without restrictions. It 
was difficult to estimate the total number of visas that Ho issued to Jews, because not all Chinese 
visa receivers went to Shanghai. For example, with Ho’s visas, the parents of Israel Singer, 
secretary-general of the World Jewish Congress, sailed to the United States through the French 
port of Marseilles.
497
 Moreover, “Recha Sternbuch, a Jewish activist working out of Switzerland, 
claimed that in 1939 at least 400 Jewish refugees used Chinese visas to make their way to 
Palestine via Switzerland.”498 A JDC record of 1946 showed that about 4,000 Jewish refugees in 
Shanghai were from Austria.
499
 Ho was probably the diplomat who issued the largest number of 
visas to Jews. 
The Shanghai Times, February 5, 1939, clearly reported that: “Chinese consulates in 
Europe are granting visas to all those applying with their passports for permission to come to 
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Shanghai.”500 There was a false belief that Shanghai was the only free port in the world that did 
not need a visa because of its internationalization. It was not the case at all. The foreign 
concessions in China, including the Shanghai International Settlement, were all de jure supposed 
to be under Chinese sovereignty.  
The self-administrative systems established by foreigners in China, such as the Shanghai 
Municipal Council, enjoyed self-governing and carrying on trade, but they had no international 
legal basis. The Chinese government had already abrogated the extraterritorial rights of certain 
states after WWI. Moreover, the Washington Naval Conference and the Nine-Power Treaty, led 
by the United States in 1921, sought to abolish all the extra-territories in China and “to respect 
the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.”501 
Even though the western powers for their own interests were de facto reluctant to relinquish all 
their extraterritorial rights, they admitted Chinese sovereignty and accepted that the Chinese 
government made progress to establish it’s judicial, educational and tax systems to incorporate 
with the existing colonial ones.
502
 Since 1927, the Chinese Nationalist government had been 
building a Greater Shanghai Municipality. Although the Shanghai International Settlement still 
had the rights to govern itself, the western powers and the Chinese Nationalist government both 
agreed on an ultimate goal to abolish all the unequal treaties and return the Settlement to 
China.
503
 An article published by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
regarding the status of the International Settlement at Shanghai in 1939 affirmed that “The 
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Settlement is Chinese territory, and not, legally at any rate, a neutralized area.”504 Therefore, 
despite the historical special status of the Shanghai International Settlement and the current 
Japanese aggression, China retained the sovereignty of Shanghai and never renounced it.  
5.2.3. Sun Ke Plan – Settling Jews in China’s “Back Door” 
When the Jewish refugees with the Chinese visas landed in Shanghai, Sir Victor Sassoon 
registered them and settled them in his Embankment Building.
505
 A school on Ward Road was 
also transformed into a refugee camp which was able to house and feed 1,200 people. Until 
February 1939, altogether six Jewish refugee camps were set up.
506
  
The New York Times on December 16, 1938 reported that “Shanghai is concerned with 
raising funds to assist Jewish refugees. Those who have arrived since September and those en 
route, who are due to arrive at Christmas, total 1062, mostly from Vienna.”507 On January 9, 
1939, Dr. Kurt Marx, Secretary of the Relief Society for German and Austrian Jews, reported the 
information on Jewish refugees to the American Consul General in Shanghai, C. E. Gauss. Dr. 
Marx informed Consul General Gauss that the Shanghai Relief Society for German and Austrian 
Jews provided direct relief averaging over $70,000, Chinese currency, per month. A proposal 
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under discussion was to supply the refugees with Chinese instead of foreign food at a level close 
to the subsistence level provided for Chinese refugees by relief agencies in Shanghai.
508
 
“Even if expenditures for relief are out to the minimum,” Gauss warned that, “it is not to 
be expected that this committee will be able to secure enough funds to provide relief in-definitely 
for the number of refugees now in Shanghai unless substantial contributions are obtained, from 
abroad.” 509  Consul General Gauss sent a letter of the Jewish refugees in Shanghai, in 
quintuplicate to the State Department in Washington, copy to Embassy, Beijing, Chungking 
(Chongqing), and London on January 24, 1939.
510
 Hence the American, the British and the 
Chinese governments were all informed of the situation of Jewish refugees in Shanghai. 
The Chinese National Government in Chongqing noticed the great number of visas that 
were issued to Jews in Europe and their arrival in Shanghai, so they began to think more 
seriously about an effective way of settling Jews in China. At the moment, the Chinese 
Nationalist Government had already re-established itself at Chongqing in Southwest China. 
On February 17, 1939, “to alleviate the ‘unregulated entry into Shanghai,’” Sun Ke, 
president of the Legislative  uan, “proposed settling Jews in the southwest border region, that is 
 unnan province which was one of the regions under Nationalist control.” 511  Sun Ke’s 
perception of the Jews was based on China’s coherent ethnic policy of alliance with world 
oppressed small and weak nations to counter imperialism.
512
 As early as in January 1928, Sun Ke 
and other nationalist leaders started a round-the-world trip to study the “emancipation movement 
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among oppressed small and weak races.”513 They stopped at Manila, Singapore, Penang, Iraq, 
Egypt, Palestine, and several other countries. Sun Ke acquainted himself with the predicament of 
the Jews.  
In early 1939, Sun Ke believed that establishing the Jewish settlement not only allied 
with the oppressed races, but also prompted the British and Americans to aid China’s war against 
Japan. According to one Chinese source, Sun visited Jiang Jieshi in his Huangshan mountain 
villa and asked Jiang about his attitude to the Jewish settlement plan. Like all heads of state in 
the world, Jiang did not see any “value” in Jewish refugees, so he said he was now most worried 
about the battles against Japan in Changsha, Xiangyang, Nanchang and other places, and he had 
no time for the Jews. But fortunately enough, Jiang did not reject Sun Ke’s plan either.514 
Back in Chongqing, Sun Ke obtained wholehearted support from Kong Xiangxi, Finance 
Minister and president of the Executive Yuan. Kong was sympathetic with Jews’ plight and 
sought to settle Jews in China from the very beginning.
515
 On March 7, 1939, the Highest 
National Defense Council principally passed Sun Ke’s proposal and submitted it to the Executive 
Yuan. The Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Military, Treasury, and Transportation 
discussed the plan, and they formulated three main rules to aid Jewish refugees, on April 22: 
1. Assistance of Entry: Chinese Consulates should grant special passports to stateless 
Jews, who are recognized by the relief organizations of the League of Nations or 
internationally well-known relief organizations, to enter China; the Jews who enjoy 
this privilege should hand in an application claiming that they will abide by Chinese 
                                                             
513Levy, Two-Gun Cohen, 160. 
514Liu  ishi, “Zai Daxinan Anzhi  outairen de Muhou,” [Back Stage of the Resettlement of Jews in Southwest 
China], in Wenshi Yuebao [Literature and History Monthly], no. 10, (2002): 55-59. 
515 For the business and friendship relations between Kong Xiangxi and the Jews, see Liu, “Zai Daxinan Anzhi 
 outairen de Muhou.” 
173 
 
law and they will not spread any political propaganda or object to “The Three 
Principles of the People”516; if they violate these rules, China should deport them. 
2. Settlement after Entry: stateless Jews should temporarily settle in trading ports 
instead of hinterland; for the Jews who prefer Chinese citizenship, they should apply 
according to Chinese law and legal procedure; Jews with Chinese citizenship will 
enjoy all civil rights equally with other citizens, without any racial or religious 
discrimination. 
3. Recommendation of Employment: as most stateless Jews are in a difficult situation at 
present, it is necessary [for the Chinese government] to assist Jewish refugees in 
finding jobs; as China is in construction, the government offices need all kinds of 
experts and technicians, such as scientists, engineers, doctors, and machinists .…517 
On May 2, the Highest National Defense Council formally passed the regulations and 
submitted a secret order to the officials in all departments. Gao Bei has analyzed the political 
details of the Sun Ke plan that circulated among the Chinese officials: for instance, the Chinese 
authorities did not want to offend Germany by aiding Jews, so they emphasized that the plan was 
for “stateless” Jews. Most ironically, the warlord of  unnan Province, Long  un, suggested 




Here I will underline the practical aspect of the Sun Ke plan: Why did the Chinese 
National Government plan to settle Jews in Yunnan Province? Geographically, Yunnan 
connected Chongqing, the new capital of the Chinese National Government, and the famous 
Burma Road, which conveyed British and American supplies to China. During 1937-38, more 
than 100,000 Chinese and Burmese labors “working under American-trained engineers,” built a 
soft-surface road through rugged country, linking Lashio, in the British colony of Burma, to 
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Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province.
519
The so-called “Burma Road” was in fact 
constructed to transport material aid to China. Right after Japan’s aggression, the United States 
and Britain aided China with $50 million, an amount “small but not despicable,” in Chambers’ 
words.
520
 China used the money to pave the Burma Road and bought large trucks. Before the 
Pacific War, Britain and the United States aided China, in order to make sure China’s economy 
would not be crushed by the Japanese on the one hand; but on the other hand, the British and 
Americans avoided direct conflict with Japan for supporting China. Consequently, “the Burma 
Road circumvented the areas held by Japan and opened a back door, however steep and narrow, 
to the Chinese refuge.”521  Therefore, by settling Jews in Yunnan, China’s “back door,” the 
Chongqing Government apparently regarded Jews as a connection to the American and the 
British aid.  
When the news that China was willing to receive Jewish refugees was publicized and 
reached the United States in early 1939, Maurice William, who first planned to settle Jews in 
China and had private contact with Sun Ke, immediately met with Hu Shi, the Chinese 
ambassador to the United States. By that time, William already had joined the Chinese 
Nationalist Party, and had become secretary of the American Bureau of Medical Aid to China 
and chairman of the fundraising committee of the United Council for Civilian Relief in China, 
which was joined by Albert Einstein, Herbert Hoover, and Henry Luce (publisher 
of Time magazine).
522
 To support the Sun Ke plan, William pointed out that “Chinese and Jews 
were both victims of aggressive wars and should cooperate and provide one another with aid.”523 
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In William’s view, not only would the German Jews find refuge in China, but in return, China 
would also benefit from Jewish technical and commercial services in solving China’s problems 
of reconstruction.
524
 In addition, William emphasized that American Jews “were capable of 
providing China with help in its war with Japan.”525 Gao Bei further indicates that: “In order to 
make the Chinese government officials consider his proposal more seriously, William also wrote 
to Kong Xiangxi, Wang Zhengting (the foreign minister), and Sun Ke, respectively, in June and 
July 1939. William informed the Chinese leaders that as the chairman of the Campaign 
Committee of the United Council he had successfully collected 15,000 dollars for the project.”526 
Moreover, William proposed the plan of settling Jewish refugees in China to the U.S. 
Department of State. Robert T. Pell of the State Department's Division of European Affairs met 
William on August 31, 1939. Pell also wrote William a letter of introduction to contact the 
President’s Advisory Committee, but there was no response from the American government.527 
When William was bridging the gaps between the governments of China and the United 
States, Jakob Berglas, a German banker who took refuge in Shanghai, provided the 
implementing measures for settling 100,000 Jewish refugees in Kunming, capital of Yunnan 
Province. He suggested creating a Committee in New York responsible for raising funds. Berglas 
also made a detailed budget for the refugees’ food, housing, and transportation, which he 
believed could be applied to all emigration schemes.
528
 However, Bernhard Kahn, of the New 
 ork JDC, questioned the practicality of Berglas’ scheme, especially concerning his ambitious 
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figure of 100,000 refugees.
529
 Mr. Charles J. Liebman, President of the Refugee Economic 
Corporation in New York, summarized the Berglas plan as dubiously sound and premature.
530
 
Nevertheless, negotiating among Chongqing, Shanghai and New York, Berglas became a 
spokesman for the Jewish settlement plan in China and his plan was widely circulating among 
world Jewry.  
While the Chinese authorities and the American Jews were still negotiating on the 
feasibility of establishing a Jewish settlement in  unnan, news of the China’s plan to settle Jews 
already spread among European Jews. As a result, Jewish refugees in Europe began concentrated 
immigration to China since April 1939.  
As more than 300,000 German and Austrian Jews escaped to France, Mr. Dijour, 
secretary of the HIAS bureau in Paris, went to see Chinese Consul General Huang Tianmai 
(Huang Zheng) on April 22. Overseas, Huang did not learn the details of the Sun Ke plan, but he 
confirmed that the Chinese Government was willing to receive Jews. Huang further asked Dijour 
to use Jewish influence in the West to support China.
531
 
Even though the Jewish settlement plan was immature, refugees began to flood into 
China. Some obtained Chinese visas, and some set out illegally by bribing the transporting 
agencies. Ironically, Consul General Huang in Paris, with whom Dijour contacted for Jewish 
immigration, illegally gained profits by issuing Chinese visas. Huang signed an agreement with a 
travel agency and increased the regular visa fee to as high as 800 francs. When Gu Weijun 
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(Wellington Koo 顾维钧 1888-1985), “one of the most important and influential diplomats in 
China's modern history and the ambassador to France,” discovered Huang’s illicit business, Gu 
immediately reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, who called back Huang to China 
subsequently.
532
 According to Gao Bei:  
Gu Weijun also received a list of more than 200 European Jews who had obtained 
such visas from Consul General Huang Zheng. The Chinese embassy in Paris informed 
the French Foreign Ministry that those visas were invalid, and the Nationalist Foreign 
Ministry ordered Huang Zheng to return to China immediately.  
Although the Foreign Ministry announced in June 1939 that the Huang Zheng 
visas were invalid, representatives of the Jewish community in Paris came to the Chinese 
embassy to ask Gu Weijun if Jews could still go to China with valid visas. The Jewish 
representatives also told the ambassador that they had received information from the 
annex of the Chinese consulate general, where the visa office was located, that German 
Jews who wished to go to Shanghai could all obtain visas. Meanwhile, since Shanghai 
was then occupied by the Japanese, the Chinese consuls could not guarantee that the 
refugees would be able to land in Shanghai. The Chinese consulate general also made it 





Gao’s research clearly shows that the Chinese government officially approved collective 
Jewish immigration to China after April 1939. The route to Shanghai was the fastest and most 
familiar way to enter China, so the Jewish refugees in Paris chose to land in Shanghai. In 
addition, a large number of Jewish refugees fleeing to Shanghai came from Vienna, by virtue of 
Consul General Ho Fengshan’s effort, as discussed previously. Exceptionally, incomplete 
evidence shows that the Aid Association of German Jews (Hilfsverein der deutschenJuden) in 
Berlin, different from international HIAS and JDC, had little contact with the Chinese 
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authorities, so that a large number of German Jews, who directly departed from Berlin to 
Shanghai, might not apply for visas.
534
 
In any case, the prevalent view that a visa was not required for Shanghai is not true. Due 
to the war situations in both Europe and China, illegal transportation might be a common 
occurrence. However, as long as China maintained its sovereignty, large-scale immigration to 
China, including Shanghai, had to be accepted by China. Therefore, it was not the visa non-
requirement, but rather China’s permission that saved Jews.  
According to Yehuda Bauer, in Shanghai, “by early February, 1939, there were 2,500 
new refugees there; by the end of March, there were 4,000; by May, there were 9,000.”535 The 
number of Jews that arrived in Shanghai by May doubled the number of March. It showed that 
the majority of Jews fleeing Europe reached Shanghai just after China announced its Jewish 
settlement plan. JTA also reported that the number of the Jewish refugees dramatically reached 
8,000 in the middle of May,
536
 and more than 13,000 in July.
537
 By the middle of August, the 
Jewish refugees increased to 15,000.
538
 
During this period, Jewish relief organizations successively set up in Shanghai: “the 
International Committee (IC), set up by Sir Victor Sassoon in July 1938; and the Relief 
Committee for German Jews, established by a German Jew named Dr. Karl Marx in October, 
1938. Marx left Shanghai in 1939, and his organization became the Committee for the Assistance 
of European Jewish Refugees in Shanghai (CFA), headed by Michael Speelman, a Dutch Jewish 
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banker.”539 Sir Victor Sassoon contributed $153,053, Chinese currency, to aid in establishing 
refugees in business.
540
 The New York JDC sent funds directly to CFA. Before May 1939, JDC 
had sent $ 160,530 to Shanghai.
541
 
The Jewish relief organizations in Shanghai, which knew little about the Chinese efforts 
to rescue the Jews in Europe, believed Shanghai was a free port to land because the Chinese 
passport office, which was responsible to check passport upon docking in Shanghai, ceased to 
exist after the Japanese aggression of 1937.  
When most of the refugees found shelter in Hongkou, part of the Shanghai International 
Settlement which was occupied by the Japanese, because food and housing were cheaper there, 
the Japanese Navy banned Jews from landing in Shanghai since August 21, 1939.
542
 After 
September, the Japanese Navy and the Shanghai Municipal Council illegally created a permit 
system and closed the door to mass Jewish immigration. The Japanese policy toward the Jewish 
refugees will be analysed below. 
Japanese intervention halted the massive Jewish immigration to China since late 1939. 
Meanwhile, Japan started intensive aerial bombing of Chongqing and tried to crush Jiang Jieshi 
by cutting off his supply lines from Britain and the United States. When the Japanese extended 
its battlefronts to South East Asia in 1940, the Sun Ke plan consequently ceased.  
However, from the humane point of view, the Chinese consulates kept issuing Jews visas 
to escape from Europe in a time when China’s suffering was no less than that of the Jews. In 
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October 1940, “a letter to Lisbon and New  ork mentions clearly that the Chinese consul in 
Stockholm is granting visas without difficulties.”543 Some Jews, by airline, did reach Kunming in 
Yunnan Province, the proposed Jewish settlement in China, such as Max Kanner, Michael 
Nothman and the Karfunkel family.
544
  
Wolfgang Karfunkel and his father Hans, a German physician, seized the last opportunity 
leaving Germany and immigrated to China in fall 1940. Hans’ brother Leo and his family already 
lived in Nanjing and achieved Chinese citizenship in 1936.
545
 In August 1940, with the visas to 
Kunming and Chongqing, Wolfgang and his father “traveled on a German airline via Russia to 
Alma-Ata and then to Urumchi, on to Zhengtu, and then to Chongqing.”546 Settling down in 
Chongqing at the age of sixteen, Wolfgang soon mastered the Chinese language and eventually 
became a truck driver on the famous Burma Road. In 1949, Wolfgang married a Chinese girl 
named Sulan. The couple immigrated to Israel in 1951. In his memoir, Wolfgang missed and 
appreciated the eleven years that he lived in Chongqing during WWII.
547
 
At last, it must be mentioned that in the northwest and central China, quite a few 
righteous Jews participated in the Chinese communists’ battlefront against Japan, such as Israel 
Epstein, Hans Shippe, Ruth Weiss, Jakob Rosenfeld, Richard Frey (Stein), Sydney Sapiro and so 
on. The Tianjin Jew, Israel Epstein, and his wife-to-be Elsie, joined pro-China relief 
volunteering. Epstein, an editor for the South China Morning Post, published articles denouncing 
Japanese war crimes. Elsie was “an activist in the women’s movement to boycott Japanese silk,” 
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and “she was also involved in the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.”548 Another 
well-known example was Doctor Jakob Rosenfeld, who escaped from a Nazi concentration camp 
and operated a private clinic in Shanghai.
549
 In 1941, Rosenfeld joined the New Fourth Army in 
Subei. In 1947, Rosenfeld became a personal doctor for General Luo Ronghuan of the Northeast 
Field Army in Harbin.
550
 In addition, in October, 1941, German Jew Eva, wife of Chinese poet 
Xiao San, participated in the anti-Fascists Alliance, which was held by the Chinese communist 
leaders Mao Zedong and Zhu De in Yan’an.551 Hans Shippe, a Galician Jew, joined the Eighth 
Route Army and was killed while fighting the Japanese on the battlefield in Shandong province 
in November 1941.
552
 Thus, these Jews in China made considerable contributions to the 
worldwide anti-Fascist war.  
5.2.4. Conclusion  
 
In fact, China was the ally of the United States fighting against Japan in WWII. Wartime 
Chinese and Jews knew that they were oppressed nations suffering from militarism and fascism, 
so that they should unite with each other. Thus, the Chinese opened their door to Jewish 
refugees. By virtue of the Chinese government’s admission of Jews and American Jews’ support, 
a total of about 17,000 German and Austrian Jewish refugees successfully reached and settled in 
Shanghai by the end of 1939.
553
 Steve Hochstadt estimates that among the Jews who escaped 
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from Europe, the Shanghai refugees “made up about one of every 13 refugees during this ‘panic 
emigration,’ and probably one in 10 of those who left in 1939.”554   
In postmodern time, we get the chance to recount the miracle of Jews who survived in 
China within a whole global history by exploring the ignored Chinese and Jewish war 
experiences and cooperation. In the golden time for rescuing Jews from the Nazis, the whole 
world abandoned Jews, but only China offered a “back door.”  
 
 
Figure 14 : Kong Xiangxi  
(Image from https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%AD%94%E7%A5%A5%E7%86%99, accessed April 20, 2019) 
 
                                                             




Figure 15: Sun Ke 




Figure 16 : Ho Fengshan 





Figure 17: Jews outside the Chinese Consulate in Vienna 
(Image from http://www.sohu.com/a/305033821_616577, accessed April 28, 2019) 
 
 
Map 8: The Battle of Shanghai, 1937 





Map 9:  Yunnan Province, China 
(Map from https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Yunnan-Province-China_fig1_26849897, accessed April 25, 
2019) 
 
5.3. Japan’s Response to the Holocaust – Fascist in Disguise of Friend  
 
Along with the aspiration for the creation of a New Order in East Asia, internationally-
isolated Japan grew friendly with Nazi Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. 
Chambers comments that “by an irresistible logic, the aggressor of the East became linked with 
the aggressor of the West.”555 The alliance of Japan and Germany effectively contained the 
influence of the Soviet Union and Britain both in Europe and in Asia. Concerning the Jews, the 
Japanese not only accepted all German anti-Semitic propaganda, but they also transferred it to a 
Japanese style of prejudice against Jews. 
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5.3.1.  Playing the “Jewish Card” in Japan’s Total War 
 
Once the Japanese Imperial Army established closer ties with Adolf Hitler, Nazi paranoid 
preaching on an international Jewish conspiracy deeply convinced the contemporary Japanese 
militarists and thus anti-Semitic propaganda flooded into the Japanese media. As previous 
chapters showed, the Japanese Army was first impressed by the American banker Jacob Schiff’s 
loan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and then during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22, 
the Japanese Army picked up The Protocols of the Elders of Zion from the White Russians. 
When turning into the fascist era of the 1930s, the Japanese Army subsequently drew a 
conclusion that the Jews, who dominated both democratic America and the communist Soviet 
Union, were the ultimate enemy of Japan. Thus “Holy” Japan’s task was to “strike down the 
Jews and save Mankind.”556 Yasue Norihiro, who completed the first Japanese translation of The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, confirmed that Adolf Hitler was the only liberator of Europeans 
who were facing the increasing threat of Jewish power.
557
 
As previous chapters on Harbin Jews illustrate, Jews, like all the other nations, were also 
experiencing nationalism, socialism, colonialism and the other turmoil in the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. However, because Jews did not have a national homeland, they became the 
scapegoat for all the current conflicts among nations. Japan took advantage of the vulnerability 
of the Jews. On the one hand, the Japanese Army used Jews as “a means to control domestic 
thought and justify the war” from the middle of the 1930s until the end of WWII.558 On the other 
hand, however, while starting the War of Aggression against China in July 1937, Tokyo 
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attempted to appease international opposition by promising equal treatment to the Jews in 
Manchukuo.  
From 1935, the Jews in the United States and Britain consistently protested against the 
persecution of Jews in Manchukuo. Shanghai Zionist leader Ezra, before he died in December 
1936, wrote at least seven letters of remonstrance to Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu Mamoru.
559
 Tokyo feared to provoke the United States and Britain into economic 
sanctions against Japan. Japan’s economy, especially its military needed imported oil, largely 
“relied on access to British and American markets, and that it therefore could not afford to 
alienate these Powers.”560 Well aware of its own weakness, Tokyo had to be very cautious in 
dealing with the West. Therefore, from the summer of 1937, to appease international opposition 
to its war of aggression in China, Japan suddenly shifted its attitude to the Jews in Manchukuo 
for a strategic position.  
In August 1937, Tokyo sent General Higuchi Kiichiro (1888-1970), one of the heads of 
military intelligence, to command the Harbin Special Services Agency (SSA) of the Guandong 
Army. The Jewish expert  asue was ordered to be Higuchi’s adviser. In 1938,  asue “was 
appointed chief of the newly established SSA in Dalian (Dairen)” in south Manchuria.561 The 
Foreign Economy Bureau in the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway 
Company, led by  asue, was in charge of conducting surveys on the “Jewish Question.”562 
Furthermore, in spring 1939, Navy Captain Koreshige Inuzuka (1890-1965),  asue’s colleague 
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in the Moslem and Jewish Problem Committee in Tokyo, was officially posted to Shanghai as 
assistant to Consul Ishiguro Shiro. According to Goodman and Miyazawa, “Inuzuka’s 
prescription was to pre-empt Jewish power lest it threaten Japan and force the Japanese to resort 
to force to suppress the Jews. This was the formulation that guided him during his tenure in 
Shanghai.”563  The so called “Jewish experts” sent to Manchukuo and China mainland were 
actually powerful anti-Semitic propaganda makers in domestic Japan. 
Soon after the War of Aggression against China began, Col. Yasue arrived in Harbin and 
summoned Kaufman. According to Avraham Altman, “ asue reportedly told Kaufman that the 
Jews in Manchukuo, China and Japan should organize themselves into a single body. This 
decision must have been taken fairly high up in the military hierarchy, because the proposed 
structure bestrode the Jewish communities in four army commands: three on the mainland and 
one in Kobe, the largest community in Japan.”564 Hesitatingly, Kaufman “replied that he would 
have to consult with other communal leaders before giving his reply.”565  
However, Kaufman did not have any choice if he and the entire Harbin Jewish 
community did not want to be thrown into the Songhua River, the largest river in Harbin. The 
Japanese Gendarmerie threw Chinese who refused to cooperate into the River. According to 
Wang Tifu’s memoir, the puppet Chinese diplomat, Wang was reluctant to cooperate at first, but 
he surrendered when he saw that the Japanese Gendarmerie threw four people into the ice holes 
that they drilled on the Songhua River surface in winter.
566
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Worse than the Chinese, Harbin Jews were also facing the threat from the Russian Fascist 
Party. Repeating the persecutions of Jews in Manchukuo, in January 1937, the Japanese and the 
White Russians “staged an anti-Communist demonstration featuring violent anti-Jewish 
slogans,” on the Soviet-Manchukuo border.567 JTA reported that “The demonstrators paraded 
through the city’s streets flaunting banner and shouting, ‘Kill the Jews.’”568 Terrorized Jewish 
families had to hide in cellars and attics.
569
 Also, in early 1937, Manchukuo police arrested a 
Polish Jewish Merchant named Jacob E. Hammer, who lived in Harbin for seven years. After 
nine months of ill treatment and starvation, Jacob was executed by a secret trial on charges of 
espionage for the Soviet Union.
570
 
In the White Terror of Manchukuo, the disadvantaged Harbin Jews were destined to fall 
into the Japanese Army’s hands. The legal entity “The National Council of Far Eastern Jewish 
Communities,” which Harbin Jews strove for a long time, was finally created in Manchukuo and 
the Japanese Guandong Army was in charge of it. Moreover, the Japanese closed the Russian 
fascist newspaper  as  Pu ’, but the Japanese used the Russian fascists to monitor if Jews were 
loyal to Japan. 
In December 1937, General Higuchi, head of the Harbin SSA of the Guandong Army, 
and Kaufman, president of the Harbin Jewish Community, held the first Far East Jewish 
Conference in Harbin.
571
 Jewish delegates from Tientsin, Kobe, Dairen, Osaka, Mukden and 
other cities all attended. In the conference, Higuchi expressed Japanese friendship for the Jews, 
declaring: “While Manchukuo is basically founded on the cooperation of five peoples — 
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Japanese, Chinese, Mongols, Koreans and Russians — it will in the future gladly support loyal 
Jewish people, enabling Jews to live in peace and to establish peaceful homes here.”572 
Under the cloak of racial equality, Japan hoped to win over international support for its 
war of aggression against China. The second and third Far East Jewish Conferences were 
separately held at the end of 1938 and 1939. In the 1938 conference, as the European Jewish 
refugees started to spread in Asia, the Jewish delegates raised the immigration issue and hoped 
Japan would open the door, but the Japanese Army made more effort to urge the Jews to 
cooperate in “the holy task of Nippon and Manchukuo in establishing a new order in the East.”573 
During the conference, “ asue reported to his superiors that the Guandong Army’s guidance 
policy at the conference aimed to get the Jewish side ‘to understand the true intentions of the 
Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities, and in this way, to bring about an improvement in 
American public opinion, which has taken a turn for the worse recently and to have our 
operations vis-a-vis American Jewry yield favorable results.’”574 Around the middle of 1939, 
Yasue, Inuzuka and Ishiguro further proposed to establish a Jewish settlement to attract 
American investment. But all the requests should be made from the Jewish side, Yasue 
emphasized, “otherwise, Japan’s opponents would say that Japan acceded in order to make use of 
the Jews or to get money from them.”575 
After the second conference, “in the spring of 1939, Kaufman himself was called to Japan 
for talks with senior officials and for sightseeing…Kaufman left for Japan on May 2 
accompanied by a woman described as his Japanese wife.”576 According to Altman, “Kaufman 
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and his party arrived in Tokyo on May 9, where they put up at the Imperial Hotel. The next day 
he made a statement at a press conference held at the hotel. As reported in the Japan Times and 
Mail, he repeated his praise of Japan’s treatment of the Jews in Manchukuo and of its actions in 
China.”577 In the meeting with Higuchi at the Army Ministry in the next day, Kaufman promised 
to correct the misperceptions in England and America that Japan discriminated against Jews.
578
 
In fear of his life, amnesic Kaufman seemed to forget about the Japanese atrocities and 
enjoyed Japan’s new “friendship.” The Jewish newspaper in Harbin then “was full of praise of 
Japan.”579 On the one hand, The Evreiskaya Jizn (Jewish Life), edited by Kaufman, added an 
English version since late 1937, introduced Japanese culture and history, and advocated Japanese 
rule.
580
 Kaufman sent the English version of Jewish life to libraries in the Vatican, Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, and the American Congress.
581
 On the other hand, Meir Birman of 
HIAS in Harbin said that Kaufman censored the Jewish press.
582
 JTA news directly reported 
from Harbin ceased since early 1939. The news of Harbin from JTA was reported in Shanghai, 
Vladivostok, and other places after 1939.  
However, Kaufman was wise enough to foresee that American Jews would not believe 
him. There was no evidence of Kaufman establishing direct contact with the American Jewish 
leaders, except a fake one that was made by the Japanese.
583
 Kaufman practically asked Lew 
Zikman, the Manchurian “Sugar King,” to approach the American Jews. Zikman’s property was 
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seized by the Japanese, and he himself was personally attacked by the Russian fascists, so 
Zikman was firmly resolved to depend on Japan. Zikman proposed a plan to settle 200 Jewish 
refugee families in Manchuria and to establish a garment manufacturing plant with American 
funds.
584
 Zikman then contacted American Jewish leaders Dr. Cyrus Adler and Rabbi Stephen 
Wise.  
Nevertheless, after the United States terminated the 1911 Japan-U.S. Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation in 1939, U.S. – Japan relations further deteriorated. “In step with 
their country, American Jews did support China” against Japan. 585 In the correspondence to 
Zikman, the prominent Rabbi Wise wrote that “it is wholly vicious for Jews to give support to 
Japan, as truly Fascist a nation as Germany or Italy…a nation that is bound to take an anti-
Semitic attitude, and indeed has already done so.”586 In a boycott of Japanese goods, Rabbi Wise 
declared that “I am in favor of taking any action against Japan, short of war, or what may lead to 
war, that will make it impossible for Japan to continue its relentless and criminal war against 
China.”587 
 Apparently, Kaufman failed to convince the American Jews. Avraham Altman blamed 
Kaufman for being used by Japan.
588
 In his book, Wang Zhijun collected Jewish memoirs, which 
showed that Jews as foreigners looked down upon the Chinese natives around them, and 
indicated Kaufman hurt the Chinese people’s emotions.589 However, Takao Chizuko, by studying 
archival documents in the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, finds that as early as at the end 
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of 1935 when anti-Semitic persecutions were rampant in Harbin, Kaufman wrote to the Jewish 
Agency in Palestine and applied for collective emigration. Takao’s research shows that:  
In his letter of November 5, 1935 to the Jewish Agency, Kaufman asked whether 
or not Palestine could accept immigrants from Manchukuo, and emphasized that Jewish 
life in Manchukuo under Japan’s rule was no longer peaceful and quiet, saying “Here 
Jews’ enthusiasm for exodus to Palestine is growing daily. […] The living conditions 
here are suggestive of those of our fellow [Jews] in Germany.” 
Kaufman requested the Jewish Agency to provide information on obtaining 
category A3 visas for craftsman with small capital. In response to his request, however, 
the Palestine Jewish Agency wrote a reply dated December 31, 1935, stating that 
“Palestine primarily accepts immigrants from Warsaw, Berlin, and Bucharest. Currently 




In 1936, a Palestinian quota for Harbin Jews was impossible. In 1937, the Japanese forces 
occupied Shanghai and Tianjin, which were Harbin Jews’ pis aller resorts. The Japanese 
authorities in Tianjin arrested Simon Genn, an exporter and president of the Tianjin Jewish 
Community, and Lev Piastunovich, a Zionist Revisionist leader.
591
 Furthermore, the Japanese 
Army forced Tianjin Jews to sign individual anti-Soviet oaths.
592
 Before long, in 1938, Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany sequentially arrived in Shanghai. In that situation, Kaufman’s 
“cooperating with Japan and by actively using ‘Japan’s plan to take advantage of the Jews’”593 
was no more than expediency. 
However, did Kaufman achieve his goal to influence Japanese policy and to save Jewish 
lives? Did the anti-Semitic experts of Japan paradoxically make a pro-Jewish policy? Was it 
possible for the Japanese Army, who kidnapped and murdered Harbin Jews and enacted the 
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Nanjing Rape, to be completely merciful for the Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany? We will 
find answers in Japan’s immigration policy to the Jewish refugees.  
5.3.2.  Barred Jews from the Japanese Controlled Areas 
 
Japan did face an economic crisis after its aggression of China. On the one hand, some 
Japanese officials hoped to obtain American financial support, including creating the fugu plan to 
attract American Jewish capital, as David Kranzler elaborated in his work. However, on the other 
hand, Tokyo more and more struggled for autarky, independent from the West. Antony Best in 
his book British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, points out that 
“from 1937 Japan’s machinations against Western interests and its efforts to attain influence in 
Asia steadily escalated.”594 But well aware of its own weakness, Japan could not alienate the 
U.S. and Britain whose “economic sanctions could strangle the Japanese economy.” 595 As a 
weak and calculating power, Japan refrained from any actions that would provoke the West. 
Japan saw its high-sounding “pro-Jewish” policy as a distraction from its obvious expansion in 
Asia. Notably, Japan not only played the Jewish card, but also simultaneously disseminated a 
pro-Islamic policy and Pan-Asianism in the Middle East, India, and the other countries in South 
East Asia.
596
 The pretended “pro-Jewish” policy was only one of its multiple war strategies.  
However, when the flow of Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany to Asia 
accelerated, it was not easy for Japan to juggle its promise of racial equality to the Jews with 
restricting Jewish immigration to Asia. In late September 1938, in Vienna, “Consul General 
Yamaji Akira wrote Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, the imperial prince who was concurrently 
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foreign minister,” about Japan’s attitude to the forced Jewish emigration in Austria.597 According 
to Pamela R. Sakamoto, “the Foreign Minister responded to  amaji within a week and also 
cabled all consular offices abroad the same day. The instructions served as the basis for an 
emerging policy towards the Jews: Japan did not want ‘foreigners being expelled by Germany 
and Italy;’…apply the existing ‘regulation governing the entry of aliens into Japan’ to prevent 
people from coming.”598  
However, because Jews with German passports did not need visas to enter Japan, the 
fascist ally country,  amaji found that “it was ‘more or less impossible’ to prevent people from 
going to Japan on the basis of Japan’s foreign immigration law.”599  amaji “saw no reason for 
Japan to disguise its intentions to discourage entry when the prohibitions were so tough 
elsewhere.”600Therefore, “it would be appropriate,  amaji suggested, if the Japanese government 
declared that it was prohibiting immigration. This would not have a major negative effect on 
relations with German, Italy, or other countries.”601 Obviously,  amaji was confused by Tokyo’s 
disguise in prohibition of Jewish refugees. In Vienna, Yamaji, as well as other Japanese 
diplomats, did not learn that Tokyo was playing the Jewish card with the United States and 
Britain, rather than Germany.  
Nevertheless, when more and more Jewish refugees spread into Asia, Tokyo had to offer 
a clear policy on the Jews, rather than ambiguous instructions. On December 6, 1938, Army 
Minister Itagakic Serishiro, the prime minister, and the ministers of foreign, navy and treasury, 
held the so called “Five Ministers Conference” concerning the “Jewish problem.”  asue, 
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Inuzuka, and other Jewish experts had certain influence on the Japanese top decision-makers, but 
their influence was very limited. Tokyo was clearly aware that: “The Soviet Union and the 
Jewish people share a mutual interest. In the struggle against fascism, in particular, the Jewish 
people are seeking for cooperation between democratic states and the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
since Japan concluded the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, the Jewish people regard Japan as 
a fascist state, and the relations between the Jewish people and Japan have changed to something 
that requires extra caution.”602 Thus the five ministers formulated a more practical policy toward 
Jews, and outlined three main principles: 
1. Jews living in Japan, Manchuria, and China are to be treated fairly and in the same 
manner as other foreign nationals. No special effort to expel them is to be made. 
2. Jews entering Japan, Manchuria, and China are to be dealt with on the basis of 
existing immigration policies pertaining to other foreigners. 
3. No special effort to attract Jews to Japan, Manchuria, or China is to be made. 





Here, Japan’s fundamental policy toward Jews declared clearly that Japan would not 
make “special effort to attract Jews.” Individual Jews with investment or technology might be 
accepted, but mass Jewish immigration was impossible. For diplomatic purposes, Japan’s 
propaganda kept preaching equal treatment to the Jews, but both Manchuria and Shanghai, which 
were occupied by the Japanese Army and Navy, tightened up their Jewish immigration 
regulations.  
In Manchuria, when more and more German and Austrian Jews who took the Trans-
Siberian railway reached Harbin and Dalian, Ueda Kenkichi, Japan’s ambassador to Manchukuo, 
cabled “the German and Italian embassies in Manchukuo [to] assume responsibility for sending 
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refugees back.”604 On December 16, 1938, the New York Times reported that “probable barring 
of Jewish refugees from Manchukuo in the future was foreseen in a statement in authoritative 
quarters in Dairen today to the effect that ‘there can be no question of Manchukuo being used as 
a dumping heap for Europe.’”605  
To cover the backhanded way in which the Japanese government was impeding Jewish 
immigration, the Japanese publicized an “incident” to blame on the Jews. The New York Times 
on December 16 continued to report that: “The conviction of a group of twenty-six Harbin Jews 
was partly responsible for the new stand. These men were accused of sending agents to Tientsin 
and purchasing the yen at the rate of 31 to the British pound, then smuggling the yen into 
Manchukuo. They were then remitted abroad at the artificial official rate of 17 yen to a pound. 
This would have grown to enormous proportions, except that the legal limit of remittance abroad 
per person is ￡50 annually.”606 
Consequently, the Japanese Army “launched an anti-Semitic campaign in north China 
and Manchukuo, barring both territories to Jewish immigrants.” 607  On December 20, JTA 
reported that the Japanese Army carried out a pogrom and arrested many Jews in Dalian.
608
 Also, 
“the Japanese Consulate has refused to grant visas for ten destitute families of Jewish musicians 
from Berlin to go to Harbin, Manchukuo, where jobs had been obtained for them by the HIAS-
ICA Emigration association.”609 
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In January 1939, JTA news discovered that Japan said one thing and did another: on the 
one hand, “The Japanese Government has rejected the request of Italian Foreign Minister 
Galeazzo Ciano for cooperation with the Rome-Berlin axis in anti-Jewish measures on the 
ground of Japan’s ‘traditional policy of racial equality;’ on the other hand, “but Tokyo agreed to 
tighten up immigration regulations to prevent an increase in the present Jewish population.”610 
Jewish refugees were easily barred from Manchukuo since late 1938. However, in 
Shanghai, a traditional British sphere of influence, Japan took pains to impede Jewish 
immigration. The Japanese occupied Greater Shanghai by force in late 1937, but they did not 
have diplomatic rights and international recognition. The Japanese took over the Chinese zone by 
establishing a puppet Chinese administration. However, the Japanese did not occupy the 
Shanghai International Settlement and the French Concession, because Japan did not want to 
involve Britain, France and the United States in a war against Japan.  
On February 24, 1939, the New York Times reported that when “popular feeling in 
Shanghai was becoming steadily more anti-Japanese,” and “officials of the International 
Settlement were growing more arrogant,” the Japanese authorities threatened to abolish the 
Shanghai International Settlement and took radical measures against the Jews.
611
 The New York 
Times recorded a dialogue between Representative No Akaike and Foreign Minister Hachiro 
Arita in Tokyo: 
Mr. Akaike injected the Jews into Japan’s China problem when he declared that 
Shanghai was an ‘invulnerable foothold for the Jews,’ as well as Britain’s Far Eastern 
base. He complained that 1,500 Jewish refugees had been admitted to the Settlement with 
the result that they would be housed in a former primary school building which the 
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council had formerly refused to rent to the Japanese Army. “Mr. Akaike wanted to know 
why these Jews had been allowed to pass through Manchukuo. 
Mr. Arita answered that only eighty Jews had passed through Manchukuo – 
‘probably because the Manchukuoan Government did not want them to settle there.” He 
reminded Mr. Akaike that Japan did not discriminate against Jews and he defended the 
council’s action in granting the school building for the use of Jewish refugees.  
The popular newspaper Yomiuri dragged the Jewish issue into the China problem 
in an article declaring that Shanghai needs a surgical operation. It declares Shanghai is a 
nest of gangsters and lawbreakers, where Jewish financiers are active, anti-Japanese 
newspapers published, and terrorists sheltered. 
The demand for reform of the council, it says, is like suggesting ‘the dropping of 
an eye-lotion from a high window,’ the International Settlement is a cancer that requires 




 This report shows that the Japanese authorities intentionally dragged “the Jewish issue 
into the China problem” to balance the conflicts with Britain. Japan wanted to abolish the 
Shanghai International Settlement, but it could not afford to offend Britain. Therefore, Japan had 
to admit that Shanghai as an “invulnerable foothold for the Jews,” as Akaike declared.  
 On April 6, 1939, JTA published an article “Jewish Refugees in China Barred from 
Japanese-controlled Areas,” saying that: “The International Settlement authorities show great 
sympathy with the refugees and place no obstacles in the way of their admission, but the 
Japanese authorities are not permitting the refugees to leave the [international] settlement either 
for Northern China, or Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia and other territories under Japanese control. 
Only highly qualified specialists can, after great difficulties, obtain permission to settle in these 
territories.”613 
In April 1939, when mass Jewish immigration with Chinese visas flooded into Shanghai, 
the Japanese foreign ministry, the army and the navy immediately set up a committee for 
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countermeasures. Before Japan took firm action, it played tricks again. On May 25, 1939, Navy 
Captain Inuzuka, Consul Shiro Ishiguro and Colonel Yasue summoned Sir Victor Sassoon and 
Mr. Ellis Hayim, who represented the Shanghai Jewish community. Noticing the “serious 
shortage of funds” of the Jewish relief organizations, the Japanese revealed that “the Japanese 
themselves had tried to stop, through petitions of foreign consuls to Germany the flow of 
refugees into Shanghai.”614 From the Jewish side, Sassoon asked the Japanese authorities to 
“provide a warehouse, a school building – any kind of edifice – to serve as a shelter for the Jews 
in the area north of Shanghai.”615 But the Japanese refused Sassoon’s request.  
However, when the news was announced in August, the Japanese claimed that “acting 
upon the request of the Jewish Refugee Committee here,” the Japanese naval authorities 
prohibited new Jewish refugees in Shanghai.
616
  Thus, postwar literature critiques Sassoon, who 
represented the wealthy Shanghai Sephardi Jews, as showing cold shoulder to the Nazi refugees. 
However, it would have been impossible for Sassoon initially to request that the Japanese 
prohibit refugees. It was well-known that, after Ezra died, Sassoon and the Shanghai Jews turned 
into radical anti-Japanese. During his trip to North America in February 1939, Sassoon made 
anti-Japanese speeches in New York, Chicago, and Vancouver. According to Sakamoto, 
Sassoon’s “subject was always the same: Japan had a dire need for capital in order to achieve its 
plans of economic development in China; if the United States, Great Britain, and France stopped 
exporting to Japan, he said, the China Incident would be resolved quickly, leading to a Japanese 
withdrawal from China.”617 
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Nevertheless, the door of Shanghai was closed to Jewish refugees. New York Times on 
August 12, 1939, reported that: “Further immigration of Jewish refugees in the section of 
Shanghai’s International Settlement north of Soochow Creek was banned today by the Japanese 
Navy, effective Aug.21. The proscribed area is within the International Settlement governed by 
the Shanghai Municipal Council, but the Japanese placed it under armed occupation two years 
ago. A spokesman said the ban was imposed ‘without reference to Settlement authorities’ and 
‘by right of military conquest.’”618 
When the Japanese navy banned Jewish refugees in Shanghai “by the right of military 
conquest,” the Committee for the Assistance of European Jewish Refugees in Shanghai had to 
cooperate with the Japanese authorities for its survival. That is why the existing literature of Jews 
in Shanghai, as well as the main body of the JDC archival records, largely revealed how the 
Jewish relief organizations dealt with the Japanese authorities in Shanghai.  
By August 1939, the majority of Jewish refugees, more than 15,000 people, had already 
arrived in Shanghai. After the Japanese ban was issued, HIAS sought to remove Shanghai 
refugees to other countries. On September 17, HIAS announced it had “cabled $10,000 to the 
Refugee Aid Committee in Shanghai to finance emigration of 300 Jewish refugees from 
Germany and Austria to other countries.”619 In addition, 750 refugees registered for migration to 
the Philippine island of Mindanao.
620
 By HIAS’ intervention, in October, the Japanese Navy and 
the Shanghai Municipal Council illegally created a Shanghai entry permit system, and entry was 
“limited to refugees having relatives in the Chinese city and others possessing $400 per adult and 
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$100 per child.”621  The Japanese authorities practically refused to issue any permits. 622  But 
during the elections for members of the Shanghai Municipal Council in April 1940, the Japanese 
suddenly issued one thousand permits. The Jews sold “their vote to the Japanese for the promise 
that permits will be issued for all their relatives to come to Shanghai.”623 From fall 1939 to June 
1940, “only 1,900 Jews had arrived” in Shanghai.624  
 The reports from the New York Times and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency all indicate that 
Japan banned Jewish refugees from the Japanese controlled areas. Sakamoto, whose research 
focuses on the inner Japanese foreign ministry policy on the Jewish refugees, draws the same 
conclusion that Japanese policy was all about restrictions and prohibitions. However, Sakamoto 
cannot explain the gap between the Japanese policy and the emergence of the mass Jewish 
immigration in Shanghai, so she called it a WWII “dilemma.”  
Sakamoto did not know that when the Japanese Consul General Yamaji in Vienna 
dissuaded the Jews from immigrating to Asia, the Chinese Consul General Ho Fengshan granted 
Shanghai visas to any Jews who applied to go to China. Therefore, the Japanese policy on the 
Jewish refugees was not a dilemma, but rather a coherent prohibition. Japan’s true attitude to the 
Jews was also revealed in their policy to the Polish refugees who were stranded in Kobe in 1941.   
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5.3.3. Japanese Transportation Business was Open for Jews 
 
The invasion of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in September 1939 marked the 
beginning of WWII in Europe. For the Jews, a new wave of evacuation began. The Western 
European ports under the fascists’ control being closed, an increased flow of Eastern European 
Jewish refugees fled the Reich and German-occupied territories via the Trans-Siberian Railway, 
a route that was once used during WWI.  
The Soviet Union permitted transit by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Jews holding 
immigration visas for the United States and Palestine. The Eastern European Jews could land in 
Vladivostok and sail to Shanghai, where they could embark on Japanese steamers to the United 
States. If the Jewish refugees could obtain the Japanese and Manchukuoan transit visas, they 
would transit to the United States via the ports of Japan and Manchuria, just as it was in WWI. 
The American Jewish relief organizations arranged with the Japanese line to transport Eastern 
European Jews across the Pacific Ocean and disembark them at San Francisco. The Japanese, 
however, took advantage of the troubled situation of Jews and increased the payment for the 
trans-Pacific crossing in American dollars at the rate of $250 per person, a high fare which added 
a heavy burden on the emigrants.
625
 Japan barred Jewish refugees in its areas, but Japan allowed 
Jews to transfer to other countries via Japan.   
Even so, the Japanese Foreign Minister Arita provided a strict standard for Japanese 
transit visas: “Japanese transit visas could not be issued unless entry visas were in hand. If the 
applicant had an entry visa for another country, a Japanese transit visa should be granted, but not 
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an entry one.”626 By this standard, the Japanese and Manchukuoan diplomats, such as Chiune 
Sugihara in Kaunas, Wang Tifu in Berlin,
627
 and many other Japanese diplomats, began to issue 
transit visas to the Jews. 
  From Jewish sources, “4413 refugees arrived in Japan between July 1, 1940, and May 30, 
1941. This figure included 2074 German refugees, 2040 Polish ones, and 299 from other 
countries.”628 By August 1941, about 3,500 Jewish refugees left Japan, but the remaining 1,000, 
who held the Sugihara visas, were stranded in Japan.  
In the end of August 1940, in Kaunas, Lithuania, Japanese consul Sugihara agreed to 
issue Japanese transit visas to the Jews, in the condition that the Dutch consul Jan Zwartendijk 
granted Curaçao entry visas. Sugihara neither broke his government’s rules for issuing visas, nor 
was he punished by his government. In early February 1941, Sugihara wrote Tokyo from Prague 
that he had issued visas to 2,132 Lithuanians and Poles, among them only about 1,500 Jews.
629
 
Before Zwartendijk shut his office in August 1940, he issued about 2,200 to 2,400 Curaçao 
visas.
630
 Following him, Sugihara began to issue Japanese transit visas, so the number of 1,500 
Jews or so, who held the Sugihara visas, was reasonable. However, the more than 1,000 Polish 
Jews, including 450 rabbis and yeshiva students, never materialized in Curaçao, the Dutch 
colonized island in South America, as a reasonable destination. When their efforts to immigrant 
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At this time, Harbin once again emerged as the best place to settle the Jewish refugees. In 
early 1940, Shanghai Jews urged Harbin Jews to negotiate with the Japanese authorities, and 
sought “permission for European refugees in Shanghai who have relatives in Manchukuo to join 
them, and also for holders of special permit to enter Manchukuo from Soviet Russia, which 
hitherto has been strictly forbidden.” 632  During the Third Congress of Far-Eastern Jewish 
Communities, “Shanghai delegates reported on the critical condition of the 17,000 refugees in 
Shanghai, 80 percent of whom, they said, were unable to earn a livelihood and were ‘caught as in 
a mouse-trap’ because of the prohibition on their proceeding to the Chinese provinces and 
Manchukuo. Their position has been rendered still more difficulty by the inability of the local 
Jewish community to continue relief work on the previous scale.”633 
 Therefore, both Jews in Shanghai and Harbin wanted to secure permits for the refugees to 
enter Manchukuo. Harbin Jews would cover all costs for the refugees as they did in WWI. In 
addition, the Mir yeshiva in Kobe contacted Harbin Rabbi Kisilev about when to observe 
Shabbat and Yom Kippur. Rabbi Kisilev insisted the observations should follow the local 
calendar.
634
 Both Rabbi Kisilev and Dr. Kaufman hoped Japan could permit Jewish refugees to 
enter Harbin. That was why they agreed to cooperate with Japan.  
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Meanwhile, the Orthodox groups in New York asked the JDC to cooperate and provided 
necessary guarantees to rescue the Mir yeshiva students. Almost all the rabbinical organizations 
in New York participated financially in the rescue movement, such as Mizrachi Organization of 
America, Young Israel Council, Vaad Hahatzalah, Ezras Torah, Rabbinical Council of America, 
Zeirei Agudath Israel of America, Hapoel Hamizrachi of America, Union of Orthodox 
Congregations, Hassidei Habbad, American offices of the Yeshivath and so on.
635
 After the war, 
the rescue movement of the Mir yeshiva students stranded in “the friendly country of Japan” 
became a collective memory among the New York Jews.  
Nevertheless, the Jewish collective memory had nothing to do with practical Japanese 
policy. Japan had never expected Jewish refugees to stay in the Japanese soil. The Japanese 
consul in Moscow stopped issuing of transit visas to Polish Jews in early 1941. The irritated 
Japanese authorities in Tokyo threatened to intern all the Jewish refugees, or to deport them from 
Kobe to the island of Sakhalin in Siberia.
636
 The so-called Jewish experts, Yasue and Inuzuka, 
were forced to leave their posts separately in October 1940 and February 1942.
637
 As Japan could 
not throw all these Jewish refugees into the Pacific Ocean, the government in Tokyo finally 
decided to deport all the 1,000 stranded Jews in Kobe to the Shanghai International Settlement, 
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which was not under full control of the Japanese. Since August 1941, the Shanghai Jewish 
refugee situation became even more difficult.
638
 
 The Japanese policy to the Jews “had everything to do with restricting refugees and 
nothing to do with rescue or settlements,” as Sakamoto claims.639 However, a popular belief is 
that the Japanese saved tens of thousands of holocaust refugees during WWII by issuing them 
“life visas.” On the contrary, Japan even denied entry to 1,000 Jews, so how could it be possible 
for more refugees to be admitted?  
There are two main rumors about Jewish immigration in Manchukuo. The most well-
known is the dramatized Fugu Plan: Tamura Kozo, a Japanese industrialist in the United States, 
planned to establish a Jewish settlement of in Manchukuo. Tamura worked with Captain Inuzuka 
in Shanghai and Ayukawa Yoshisuke of Manchukuo Heavy Industries Development 
Corporation. In America, Tamura proposed his plan to several Jewish leaders, such as Rabbi 
Wise, and Dr. Bernhard Kahn of JDC. But the Japanese Guandong Army, which was the 
ultimate power, never adopted Tamura’s plan officially.640 
Less-known, but also cited by scholars, is the rumor that 20,000 Jewish refugees crossed 
the Manchuria-Soviet border and found shelter in Manchukuo in 1938. The truth is that in March 
1938, Higuchi Kiichiro, afore-mentioned head of military intelligence in Harbin, helped several 
families of Jewish refugees in Otpor, a Manchuria-Soviet border town, to enter Manchukuo.
641
 
Higuchi left his office of Harbin for Japan as of July 1938, a time before the intensive European 
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Jewish immigration reached Asia. Post-war literature exaggerates the number of “several Jewish 
families” to “20,000 Jewish lives” that were saved by Higuchi. Consequently, Higuchi was 
honored as a trustee of Japan’s Israel Association after WWII.642  
Both Jewish and Japanese sources show that Harbin Jewish population was reduced to 
less than 3,000 in 1938.
643
 The JDC report recorded that Harbin admitted in total 113 refugees 
from 1933 till 1940.
644
 It was impossible for large number of Jews to survive in other cities of 
Manchukuo either. In the letters to various Jewish organizations in Hong Kong and Shanghai, 
Meir Birman of HIAS strove to settle refugees in Chinese cities rather than in Manchukuo.
645
 
Birman himself relocated to Shanghai in September 1939.  
In addition, the Jewish leaders in Shanghai warned European refugees that “Japan’s rule 
in Shanghai might endanger Jews as much as German rule.”646 Doubting that Jewish leaders 
made an excuse to discourage Jewish immigration, Irene Eber thus critiques the indifference and 
the irresponsibility of the Jewish organizations.
647
 The postwar scholars like Eber and Kranzler 
were not acquainted with the wartime situation in China. Japan’s war in Asia indeed caused great 
terror both to natives and foreigners. Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbour, misfortune fell on 
the Jewish refugees who fled Nazi Germany only to suffer from the Japanese fascists.  
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5.3.4. Ghetto in the East 
 
By a carefully camouflaged tactic, Japan successfully played the dangerous game of cat 
and mouse with the West. When the Japanese Navy launched its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 
and the Japanese Army landed at Malaya on December 7, 1941, all the Americans and British 
were shocked. Antony Best writes that “the sense of shock was ably summed up by Sir Shenton 
Thomas who, in a letter to the Colonial Office on 17 December, noted, ‘The Jap is good. In the 
air and on land he has already done things which we didn’t expect.’”648 Also, “Churchill, who 
had consistently underestimated the Japanese, afterwards described the fall of Singapore as ‘the 
worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.’”649 Postmodern scholars satirized the 
U.S. isolationists and commented that: “fortunately for Roosevelt, both Germany and Italy 
declared war on America just four days later. America was now at war in both Europe and 
Asia.”650 
In the Pacific War, Japan dispatched its main troops from the North to South-East Asia. 
To prevent a Russian attack on its Northern frontier, Japan signed a Non-aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union in April 1941. Therefore, “Japan dared not persecute any of the thousands of 
Russian Jews and non-Jews in the regions under its control.”651 During the Pacific War, for the 
security of Manchuria, the Japanese left the Harbin Jews, most of whom were Russians, free, but 
not intact. In June 1943, the Japanese authorities closed Kaufman’s newspaper Jewish Life.652 In 
1944, the Japanese intended to place the statue of Amaterasu, the sun goddess and the most 
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important deity of the Shinto religion, in every synagogue. Rabbi Kiselev resisted under threat of 
death. The Japanese finally gave in.
653
   
The Russian Jewish community in Shanghai also remained free after Japan occupied the 
Shanghai International Settlement in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor. But the Japanese 
authorities seized the Sephardic Jews who were British subjects as hostages or anti-Axis 
elements. JTA in May 1943 reported that “The Japanese authorities have closed down the offices 
of the Sephardic community in Shanghai and confiscated its property.... At the same time they 
mobilized all Jewish mechanics and skilled laborers for forced labor. Simultaneously, Jewish 
doctors and dentists were ordered to report for work in Japanese hospitals. The Jews are being 
paid twenty-five percent of what the Japanese workers receive.”654 The wealthy Sephardic Jews 
in Shanghai lost all their fortunes during the war. Sir Elly Kadoorie died in Japanese captivity in 
February 1944.
655
 The Japanese confiscated all the extensive Jewish properties not only in 
Shanghai, but also in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the other South-East Asian regions.
656
 The 
Sephardic communities ceased to exist in the Japanese military controlled areas during the 
Pacific War.   
The most unfortunate were the Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. According to JTA in 
May 1942, “the number of Jewish refugees in Shanghai who depend on relief has grown from 
7,000 before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor to 14,000 at present. This, the report explains, is due to 
the fact that a third of the Jewish refugees in the city lost their livelihood after Japan’s entry into 
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war against the United States.” 657  Worse, Japan mimicked Germany and intensified 
discriminatory anti-Jewish measures. In November 1942, the Japanese ordered all Jewish owners 
of automobiles to display a special marker on front of their vehicles to indicate that they 
belonged to Jews. In addition, the Japanese stamped the Jewish identification papers with the 
letter “J”.658 Moreover, Jewish businesses were forced to liquidate. In March 1943, the Japanese 
police “shut down all Jewish cafes, restaurants and cabarets in Shanghai on the pretext that they 
were centers of Allied propaganda and were demoralizing Japanese troops.” 659  Japan also 
imposed the Chinese Puppet leader, Wang Jingwei, to broadcast anti-Jewish and anti-American 
propaganda in Nanjing.
660
 In June 1943, “in order to prevent the Chinese from being exploited 




Jewish life in Hongkou Ghetto was harsh and humiliating. The brutal and sadistic 
Japanese official Ghoya Kanoh was in charge of the ghetto. Ghoya called himself “King of the 
Jews,”662 “who arbitrarily issued or denied issuing a pass [to leave the ghetto] and who used 
physical violence whenever it suited him.”663 Furthermore, starvation took heavy toll among the 
Jewish refugees, who rarely obtained more than five meals a week. The Japanese authorities 
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interned the two JDC representatives in Shanghai, Laura Margolies and Manuel Siegel. JDC 
could not send money from New York to Shanghai due to the war. The relief funds were 
borrowed locally on the promise that it would be repaid by the American JDC at the end of the 
war. In addition, the Shanghai Jewish Relief Association, composed mostly of Russian Jews, 
imposed a voluntary tax upon the local Jewish population. Tianjin Jews also raised funds for 
Jewish refugee relief. Even so, 1,497 Jewish refugees, about one in tenth, died of starvation in 
the Shanghai ghetto. The surviving Jews were penniless and, in many cases, ill after years of 
internment, persecution and brutality in the Japanese occupation.
664
  
The Japanese militarists did not murder the Jewish refugees but only starved them, 
because Shanghai was a world window for Japanese rule and Japan feared that the Allied powers 
would take revenge. In October 1942, Japan released a group of Jewish refugees, 29 Polish and 
14 Czechoslovakian Jews, from Shanghai to London, under the scheme providing for the 
exchange of British and Allied citizens in the Far East.
665
  
Japanese propaganda wanted the public to believe that all its anti-Semitic activities were 
under German pressure, so that the Shanghai Jewish refugee survivors condemned the Germans 
but felt grateful to the Japanese.
666
 Nevertheless, the “Warsaw Butcher” Gestapo, Col. Josef 
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Meisinger, did have some influence on Japan but it was very limited, because Germany and 
Japan were not military allies. James R. Ross reviewed thousands of documents on the Shanghai 
Jewish refugees, and found that the Meisinger’s plot to kill Shanghai Jews, if it existed, was 
never seriously considered by the Japanese, because “the Japanese distrusted the Gestapo and 
Meisinger:”  
A recently declassified report from the Office of Naval Intelligence suggests that 
the Meisinger plot may have been fabricated by a Japanese official to extort money from 
the wealthier Russian Jews who had resisted Japanese requests for funds to assist the 
European refugees. 
Furthermore, it was the German Government, not the Japanese, who declared the 
Jews stateless in November 1941. One more reason, the Gestapo had so little influence 
over the Jewish community in Shanghai. 
The Japanese did restrict the European Jewish refugees to a ghetto after May 
1943, but not to placate the Gestapo. They were more concerned with security issues, 




 Apparently, German influence on Japan needs to be re-evaluated. Kranzler also admitted 
that his research on “the Nazi-influenced Japanese policy in the occupied territories and the 
German influence in the creation of the ghetto is not yet complete.”668  Nevertheless, Ross’ 
argument is highly in accord with my research that the Japanese were used to extort money from 
the wealthier Russian Jews and to restrict refugees’ black market activity. In any case, Japan’s 
mistreatment of the Jews, did not stem from anti-Jewish hatred but rather from political prejudice 
and practical purposes, and was self-determined.   
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5.3.5. Conclusion   
 
Since the Cold War, different from Germany, which is labelled as “evil” fascist, the case 
of Japan has been a debate: its wars in Asia are good for the economy, but only the attack on 
Pearl Harbor was stupid. Even today, Japan still justifies its series of wars as liberation of the 
Asians from the West.  
However, Japan’s military liberation caused even greater suffering for the Asians. Japan 
has never faced up to its crimes, which they deal with like “a blanket of snow...hiding all traces, 
muffling all sound.”669 Japan scholar Gavan McCormack critiques that “Japan’s war atrocities 
were arguably no less than those of Nazi Germany”: “In some respects, Japan was guilty of 
crimes which even the Nazis did not commit—trading in opium to finance the activities of its 
puppet governments, bacteriological and gas warfare, and (in China) the scorched-earth policies 
to force the evacuation of vast areas.”670  
For the Jews, post-war Japan turns into a holocaust savior. However, a careful 
examination shows that militarist Japan’s prejudice and persecution of the Jews shockingly 
coincided with Nazi Germany: in 1933, Nazi Germany forced Jews out of German public life, 
while the Japanese Army violently kidnapped and murdered Jews in Manchuria and created the 
“Kaspe File;” in 1938, when Nazis expelled Jews from Europe, the Japanese barred Jews from 
its occupied areas in Asia; during the Pacific War since 1941, Germany established death camps, 
while Japan set up Shanghai ghetto to starve Jewish refugees. Therefore, no matter what 
propaganda they proclaim, the nature of militarists and fascists is against humanity. Wartime 
Japan is a lesson to all the nations in the world.  
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Chapter VI: Epilogue 
 
6.1. The End of the Harbin Jewish Community 
  
At the end of WWII, the Shanghai Jewish refugees managed to go back to Europe or 
immigrate to other countries. Meanwhile, the Shanghai International Settlement as a treaty port 
ceased to exist anymore due to the war. According to Steve Hochsdadt, “Nearly all refugee 
families wanted to leave Shanghai as soon as possible. Very few had been able to create a life 
they wanted to continue in China. Remaining in postcolonial China after the war meant learning 
and adopting Chinese culture; only a handful of European Jews accepted that challenge.”671 
Consequently, “by the end of 1948, nearly 10,000 refugees had left Shanghai, with thousands 
still seeking a way out. About 1,700 went to Germany and Austria, 7,000 to the United States, 
and 1,000 to Australia.”672 When the State of Israel was founded in 1948, many Shanghai Jewish 
refugees also chose to immigrate to Israel.
673
  
The Jewish communities in Shanghai, Tianjin and other port cities began with the 
western colonization in China, and ended when the colonial period finished. However, the 
situation in Harbin was much different because the special history of Harbin as a Russian “white 
guard city,” which caused the Russians in Harbin, including the Russian Jews, to have no place 
to go back to.   
On August 8, 1945, based on the Yalta Conference agreement, the Soviet Union declared 
war on Japan. The Soviet Army defeated the Japanese Guandong Army and secured Harbin on 
August 18. The Soviet Union ruled Harbin until April 1946 when the Chinese communists 
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moved in. At the beginning, the Harbin Russians welcomed the Soviet Army with euphoria. 
According to Olga Bakich, “Harsh Japanese control and indoctrination in Japanese superiority 
became more and more intolerable, and a number of people turned to secret work for the Soviet 
consulate in Harbin. The arrival of the Soviet army was warmly welcomed; on the streets 
soldiers were embraced and given cigarettes, apples, sweets, and flowers. Some Harbin Russians 
helped the Red army command keep order and prevent acts of sabotage by desperate 
Japanese.”674 
 After thirteen years’ repression in Japanese Manchukuo, the Russian émigrés saw “in the 
victory of the Soviet arms in Manchuria some sign of a future resurrection of the former glory 
and power of Russia, a herald of returning Russian influence in Manchuria and a possibility of 
calmer, safer, and harmless existence for themselves in the near future.”675 Bakich wrote that 
“Almost immediately, however, celebrations, meetings, and patriotic speeches gave way to 
arrests of some 15,000 Harbin Russians” 676 with the operation of SMERSH (Death to Spies) in 
the NKVD department:  
One of the first actions of the Soviet army was to seize the documents of the 
Bureau for the Affairs of Russian Emigrés with its massive files on each Harbin Russian. 
Japanese insistence on control and records helped the USSR to lay charges for infractions 
such as collaboration with the enemy, membership in the Russian Fascist Party and in 
White Russian organizations, service in Russian detachments of the Kwantung army, and 
publication of anti-Soviet articles and books. In several instances the Soviet command, to 
save the trouble of individual arrests, called meetings of prominent public figures and 
arrested all present. Many people, however, were seized for no reason, on a denunciation 
or gossip, or again, simply for being kharbintsy [residents of Harbin]. All were taken to 
the USSR, where many were shot or perished in the camps. In August 1946, at a trial in 
Moscow, key figures of the White movement were found guilty of anti-Soviet espionage, 
sabotage, terrorism, armed struggle, and spying for Japan.  Ataman G.M. Semenov was 
hanged; the leader of Russian Fascists K. V. Rodzaevskii, Lieutenant General A. P. 
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Baksheev, Major General L.V. Vlas’evskii, B.N.Shepunov, and I.A.Mikhailov were shot; 
and Prince N. A. Ukhtomskii and L. P. Okhotin were sentenced to twenty and fifteen 




Among those arrested were the leaders of the Harbin Jewish community, including Dr. 
Kaufman and several other key leaders. Dr. Kaufman’s son, Teddy Kaufman, recalls that “After 
about two weeks of detention under very harsh conditions they were all transferred to the Harbin 
prison, on ‘Commercial (Kommercheskaya) Street,’ and from there they were transported in 
cattle wagons to the Soviet Union. At first they were held in a prisoners’ camp in Grodekovo, a 
border town along the Manchuria-Russian frontier, and were later sent to hard labor camps in 
Siberia, and other desolate areas of the Soviet Union.”678 Dr. Kaufman was jailed and became a 
camp doctor in the Soviet Union for a decade.
679
 
 The remaining Harbin Jews were supposed to apply the Soviet citizenship and many did. 
Teddy Kaufman and his friends burnt the archives of Betar, Maccabi and the relevant archives of 
the Zionist movement. Before long, the Soviet consulate in Harbin summoned all Jewish youth. 
According to Teddy Kaufman, “About three hundred youngsters answered the summons and the 
auditorium was full. In a long speech Comrade Osipov, the first secretary of the Soviet consulate 
accused the Jewish youth of being anti-Soviet, lacking faithfulness to the ‘motherland’…. and 
urged us to dismantle the Jewish youth organizations and join the Soviet youth movement.”680 
Thus, the Soviet consulate in Harbin established the Union of Soviet Youth, and spread Soviet 
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films, books and newspapers, to prepare Harbin Russians, as well as the Jews, “to be worthy of 
future residence in the Soviet Union.”681 
After the State of Israel was officially declared in 1948, Harbin Jews were eager to 
immigrate to Israel. However, “the Soviet consulate made loud noises about refusing to allow 
Soviet citizens to go there and belittled a homeland of ‘sand and stones.’”682 Even though the 
Soviet consulate granted the exit permits, Harbin Jews first had to obtain a permit to travel to 
Tianjin or another city, where they could leave for Hong Kong and from there via various 
countries to Israel. Except the Jewish leaders who were arrested and sent to the Soviet Union, 
Harbin Zionists, such as Kaufman’s family members, gradually immigrated to Israel. Rabbi 
Kiselev died in Harbin in September 1949 at the age of 83. After Rabbi Kiselev passed away, 
Rabbi Saadia Litvin, who served the community as shohet (ritual slaughterer) for thirty-five 
years, acted as the chief rabbi. In January 1950, Rabbi Litvin immigrated to Israel from 
Harbin.
683
 There were no more official rabbis in Harbin. Rabbi Levin, the first rabbi of Harbin, 
and his family immigrated to different parts of the world from Tianjin. Rabbi Levin and his wife 
Hannah had four children: Nathan, Sara, Gita (Genia) and Basia. Rabbi Levin and Basia 
immigrated to Chile, Nathan to Germany, Gita to the United States. Sara’s daughter, Marina, and 
her family are now living in the United States.
684
     
In late 1949, the Chinese Communist Party, whose troops effectively expanded during the 
anti-Japanese War, finally defeated the Chinese Nationalist Party and founded the People’s 
Republic of China. The newly-established Chinese communist government saw the Russian and 
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Jewish émigrés as Soviet Union subjects, so the Chinese authorities encouraged the former 
Russian émigrés to go back to Russia. In 1953, there were 454 Jews in Harbin, among whom, 
395 had Soviet Union citizenship (87%), 29 were stateless, 19 had Polish citizenship, 3 Israeli, 1 
Hungarian, 1 Japanese and 6 uncertain.
685
   
Notably, 3,000 Russian émigrés and their families in Shanghai, Tianjin and other cities 
were allowed to go back to the Soviet Union as early as in 1947. The Soviet Union welcomed 
these émigrés back to their motherland, and offered them job opportunities and bursaries.
686
 By 
contrast, more than 20,000 Harbin Russians, who were labeled as “belobandity (White bandits)” 
and Japanese collaborators, had nowhere to return. They remained in China until 1954 “when the 
Soviet consulate in Harbin announced to the Harbin Russians that they were granted permission 
to be ‘repatriated’ to the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Altai, and several other rough regions.”687  
Gradually Harbin Russians and Jews emigrated to the Soviet Union, Australia, Israel, and 
countries in North and South America. In November 1953, the Harbin Soviet consulate 
transformed the Harbin Jewish hospital into the Second Soviet Immigrants Hospital. In January 
1954, the Harbin Jewish council rented the building of the new synagogue to the local Public 
Security Bureau. In 1958, the remaining 294 Harbin Jews relocated the Jewish cemetery to 
Huangshan. In 1963, the Harbin Jewish community was officially closed.
688
 Hence, more than 
half a century of Jewish Diaspora in China was over.  
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6.2. Double Nostalgia 
 
In the new era after the foundation of the State of Israel, Jews who emigrated from China 
to the Holy Land retained their special identity, and they established the association of former 
residents of China, later known as Igud Yotzei Sin. In June 1951, Jews of China rented a small 
office at Mr. King's law offices on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv (moved to the Gruzenberg 
Street in 1972), where members of Igud Yotzei Sin got together and published a bulletin. The 
Bulletin collects all the memoirs and historical documents of Jews from China in Russian 
initially, and later in Hebrew and English until the present.
689
  
In 1954, Jews of China built their own synagogue with the compensation from the 
Chinese government: “as a result of development projects carried out by the Shanghai 
authorities, the Ashkenazi Synagogue in the City was demolished. The Chinese Government 
transferred to Israel via the Embassies of China and Israel in Bern, Switzerland, a sum of money, 
which was considered equal to the value of the demolished synagogue, with an explicit condition 
that the money be used to build a synagogue in Israel. The Tel-Aviv municipality donated a plot 
of land on Golan Street in Ramat Hachayal ("Shikun Shanghai" at that time). With the money 
that was received from China plus donations from ex-China residents and the Ponve family, a 
synagogue was built in memory of the Jewish communities of China. It was inaugurated in 
1962.”690 Every Sabbath, the congregation in the Synagogue prayed for their deceased family 
members and reminisced concerning their old times in China.  
For decades, the Bulletin of Igud Yotsei Sin and the synagogue of the Jews of China 
maintained “a permanent link between the former China residents of the Diaspora with their 
                                                             
689 All the information is from the official website of Igud Yotzei Sin: “About,” Association of Former Residents of 
China in Israel, accessed January 6, 2019, http://www.jewsofchina.org/about.  
690 Ibid.  
221 
 
compatriots in Israel, to strengthen their bonds with the State of Israel, to update the readers on 
the activities of the Igud, to reconstruct and publish the rich history and culture of the Jews of 
China, to signify the contribution of the Jews of China to the State of Israel and to maintain the 
memories of the Jews, ex-China residents, who passed away.”691 Moreover, Igud Yotsei Sin 
effectively bonded the Jews of China worldwide with the Jewish Far-Eastern Associations 
established in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Montreal and Sydney.  
The leaders of Igud Yotzei Sin are mainly from Harbin, such as Boris Kotz, Teddy 
Kaufman, and Yossi Klein. Two years after Israel and China officially established diplomatic 
relations, Teddy Kaufman was among the first group of Jews who went back to seek their roots 
in Harbin in August 1994. During the Cold War, because Israel and China belonged to different 
camps, they did not establish normal diplomatic relations until 1992.
692
 Teddy Kaufman’s visit to 
Harbin and the succeeding establishment of the “Israel-China Friendship Society” by Igud Yotzei 
Sin aimed to strengthen the ties between Israel and China. The Jews of China consequently 
became the live link between the two nations.  
From the Chinese side, Teddy Kaufman’s back-home journey to Harbin reminded the 
Chinese authorities and scholars the existence of the former Jewish community in China. During 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Red Guards almost destroyed the Chinese traditional sites 
and history, not to mention the destruction of the Russian and Jewish relics. Therefore, when the 
Chinese rebuilt their cities in the 1980s to 1990s, the Jewish vestiges both in Harbin, Shanghai 
and Tianjin suddenly became part of a valuable historical heritage and a means to attract tourists 
and foreign investments under the Reform and Opening-up (gaige kaifang) policy. 
                                                             
691 Ibid.  
692 For Israel and China relations, see Jonathan Goldstein and Yitzhak Shichor, eds.,   n  e-Y  ra el :  e-eva  le-
  rva  [China and Israel : from discord to concord] (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2016). 
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Consequently, the history of Harbin Jews became “a unique historical treasure and cultural 
resource … it possesses significance appealing to global Jewry.”693 
In the Chinese perspective, the former Jewish communities in China not only mark the 
Jewish contributions to the development of the Chinese cities, but also demonstrate Chinese 
people’s humanitarianism to the Jewish people who escaped persecutions and the holocaust in 
Europe and took refuge in Harbin and Shanghai. Tourists to Harbin nowadays will discover that 
the city visualizes a Jewish Harbin. The historical buildings on the Central Street, connecting the 
CER station to the Songhua riverbank, are marked as Jewish relics. The Heilongjiang Provincial 
and Harbin Municipal governments have invested $2.5 million to $3.5 million in renovating 
Jewish historical sites, including the two synagogues, the Jewish middle school, and the Jewish 
cemetery.
694
 The New Synagogue was restored by the Harbin municipality in 2004 and serves as 
the Harbin Jewish history and culture museum with a 400-photo exhibition. The Old Synagogue 
was refurbished as the city’s Concert Hall in 2013. In an interview with the JTA in 2004, Qu 
Wei, president of Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, told the JTA staff in 
Harbin that “We want to show the cooperation between the Israeli people and the Chinese 
people,” and “bring that historical friendship into current friendship.”695  
Consequently, Harbin, as well as Shanghai, have become popular tourist cities among 
Jews. The Harbin Jews, who immigrated to Israel, Germany, the United States, and Australia, are 
                                                             
693 Patrick Fuliang Shan, “Proud and Creative Jewish Community Harbin Diaspora, Jewish Memory and Sino-Israel 
Relations,” American Review of China Studies (Zhongguo yan jiu xue kan), Vol 9, (Fall 2008): 21. Shan’s article 
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eager to come back to search their roots.
696
 Helmut Stern, the renowned Jewish violinist of the 
Berlin Philharmonic, has been visiting Harbin since the late 1970s. Stern along with his parents 
escaped from Nazi Germany and lived in Harbin from 1938 to 1949. As a Holocaust survivor, 
Stern globally advertises the fact that he and his family survived in Harbin of China.
697
 Like 
Stern, more than 100 Jews every year go back to visit Harbin to pay respect to their second 
hometown.
698
 The Chinese provincial and municipal officials indorse the development of Jewish 
programs in Harbin on all economic, political, cultural and social levels. The world-reputed 
Harbin Ice Festival especially sets up a 4-day tour featuring the Jewish Sites.
699
 Jonathan 
Goldstein observes that “unlike some European Jews who retain only negative feelings toward 
their ancestral homelands,” including many members of his family toward Poland, Jewish 




The role the former Harbin Jewish community played between Jews and Chinese reached 
its climax when the former Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, visited Harbin in June 2004. 
Olmert’s family fled to China from war-torn Russia after World War I. Visiting Harbin, Olmert 
paid respects to his grandfather, who was buried in the Harbin’s Huangshan Jewish cemetery, the 
largest Jewish cemetery in East Asia with over 600 graves. "My grandfather will remain here 
forever, so this place is of great significance to me," Olmert said, “The place has become the 
                                                             
696  See “Finding Family Roots at Harbin’s Jewish Cemetery,” Zhongguo Wang, accessed May 22, 2019. 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Sep/106964.htm. 
697 Hellmut Stern,  a  ensprünge’ Lebensber     [Extramusical Escapades: A Musician's Memoirs] (Berlin: Transit, 
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symbol of the friendship between China and Israel.” 701  Furthermore, Olmert’s parents, 
Mordechai and Bella, who received professional training in Harbin, spoke some Mandarin at 
home. “Chinese culture became a part of our family’s tradition. It is my first memory from my 
childhood in Israel,” Olmert asserted, “We maintain a profound love for the Chinese people and 
are grateful for the warmth and friendship offered to the Jewish people in the early years of the 
20th century and Second World War from the people of Shanghai and Harbin.”702 Hence, the 
Olmert family, as scholar Goldstein observes, have transformed their identity from Russian Jews 
to Jews of China.
703
  
Harbin and Jews have a double nostalgia. As a result, Harbin becomes the economic, 
diplomatic and cultural bridge between Israel and China. As contemporary Israel and China both 
develop rapidly, China has almost become Israel’s largest trading partner and imports Israel’s 
new technology for military and agriculture.
704
 According to Qu Wei, Jewish business and 
investment in Harbin grew into $100 million in 2015.
705
 A Canadian Jewish journalist observes 
that “as if catching up with its own past, Harbin is eager to attract a new wave of Jewish business 
and settlers to replicate the success that the earlier legendary generation had brought.”706 
In the academic and educational fields, the Harbin Jewish History and Culture Research 
Center was founded by the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Science in Harbin in 
2000. Li Shuxiao, a specialist in the local history of Harbin, became the director of the Harbin 
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Jewish Research Center. In addition, an Israeli journalist named Dan Ben-Canaan established the 
Sino-Israel Research and Study Center in at Heilongjiang University in 2002. From 2004 to 
2006, the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, led by Qu Wei, and the Israel-
China Friendship Society, led by Teddy Kaufman, held two international seminars on “Jews of 
China,” attracting many scholars from Israel, the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia, 
France and England. Dozens of articles, books and memories have been published in Chinese, 
Hebrew, English, Russian and German, including an anthology The Homesick Feeling of Harbin 
Jews, and an album The Jews in Harbin. At the time this study is finished, the Harbin Jewish 
Archives, collected by the Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, are inaccessible to public 
researchers, but only open to designated staff. The Compilation of Documents on the Harbin 
Jewish Archives: First Compilation, which contains 15 volumes, has been recently published by 
China’s Social Sciences Academic Press. 707  The Chinese scholars take advantage of the 
historical relics so that almost all the essential academic surveys on the Harbin Jewish 
community are published in Chinese.  
Interestingly, some western scholars pay attention to the Jews of China from a post-
colonial view and saw Harbin Jews as a cultural phenomenon that a group of immigrants lived in 
a place that they never belonged to.
708
 However, when we recount this history of Jews in China, 
we find that Harbin is neither an unexpected safe heaven nor that remembering China is mere 
fancy nostalgia. The history of Harbin Jews is an epitome of the last century: first, Harbin Jews 
experienced the Russian colonial period in China; and then they witnessed the rising of both 
Chinese and Jewish nationalism after WWI; at last, the disasters of WWII almost destroyed the 
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two ancient nations and finally transformed their traditional lives and beliefs. Honored or 
humiliated, prosperous or miserable, the Chinese and the Jews once shared similar experience of 
national reconstruction and turned to each other for support. In the new era, we wish that the two 
nations revive the history, strengthen their friendship, and contribute to a peaceful world.  
  
 
Figure 18: Harbin’s Old Synagogue Concert Hall 
(Image from 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%93%88%E5%B0%94%E6%BB%A8%E8%80%81%E4%BC%9A%E5%A0%8





Figure 19: A Concert at the Old Synagogue 
(Image from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/arts/music/in-china-rejuvenating-a-classical-music-heritage-
linked-to-a-jewish-community.html?_r=3, accessed 14 April 2017) 
 
 
Map 10: A Sketch Map of the Jewish Sites in Harbin 
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